Daniel Weinstock

Language is central to political philosophy, yet until now there has been little in the way of a common framework capable of bridging disciplines that share an interest in language, power, and ethics. Studies are predominantly carried out in isolated disciplinary silos - notably linguistics, philosophy, political science, public administration, and education. This volume proposes a new vision for understanding the political ethics of language, particularly in linguistically diverse societies, and it establishes the necessary common framework for this field of inquiry: language ethics. Through creative and constructive thinking, Language Ethics considers how to advance our understanding of the human commonalities of moral and linguistic capacities and the challenge of linguistic difference and societal interdependence. The book embraces the longstanding centrality of language to moral reasoning and reinterprets it in a manner that draws on the social and political life of real-world inter- and intralinguistic issues. Contributors to this collection are leading international experts from different disciplines and approaches whose voices add diverse insight to the discourse on ethics and language justice. Exploring social, political, and economic realities, Language Ethics illuminates the complex nexus between ethics and language and highlights the contemporary challenges facing multilingual societies, including the uncertainties, ambiguities, anxieties, and hopes that accompany them.

An implication of the negative right to reproductive freedom is that the state cannot deny people access to Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ARTs). This right, however, does not imply that the state should fund these technologies. That conclusion requires a distinct argument that would link ARTs with the satisfaction of a fundamental interest. Notice that the interest in parenting, for those who cannot procreate "naturally," can be satisfied through adoption. _Ceteris paribus_, the state is under no obligation to fund ARTs. In real-world conditions, however, all things are not equal. There are considerable obstacles to adoption, most notably financial and bureaucratic obstacles that stand in the way of people becoming parents through adoption. This chapter aims to establish that, in such circumstances, access to ARTs should be regulated through an appropriate pricing mechanism, where price is set at the level that would allow all children in need of adoption to find parents willing to adopt them.

What, if any, are the obligations of those who engage in natural sexual procreation towards the many children in need of an adoptive family? And what role, if any, can or should the state play in promoting or enforcing those obligations? Taking a state-centered perspective, this chapter reviews the difficulties the state encounters when attempting to regulate sexual procreation. Where reproductive policy can relatively easily induce potential parents who are unable to conceive naturally to adopt (by influencing the cost of assisted reproduction), it does not have this option in the case of sexual reproduction. This chapter suggests that typical regulatory options that directly impact on sexual procreation are ethically suspect. The alternative, the chapter argues, is for the state to move its focus “upstream” by shaping the background context for adoption decisions in an attempt to promote more potential parents to consider adoption instead of natural procreation.

Elizabeth Ashford argues that there exists a primary duty for citizens of affluent nations to alleviate the plight of those whose subsistence needs are currently not met. It is argued that her position underestimates the institutional requirements that must be in place in order for these needs to be met. Individual action aimed at alleviating need must be coordinated through appropriate institutions. The obligation of citizens of affluent states should be thought of as the obligation to contribute to the establishment of such institutions. But this obligation cannot be assimilated to the “primary duty” framework in the way Ashford thinks it can. We need moral concepts other than that of primary duty to express the moral urgency of the duty to contribute to the establishment of just institutions.

ABSTRACT Recent writings by philosophers such as David Miller and Yael Tamir have undertaken to provide nationalism with a normative foundation, a task which has been all but ignored by post‐War English‐language political philosophy. I identify and criticise three lines of argument which have been deployed in their writings. First, it is argued by Miller that the universalism and abstraction of rationalist moral theories have made them suspicious of ‘particularisms’ such as nationalism, but that they stem from a faulty metaethics. Against this I argue that abstraction and universality need not be grounded in a universalist metaethics, but can be derived pragmatically from the ethical needs of multicultural societies. Second, it is argued that liberal policies such as taxation and material redistribution, restrictions on immigration, as well as liberal concepts such as political obligation, presuppose the validity of the nationalist point of view. Against this I hold that nationalism never provides the strongest moral grounds for these policies and concepts, and that, in the specific case of distributive justice, it can even undermine them. And third, I examine the argument that the historical excesses of which nationalists have been guilty are actually the product of a narrow, ‘ethnic’nationalism, in contrast to which we can articulate a categorically distinct, open, ‘civic’nationalism, which would be broadly compatible with liberal political morality. I argue that the concept of civic nationalism is unstable, and that under fairly plausible and widespread empirical conditions, it either collapses back into a form of ethnic nationalism, or else becomes devoid of any recognisably nationalist content.

The publication of "The Practice of Liberal Pluralism" by Willam Galston has appeared as an event of first importance regarding contemporary theory about the relation between pluralism and liberalism. William Galston’s theory has had a visible evolution: in "Liberal Purposes", the main object is a critique of neutralism and a defence of perfectionist liberalism, whereas "Liberal Pluralism" main concern was to draw the limits of state intervention. This evolution is the object of numerous questions in the following discussion. "The Practice of Liberal Pluralism" operates an interesting synthesis on this point. Galston defines himself as a liberal pluralist such as Berlin, but although he acknowledges that conflict between values can be tragic, he minimizes this aspect in the following discussions, and considers the possibility of having prima facie duties. One of the main arguments for the defence of value pluralism is its capacity to explain the complexity of the moral universe. Galston endorses a political pluralism, which means that the sources of authority are multiple. Galston’s liberalism is very tolerant regarding non-liberal communitarian practices, although this tolerance is based on the defence of an exit right, which is a fundamental notion in his theory. In the following discussion, Galston proposes how to understand this right of exit in an adequate manner.

Deliberative democracy is a dominant paradigm in normative political philosophy. Deliberative democrats want politics to be more than a clash of contending interests, and they believe political decisions should emerge from reasoned dialogue among citizens. But can these ideals be realized in complex and unjust societies? Deliberative Democracy in Practice brings together leading scholars who explore debates in deliberative democratic theory in four areas of practice: education, constitutions and state boundaries, indigenous-settler relations, and citizen participation and public consultation. This dynamic volume casts new light on the strengths and limitations of deliberative democratic theory, offering guidance to policy makers and to students and scholars interested in democratic justice. Contributors inlcude James Bohman, Harry Brighouse, Simone Chambers, Glen Coulthard, James Fishkin, John Forester, Duncan Ivison, Micheline Milot, Henry S. Richardson, Jorge M. Valadez, and Paul Weithman.