John J. Drummond

From a position informed by the philosophical legacy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, this paper examines the idea of ‘care’ in nursing theory and philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between, on the one hand, ‘concepts’, which are the proper domain of philosophy and, on the other, ‘functives’ which are the domain of science and all other empirical matters. At first blush, this distinction and use of the word concept appears rather odd, but Deleuze and Guattari hold it to be important for reasons that go beyond the acknowledged and obvious differences between philosophy and science. In Deleuzian terms, a ‘functive’ is any proposition that makes a verifiable truth-claim about actual states of affairs, whereas a ‘concept’ is a philosophical tool that, although it is used in statements that make claims and that seek to affect our thinking on states of affairs, is not a representation of them in any verifiable (functive) sense. In this respect, philosophical concepts, and the statements in which they are used, are neither true nor false. I argue that the way in which the word ‘care’ is used in much nursing theory and philosophy conflates concept (neither true nor false) with functive (either true or false) with less than productive results. I seek to persuade that if we can gain more clarity between the use of care as a would-be functive and its use as a philosophical concept, this would strengthen the purpose of the use of the idea of care in nursing theory. This is to say that I take the view that the role of ‘care’ as a philosophical concept is to be used in statements that ‘think the event’ called nursing; that seek to be ‘worthy of the event’, but without being an actual part of the event. Finally, I show how the concept of care in nursing philosophy has been, and can continue to be, reworked to achieve the permanent task of surveying the ever-shifting planes of the event and how it is described.

The notion of community—a many that is one—is troubled in two respects: (1) On a theoretical level, given that there are many kinds of communities, what, despite their differences, do they share as communities? (2) On a practical level, communities in fact often manifest little unity riven, as they are, by factions and conflicts. After exploring the ways in which empathy as supplemented and complemented by affective dimensions of experience contributes to both the unity and disunity of communities, I shall focus on what I take to be an extreme instance of a disunified community, namely, the political community in which the disunity is institutionalized in political parties, governing administrations, and opposition movements. The focus on the disunified community, I suggest, points to a difference between those communities unified by a shared understanding of the ends and activities pursued in collective action and those communities more weakly unified by conflicting “thick” understandings of a shared “thin” understanding of the ends and activities proper to the political community.

The terms “empathy” and “sympathy” are often used interchangeably, and the terms “sympathy” and “compassion” are also often used interchangeably. In other words, empathy sympathy, and compassion seem to be one thing. I shall argue, to the contrary, that there are important differences between three. I shall distinguish empathy from sympathy and compassion on the ground that empathy is not an afective experience; I shall show how empathy underlies sympathy and compassion; and I shall clarify the nature of the three kinds of experience.

This contribution summarizes a well-known phenomenological view of empathy and argues that it underlies both the respect and the sympathy that are central to and required by well-ordered interpersonal and moral relationships. I summarize an amalgam of the views of several phenomenologists, including Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Max Scheler, and Dan Zahavi, an amalgam that I shall refer to simply as the phenomenological understanding, even though it is undoubtedly a phenomenological understanding. I then outline the way in which empathy underlies both respect and sympathy and give brief accounts of each. I shall further sketch ways in which respect and sympathy are the two affective attitudes that in their unity jointly ground our ethical lives.

Following a brief summation of the phenomenological method, the paper considers three metaethical positions adopted by phenomenologists and the implications of those positions for a normative ethics. The metaethical positions combine epistemological and ontological viewpoints. They are non-intellectualism and strong value realism as represented by the axiological views of phenomenologists such as Scheler, Meinong, Reinach, Stein, Hartmann, von Hildebrand, and Steinbock; non-intellectualism and anti-realism as represented by the freedom-centered phenomenologies of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty; and weak intellectualism and weak value realism as represented by Husserl and Drummond. The paper argues that only the third metaethical view can support a normative ethics that is consistent with the essential features of the phenomenological method, that allows for freedom in an agent’s choosing from a multiplicity of first-order goods, including vocational goods, practical identities, and life plans, available in the agent’s factical circumstances, and that provides norms governing the correctness of our actions and our obligations to others. The normative dimension is introduced, first, by the requirement that the fulfillment of first-order evaluations and choices be truthful, that is, that the evaluations be appropriate and the actions right. Second, transcendental considerations revealed in the phenomenological analysis of intentional experience disclose a notion of second-order goods of agency that universally bind agents in their exercise of freedom and their dealings with others.

