•  143
    Phenomenological contributions to a theory of social cognition
    Husserl Studies 21 (2): 95-110. 2005.
    Hidden away in the remote corners of one of the largest parts of Husserl's Kˆrper, if we can use that word to translate Corpus, there is ein Leib , an animate body of text that reverberates not only with some of Husserl's other little known texts, but also with some of the most recent discoveries in neuroscience. These texts suggest a theory of intersubjectivity, or what psychologists term social cognition. Let me start with a proviso: whether Husserl ever fully settled on this theory is complet…Read more
  •  8
    Book reviews (review)
    with Robert S. Stufflebeam, Adina Roskies, Fred A. Keijzer, Carol Slater, Henry Cribbs, and John T. Bruer
    Philosophical Psychology 9 (4): 545-570. 1996.
  • Time in Action
    In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  55
    Consciousness and free will
    Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39 (1): 7-16. 2004.
    I argue against epiphenomenalist views that consciousness is part of and has an effect on the system in which action is generated. Those who deny free will based on recent results in neuroscience are looking for it at the wrong level of explanation. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists conside…Read more
  •  189
    In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2): 187-212. 2012.
    I clarify recently developed phenomenological approaches to social cognition. These are approaches that, drawing on developmental science, social neuroscience, and dynamic systems theory, emphasize the involvement of embodied and enactive processes together with communicative and narrative practices in contexts of intersubjective understanding. I review some of the evidence that supports these approaches. I consider a variety of criticisms leveled against them, and defend the role of phenomenolo…Read more
  •  103
    Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experience
    Atelier Phenomenologie Et Cognition: Theorie de la Cognition Et Necessité d'Une Investigation Phenomenologique. 2000.
    In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian …Read more
  •  37
    Introduction
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3). 2008.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  2
    Body: Disorders of Embodiment
    with Mette Vaever
    In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, Oxford University Press. 2004.
  •  97
    Somaesthetics and the care of the body
    Metaphilosophy 42 (3): 305-313. 2011.
    Abstract: This article poses a number of questions to Richard Shusterman concerning his concepts of somaesthetics and body consciousness in his book Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics. How do the concepts relate to the kind of forgetfulness of the body that can happen in expert performance? What is the nature of somatic reflection, and how is it different from pre-reflective awareness of the body? The article suggests that our immersed involvement and overt orienta…Read more
  •  48
    How embodied cognition is being disembodied
    The Philosophers' Magazine 68 96-102. 2015.
  • In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 539 ls There a Measure on Earth? Foundations for a Nonmetaphysical Ethics. By WERNER MARX. Trans. Thomas J. Nenon and Reginald Lilly. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. 172. (Hardcover.) (Originally published as Gibt es au/ Erden ein Mass? Grundbestimmungen einer nichtmetaphysischen Ethik. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983.) Is there a non-metaphysical earthly measure for responsible action? Marx takes his questio…Read more
  •  96
    In the past dozen years a number of theoretical models of schizophrenic symptoms have been proposed, often inspired by advances in the cognitive sciences, and especially cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps the most widely cited and influential of these is the neurocognitive model proposed by Christopher Frith (1992). Frith's influence reaches into psychiatry, neuroscience, and even philosophy. The philosopher John Campbell (1999a), for example, has called Frith's model the most parsimonious explanat…Read more
  • Fenomenologia I Nauki Kognitywne
    Wydawnictwo Rafal Marszalek. 2005.
  •  78
    The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern Hermeneutics
    Philosophy Today 37 (3): 298-305. 1993.
    The conception of paralogy, which Jean-Francois Lyotard develops in The Postmodern Condition, motivates a number of questions concerning justice and the moral life. In this paper I suggest that Lyotard's account fails to provide an adequate answer to these questions, and that a more satisfactory account of justice in paralogy can be developed by exploring the concept of phronesis. John Caputo's "ethics of dissemination," in some respects, leads us in this direction. Although both theorists attem…Read more
  •  937
    Metzinger's matrix: Living the virtual life with a real body
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11. 2005.
    Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on a non-Cartesian concept of reality, the self should be considered something real, and …Read more
  •  108
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependen…Read more