Margit Gaffal

Wilhelm Dilthey defines the specific nature of understanding utilizing two aspects: on the one hand, understanding is a comprehension of connections, typically regarding the relation between a whole and its parts. Understanding captures the meaning of something according to this relation: We understand an episode from its function within a story, a text from its words and sentences. On the other hand, understanding consists of understanding something as an expression. We understand cultural and historical facts as objectifications of individual and social life. The triad life-expression-understanding forms the structural framework of hermeneutics. Eventually, understanding implies self-understanding. Therefore autobiography, for Dilthey, is the paradigm of understanding.

If we ascribe someone an intention we presuppose that his actions are directed towards a goal. The origin of the word “intention” is derived from the Latin word “tendere” which means “to strain” or “tense” (a muscle) and together with the prefix “in” the word denotes someone’s “focusing on” or “being directed at an object”. If someone intends to do something one is directed towards an ob-jective. Whereas intention is a set of coordinated acts as part of an overall en-deavour to achieve X, the objective is X itself. In English the expression intention is used for a determination to act in a certain way. The related expression ‘purpose’ denotes as well an intention or plan but additionally points to the reason for an action. German has the two expressions ‘Intention’ and ‘Absicht’. Both are synonymous but with ‘Absicht’ it is usually assumed that measures have been taken to achieve an envisaged objective. As such it was particularly used in Austrian officialese of the state administration in the late 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century. Whereas “intention” points to a person’s orientation or tendency towards an aim, “Ab-sicht” implies an elaborated plan ready to be put in practice. The word “Zweck” corresponds to purpose in English and refers to aspects, such as the function, benefit or application of an objective.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the philosophical conditions of understanding. It is based on Wittgenstein’s talk on understanding recorded by Moritz Schlick. The first two sections contain an overview of the meaning of ‘understand’ and the diversity of language games in which ‘understand’ is used, respectively. The third part deals with the mode in which psychological states are expressed and analyses fallacies produced by the combining of scientific with prescientific expressions. The fourth section is dedicated to the nature of ambiguous concepts and the role of grammar. Finally, the question of what it means to understand a piece of art is discussed by comparing visual language to verbal language.