Jeffrey Moriarty

Many people believe that some things, like kidneys or sex, should not be for sale. Let us call these things “contested commodities.” Against this, Brennan and Jaworksi defend “markets without limits” (hereafter: MwL). According to this thesis: “If you may do it for free, you may do it for money” (2016, p. 10). Since we can give away our kidneys for free and have sex for free, we should be able to do these things for money. Brennan and Jaworksi deftly blend rigorous philosophical argument with the latest research in social science to counter some of the most prominent against commodification. But, I will argue, their arguments stop short of establishing MwL. Brennan and Jaworksi do not say enough in favor of markets in contested commodities.

According to an existing “environmental” narrative, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was due in part to executive compensation packages in the financial services industry that incentivized excessive risk-taking. Also according to this narrative, those who have a duty to protect society – principally, government regulators, but also firms themselves – are open to blame for how executives were paid, and must take steps to change executive compensation. This narrative is important but incomplete. I offer a supplementary “agential” narrative. According to this narrative, executives are open to blame for the financial crisis for taking socially excessive risks. Moreover, since executives can play a role in shaping their compensation, they have an obligation to ensure that it does not incentivize them to take such risks.

Justice requires giving people what they deserve. Or so many philosophers – and according to many of those philosophers, everyone else – thought for centuries. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, however, perhaps under the influence of Rawls’s (1971) desert-less theory, desert was largely cast out of discussions of distributive justice. Now it is making a comeback. In this chapter I consider recent research on the concept of desert, arguments for its requital, and connections between desert and other distributive ideals. I suggest that desert-sensitive theories of distributive justice, though they face obstacles, have a promising future.

In many places, it is possible to buy psychic services, including tarot card, palm, and mediumship readings. Yet we have powerful evidence that psychic abilities do not exist. This paper asks whether psychic services should be for sale. I begin by considering whether psychics deceive or mislead buyers. Next, I consider a harm-based argument against the sale of psychic services. Finally, I consider an argument in favor of their sale that appeals to expressive considerations. I conclude with a tentative policy recommendation: the sale of psychic services should be permitted. This is so even though much of the money spent on them will be money wasted.

The view that justice requires giving people what they deserve is both ancient and plausible. Yet many contemporary political philosophers, including John Rawls and Robert Nozick, have put forward distributive theories that give no place to desert. In this dissertation, I give reason to believe that the contemporary rejection of desert is mistaken, and that desert should be taken seriously by political philosophers. ;This project is incomplete in the sense that I do not say how seriously desert should be taken---how important it is compared to other distributive ideals . This is an important task, but I do not have the space for it. Hence, while my dissertation is an important first step in restoring desert to a place of significance in theories of distributive justice, it is not the last word. ;In chapter 1, I consider different views about what it means to be deserving, and about the necessary and sufficient conditions for desert. I do not try to solve these debates, but rather stipulate the conception of desert I am interested in. In chapter 2, I offer arguments for its use as a distributive criterion. ;In chapter 3, I consider the "metaphysical argument" against desert. Deriving from naturalistic worries about the robustness of human agency, this argument denies that people are capable of the kind of responsibility required for desert. I distinguish three versions of it, and argue that all fail. The "epistemological argument," examined in chapter 4, doubts that we can know what people deserve. In response, I suggest a way of making distribution according to desert practicable. ;I consider in chapter 5 the asymmetry of desert: the fact that desert plays an insignificant role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice, but a central role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice. I give good reason to believe the asymmetry cannot be justified, considering five potential justifications of it, and arguing that none is successful. I conclude the dissertation by summarizing what I have done, then mapping out directions for future research