Daniel Weinstock

Wendy Donner'sThe Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophyis an important and thought-provoking addition to the growing body of literature seeking to rescue Mill's practical philosophy from the rather lowly place it occupied in the estimation of many philosophers earlier this century, and to present him as a philosopher whose views form a coherent, systematic whole that can still contribute significantly to numerous moral and political debates. The book proposes an interpretation of the whole of Mill's practical philosophy, and attempts to reveal how aspects of Mill's thought, hitherto considered incompatible, actually mutually support one another. At the same time, Donner sets many of Mill's positions in the context of contemporary moral and political philosophical debates, and finds that on a number of important issues, his thought stands up rather well against more recent work.

Multicultural theory and practice have in recent years been subjected to substantial criticism. While some of these criticisms can be dismissed as grounded in discriminatory attitudes, others are less easily swept aside, as they are underwritten by values that multiculturalists tend to affirm. A harm reduction approach, that recognizes that reasonable citizens can disagree about some multicultural practices while at the same time acknowledging that attempts at prohibition are either exceedingly costly or contrary to the very values that opponents subscribe to, can provide an alternative foundation for some multicultural accommodations to which both opponents and advocates can subscribe. It involved permitting contested behaviours while imposing regulations aimed at minimizing the harms relative to shared values that they can give rise to.

Le débat entre libéraux et communautariens a fait coulé des fleuves d’encre depuis le début des années 1980 dans le domaine de la philosophie politique d’expression anglaise. Le coup d’envoi de ce débat fut sans doute la Théorie de la justice de John Rawls, publiée en 1971. Le livre suscita de la part des auteurs communautariens une vive réaction, dont les moments les plus forts furent probablement Liberalism and the Limits of Justice de Michael Sandel, Spheres of Justice de Michael Walzer, et After Virtue, d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Le projet de Rawls fut de renouveler la tradition libérale du contrat social en mettant à contribution les ressources conceptuelles des sciences économiques et de la théorie du choix rationnel. Rawls démontra que des individus auxquels on aurait ôté toute information quant à leurs traits individuants choisiraient dans une situation contractuelle hypothétique des principes de justice garantissant en premier lieu à tous une part aussi importante que possible de droits et de libertés, et établissant deuxièmement, à travers le célèbre «principe de différence» les bases d’une redistribution équitable des richesses sociales.

There is an underappreciated disconnect between the ultimate values that lie at the heart of contemporary theories of distributive justice, and the practice of state institutions. State institutions deliver “intermediate goods” – goods such as health-care, education, housing, transportation, and the like – that are instrumental to a society being distributively just, but that do not in an of themselves constitute criteria of justice. Researchers who have emphasized the “social determinants of health” provide an insight that, when generalized, point us in a direction that theorists of distributive justice should follow, that of attending not just to the instrinsic value of intermediate goods, but also to their causal contributions to realizing the values that theories of distributive justice make central. “Platforms”, which represent principle-driven attempts at designing compossible policies that attend both to the causal and to the intrinsic value of intermediate goods, should be given more importance within theories of distributive justice if such theories are to be policy-relevant, for they connect the ultimate values of these theories to the practices of state institutions

The political philosophy of health care has been characterized by considerable conceptual inflation in recent years. First, the concept of health that lies at its core has come to encompass ever-increasing aspects of individuals’ existences. And second, the emergence of the public health perspective has increased the range of resources relevant to health equity. This expansion has not been without cost. The decision to include more rather than less within the ambit of "health" is ultimately a moral/political rather than an ontological or metaphysical one, and there are several ethical reasons to define the scope of theories of distributive justice in health narrowly

Talk of harm reduction has expanded horizontally, to apply to an ever-widening range of policy domains, and vertically, becoming part of official legal and political discourse. This expansion calls for philosophical theorization. What is the best way in which to characterize harm reduction? Does it represent a distinctive ethical position? How is it best morally justified, and what are its moral limits? I distinguish two varieties of harm reduction. One of them, technocratic harm reduction, is premised on the fact of non-enforceability of prohibitionist policies. The second, deliberative harm reduction, is premised on the fact of reasonable disagreement, grounded in the fact that reasonable persons disagree about a range of controversial behaviours. I argue that deliberative harm reduction better accounts for some of harm reduction’s most attractive features, and provides a plausible way of accounting for harm reductions’s justificatory grounds and limits.

In this article, I distinguish boycotts from other kinds of superficially similar types of actions, and argue that boycotts involve at least coordinated activity on the part of the members of a group to abstain on moral grounds from otherwise normal interaction with the members of another group. Boycotts in their minimal forms do not face high justificatory hurdles, since they involve the exercise of freedom of speech, along with the exercise by members of the boycotting group of basic rights and freedoms, such as the right to associate, freedom of movement, and the like. The justificatory hurdles are greater, though not insurmountable, when boycotts involve the coercion of members of the boycotting group who either disagree with the grounds for boycott, or with the appropriateness of boycotting as a strategy to bring about a morally desirable change, or when they involve defeating the reasonable expectations of members of the boycotted group. I describe the justificatory challenges in both these cases, as well as the ways in which they can be met.

The pluralism that marks modern, pluralist liberal democracies makes compromise an attractive goal of democratic decision-making. Compromise differs from consensus in that it is viewed as sub-optimal by all parties relative to the disagreement at hand, but preferable to the absence of agreement, as long as that which is agreed to does not require by any party the sacrifice of a fundamental value. Voting does not vitiate the need for compromise in democracies, given that all practicable electoral systems are only imperfect ways of translating political preferences into democratic representation. What’s more, deliberation aimed at consensus is inappropriate, and potentially counter-productive, in the context of pluralist liberal democracies. Deliberation aimed at compromise, rather than consensus, should therefore be promoted and practiced in pluralist liberal democracies. It requires deliberative procedures distinct from those that characterize deliberation aimed at consensus, in that it requires of parties to a disagreement that they be transparent about their comprehensive conceptions of the good, in order to be able to measure the mutual concession that parties make to one another in deliberation.

Abstract:In this essay I argue that adversarial institutional systems, such as multi-party democracy, present a distinctive risk of institutional corruption, one that is particularly difficult to counteract. Institutional corruption often results not from individual malfeasance, but from perverse incentives that make it the case that agents within an institutional framework have rival institutional interests that risk pitting individual advantage against the functioning of the institution in question. Sometimes, these perverse incentives are only contingently related to the central animating logic of an institution. In these cases, immunizing institutions from the risk of corruption is not a theoretically difficult exercise. In other cases, institutions generate perverse or rival incentives in virtue of some central feature of the institution’s design, one that is also responsible for some of the institution’s more positive traits. In multi-party democratic systems, partisanship risks giving rise to too close an identification of the partisan’s interest with that of the party, to the detriment of the democratic system as a whole. But partisanship is also necessary to the functioning of such a system. Creating bulwarks that allow the positive aspects of partisanship to manifest themselves, while offsetting the aspects of partisanship through which individual advantage of democratic agents is linked too closely to party success, is a central task for the theory and practice of the institutional design of democracy.