Margit Gaffal

Wittgenstein used the concept of language games to refer to all forms of linguistic expression in practical contexts and to the myriad ways in which signs are used in language. He used the term to specify speaking as an activity and to relate it to a form of life. Wittgenstein was well aware that his proposal for "language games" did not solve the central problems of language. Until today, the essential characteristics of the concept remain unspecified. The contributors in this volume analyze the reasons for the difficulties in understanding the concept and propose new essential characteristics and contents, by examining language games such as certainty and error, belief, strategy, and their linguistic foundations.

To what extent can we doubt certainties? How are certainties expressed in words? Which language games convey certainty? To answer these questions we have to recall the method Wittgenstein used in his investigations. When we look at language games and forms of life as inseparable phenomena, do forms of life then provide any certainty? On the other hand, do we automatically relapse into relativism once we doubt certainties? Which formal structures underlie certainty and doubt? The book is intended to answer these questions

The book links the concept of intention to human action. It provides answers to questions like: Why do we act intentionally? Which impact do reasons and motives have on our decisions? Certain events are identified as intentional actions when they are considered as being rationalized by reasons. The linguistic description of such events enables us to reveal the structure of intention. The mental and the linguistic constitute irreducible ways of understanding events. Among the topics discussed are intentionality, actions, the linguistic form to talk about intentionality and actions, Brentano’s view of intentionality, the phenomenological approach to intention and Wittgenstein's proposals. The contributions by Wolfgang Künne, Peter Simons, Christian Bermes, Kevin Mulligan, Severin Schroeder, António Marques, Margit Gaffal, Michel Le Du, Jesús Padilla Gálvez, Bernhard Obsieger and Amir Horowitz show that actions and decisions are guided by intentional considerations.

It has sometimes been argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy is marked by relativism. According to this view people view general concepts in relative terms due to different considerations and perceptions. More specifically, there is a tendency among some philosophers to assign the Wittgensteinian concept of form of life to the idea of culture. The argument goes like this: as language games and forms of life develop within a particular culture and cultures are different they are no absolute phenomena but rather relative depending on the frame within which they developed. I would like to take up this thought and examine whether we can find any relativistic position in Wittgenstein’s writings. The question is whether the existence of a multitude of forms of life points to any sort of relativism. Many philosophers have speculated over the significant concept of “form of life”. There has been an ongoing debate over the question whether the concept is to be understood in the singular or in the plural. The discussion here revolves around the question of whether there is only one prevailing form of life to which others can be subsumed. Or else, is there a variety of coexisting forms of life of equal value?

The Nash equilibrium describes a principle according to which negotiators use strategies to maximize their profits. To this aim, negotiators have no incentive to modify their negotiation tactics. However, this balance may begin to sway if we analyze the negotiators’ preferences in more detail. In fact, the principle becomes very complex if we study the linguistic discrepancies of the terms involved in a negotiation. In this article we will first, study the preferences that are generated when certain terms are negotiated. Second, the terms are examined with regard to the whole context and third, according to their binding effect. Finally, linguistic discrepancies that may arise from different interpretations of terms will be analyzed. We will refer to the solutions provided by the legal system for such cases.

n this paper I propose that any action attained through education and for-mation is embedded in a person’s form of life. The experiences that one was exposed to in early socialisation are crucial for the construction of a form of life. Actions are not regarded as acts per se or solely conceived of as singular move-ments but they are linguistically introduced and practiced. Someone’s acting or behaving in a specific way becomes manifest in language. Individuals com-municate with each other through a combination of speech acts. Selection and arrangement of language actions are not random but follow certain patterns. In line with L. Wittgenstein’s view, human conduct is characterized by a process of rule-following. The assumption of rule-governed language actions forms the starting point of this investigation. The context in which human actions proceed shall be investigated in three steps. First, we will establish a conceptual frame-work within which actions take place. Second, the relationship between lan-guage games and forms of life shall be examined. And third, form of life will be analysed in the broad context of society.

This volume sets out from the assumption that emergent forms of life find some of their most complex and challenging expressions in literature. Arguably, literary forms have always played an important role in giving form to life; they raise important questions about which forms of life are desirable or valuable, they imagine alternative life-forms, and they aesthetically embody the tensions between various conflicting forms of life. As understood here, then, the concept 'forms of life' refers at once to cultural life-forms and to the literary forms and styles that incorporate and interrogate them. Covering a wide range of Anglophone literary texts, the essays in this volume strive towards a critical analysis of the links between stylistic devices, formal procedures, and narrative techniques, on the one hand, and emergent forms of life, on the other. By reframing and theorizing the Wittgensteinian concept of 'forms of life' from a literary-critical perspective, the volume aims to enlarge the conceptual and interpretative repertoire of literary and cultural studies and to furnish the study of narrative fiction as well as of other genres with new descriptive and analytical resources.

This chapter deals with Kasimir Twardowski’s detailed explanations on representation. After a brief overview of the origins of representation, its constituting parts and their role in the formation of judgments are examined. The article explores the ontology of objects and makes reference to indirect representations. It points to the relevance that Twardowski ascribed to representations for the formation of ethical and aesthetic judgments. Finally, the author analyses the terms function and construct and explains their significance for the creation of meaning.

In this article we have pointed out the importance that the language has for law. Their interdependence affects many areas ranging from the process of law building to its application and the scientific analysis of law. We have dealt with the syntactic and semantic characteristics of the language for legal purposes. The globalization process has produced a demand for a harmonisation of the laws. Language and translation have a predominant role in the harmonisation process because the citizens’ access to legal rules and legislation can only be guaranteed through language. The translation of law involves necessarily a comparative legal analysis between the version of the first language and that of the second language. Therefore we have outlined some problems that are associated with the translation and analysis of legal texts. The aim of legal interpretation is to ascertain a meaning to a legal norm. It is an essential tool in legal practice and is situated within legal hermeneutics denoting the methodology of interpretation. In the process of legal interpretation the wording of the legal norm is not just to be understood according to its literal meaning. Thus a contract does not need to be interpreted if the wording is clear and free of misunderstandings. However, if it is vague or ambiguous the general rules of interpretation apply