The key to understanding self-identity is identifying the transcendental structures that make a temporally extended, continuous, and unified experiential life possible. Self-identity is rooted in the formal, temporalizing structure of intentional experience that underlies psychological continuity. Personal identity, by contrast, is rooted in the content of the particular flow of experience, in particular and primarily, in the convictions adopted passively or actively in reflection by a self-identical subject in the light of her social and traditional inheritances. Secondarily, a person’s identity is rooted in others’ characterizations of that person in the light of the social conventions and constructs of the cultures and traditions that have shaped the personal identity of the ones who make the attributions. Personal identity, on this view, is fundamentally rooted in beliefs, traits—especially character traits—sentiments, and moods, that is, in the subject’s convictions about the true, the good, and the right—and in the commitments to the pursuit of (apparently) worthwhile goods and to the practical identities rooted in those convictions.

This paper approaches the intentional structure of the emotions by considering three claims about that structure. The paper departs from the Brentanian and Husserlian ‘priority of presentation claim’. The PPC comprises two theses: intentional feelings and emotions are founded on presenting acts and intentional feelings and emotions are directed specifically to the value-attributes of the presented objects. The paper then considers two challenges to this claim: the equiprimordial claim and the priority of feeling claim. The EC asserts that the presentational and affective dimensions of intentional feelings and emotions are equiprimordial. I respond to this challenge to the PPC by revising it, claiming instead that the founding relations exist between the presentational and affective senses in an experience whose presenting and affective aspects are equiprimordial. The PFC grants priority to the affective, a grant which presupposes the independence of the affective from the presentational. I argue that the PFC is mistaken, and that the revision of the PPC can handle the examples on which the PFC is based.

CONTENTS An Editor's Introduction INTRODUCTORY CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW HEIDEGGER'S ACADEMIC CAREER 1909-1930 A. Background (1889-1930) B. Lehrveranstaltungen/University Education and Teaching (1909-1930) C. Heidegger's Early Occasional Writings: A Chronological Bibliography PART I: STUDENT YEARS 1. Curricula Vitae 2. Two Essays for The Academician o Authority and Freedom (1910) o On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics (1911) 3. The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy (1912) 4. Recent Research in Logic (October-December 1912) 5. Meßkirch's Triduum: A Three-day Meditation on the War (January 1915) 6. Question and Judgment (July 1915) 7. The Concept of Time in the Science of History (July 1915) 8. The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus (1915): Supplements o Author's Notice (1917) o Conclusion: The Problem of Categories (1916) 9. On Schleiermacher's Second Speech "On the Essence of Religion" (1917) PART II: EARLY FREIBURG PERIOD 10. Letter to Engelbert Krebs on his Philosophical Conversion (1919) 11. Letter to Karl L÷with on his Philosophical Identity (1921) 12. Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch (June 1922) 13. Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews (1920) 14. Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation (1922) PART III: THE MARBURG PERIOD 15. The Problem of Sin in Luther (February 1924) 16. The Concept of Time (July 1924) 17. Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle (December 1924) 18. Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview (Kassel Lectures, April 1925) 19. On the Essence of Truth, Pentecost Monday (May 24, 1926) 20. Letter Exchange with Karl L÷with on Being and Time (August 1927) 21. "Phenomenology," Draft B (of the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article), with Heidegger's Letter to Husserl (October 1927) 22. "Heidegger, Martin": Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Bultmann (1927-1928) APPENDICES: SUPPLEMENTS BY HEIDEGGER'S CONTEMPORARIES Appendix I: Academic Evaluations of Heidegger by his Teachers and Peers A. Evaluation of Martin Heidegger's Dissertation by Arthur Schneider (July 1913) B. Evaluation of Dr. Heidegger's Habilitation by Heinrich Rickert (July 1915) C. Nomination for Associate Professor at G÷ttingen (November 1922) D. Nomination for Associate Professor at Marburg (December 1922) E. Nomination for Professor at Marburg (August 1925) F. Nomination for Husserl's Chair at Freiburg (February 1928) Appendix II: Husserl and Heidegger A. Their Correspondence to and about Each Other (1914-1934) B. "For Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday" (April 8, 1929) Appendix III: Karl L÷with's Impressions of Husserl and Heidegger, 1926-1927 Annotated Glossary Bibliography of GA-Editions of the Lecture Courses Select Secondary Bibliography.

Rapaport, a professor of literature, differs from many literary critics interested in the thought of Jacques Derrida insofar as he seeks to locate Derrida within the philosophical tradition and problematic out of which Derrida's ideas, so significant for critical theory, emerge. While Rapaport considers Derrida in relation to thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, Blanchot, Joyce, and Celan, he focuses his attention on Heidegger, and Derrida's reflections on Heidegger, for there the relation between time and language central to Derrida's deconstructionism is most fruitfully to be examined.

The critical edition of Husserl's works will, upon its completion, include three volumes of Husserl's shorter essays, reviews, and lectures. These works--only some of which were published during Husserl's lifetime--have no natural home as supplementary texts to Husserl's major works and lecture-courses, and are therefore collected in separate volumes. Nijhoff published the first of these volumes in 1979; it collects works focused largely around logical issues from the years 1890-1910. The second volume, presently under review, is a more heterogenous collection than the first, and the third is still in preparation.

Philosophers contributing new ideas are commonly caught within a received philosophical vocabulary and will often coin new, technical terms. Husserl understood himself as advancing a new theory of intentionality, and he fashioned the new vocabulary of `noesis' and `noema'. But Husserl's own statements regarding the noema are ambiguous. Hence, it is no surprise that controversy has ensued. The articles in this book elucidate and clarify the notion of the noema; the book includes articles which phenomenologically describe and analyze the noemata of various experiences as well as articles which undertake the `metaphenomenological' explication of the doctrine of the noema. These two enterprises cannot be isolated from one another. Any analysis of the noema of a particular type of experience will necessarily illustrate, at least by instantiating the general notion of noema. And any metaphenomenological account of the noema itself will guide particular researches into the noemata of particular experiences.

This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “ phenomenology ”: a narrow sense and a broader sense. It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “ phenomenology ” serves to provide a more precise sense of what we might mean by “ moral phenomenology.”

CONTENTS An Editor's Introduction INTRODUCTORY CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW HEIDEGGER'S ACADEMIC CAREER 1909-1930 A. Background (1889-1930) B. Lehrveranstaltungen/University Education and Teaching (1909-1930) C. Heidegger's Early Occasional Writings: A Chronological Bibliography PART I: STUDENT YEARS 1. Curricula Vitae 2. Two Essays for The Academician o Authority and Freedom (1910) o On a Philosophical Orientation for Academics (1911) 3. The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy (1912) 4. Recent Research in Logic (October-December 1912) 5. Meßkirch's Triduum: A Three-day Meditation on the War (January 1915) 6. Question and Judgment (July 1915) 7. The Concept of Time in the Science of History (July 1915) 8. The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus (1915): Supplements o Author's Notice (1917) o Conclusion: The Problem of Categories (1916) 9. On Schleiermacher's Second Speech "On the Essence of Religion" (1917) PART II: EARLY FREIBURG PERIOD 10. Letter to Engelbert Krebs on his Philosophical Conversion (1919) 11. Letter to Karl L÷with on his Philosophical Identity (1921) 12. Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch (June 1922) 13. Critical Comments on Karl Jaspers' Psychology of Worldviews (1920) 14. Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation (1922) PART III: THE MARBURG PERIOD 15. The Problem of Sin in Luther (February 1924) 16. The Concept of Time (July 1924) 17. Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle (December 1924) 18. Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview (Kassel Lectures, April 1925) 19. On the Essence of Truth, Pentecost Monday (May 24, 1926) 20. Letter Exchange with Karl L÷with on Being and Time (August 1927) 21. "Phenomenology," Draft B (of the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article), with Heidegger's Letter to Husserl (October 1927) 22. "Heidegger, Martin": Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Bultmann (1927-1928) APPENDICES: SUPPLEMENTS BY HEIDEGGER'S CONTEMPORARIES Appendix I: Academic Evaluations of Heidegger by his Teachers and Peers A. Evaluation of Martin Heidegger's Dissertation by Arthur Schneider (July 1913) B. Evaluation of Dr. Heidegger's Habilitation by Heinrich Rickert (July 1915) C. Nomination for Associate Professor at G÷ttingen (November 1922) D. Nomination for Associate Professor at Marburg (December 1922) E. Nomination for Professor at Marburg (August 1925) F. Nomination for Husserl's Chair at Freiburg (February 1928) Appendix II: Husserl and Heidegger A. Their Correspondence to and about Each Other (1914-1934) B. "For Edmund Husserl on his Seventieth Birthday" (April 8, 1929) Appendix III: Karl L÷with's Impressions of Husserl and Heidegger, 1926-1927 Annotated Glossary Bibliography of GA-Editions of the Lecture Courses Select Secondary Bibliography.

This is a difficult book to review, primarily because it is, in a sense, not a book at all. This book not only does not but cannot yield clear and plain results; it is, I think, misconceived. It is simply a collection of some of Brentano's essays written, for the most part, in the years from 1914 to 1916. And while Kraus has been moderately successful in imposing an external unity of themes upon the work by juxtaposing thematically connected essays, he has been less than successful in establishing the desired internal unity of a clearly argued and continuously developed position.