•  14
    Analytical Philosophy
    Philosophical Review 77 (4): 500. 1968.
  •  22
    Stories, Pictures, Arguments
    Philosophy 62 (240). 1987.
    There is a tradition of philosophy—a conception we can easily under-stand as a limit of a tendency of our own thinking—that philosophy consists only of argument. The rest of the vast prepon-derance of words in philosophical texts is simply embroidery. ‘Naturally’, it will be conceded, actual philosophy books contain more or less of verbal pictures, words and phrases whose purpose is to evoke images, and many stories—examples, hard cases for definitions, and 4 anecdotes. These, it will be said, ‘…Read more
  • Subjecting and Objecting
    Philosophy 60 (231): 138-140. 1985.
  • In Sensible Judgment
    Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 16 (1): 203-225. 2012.
    The article focuses on the support to the position of Hannah Arendt that taste and feelings have roles in having sensible judgment. It mentions the pleasure that are derived from judgment such as aesthetic judgment and judging what is right. It states that Arendt argues that judgment should be used to defeat moral epithets.
  •  106
    David Armstrong and perception
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): 80-88. 1963.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  874
    Remembering
    with C. B. Martin
    Philosophical Review 75 (April): 161-96. 1966.
  •  41
    Popper's problem of an empirical basis
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3). 1968.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  30
    I exist
    Mind 76 (304): 583-586. 1967.
  •  79
    Bonney on Saying and Disbelieving
    Analysis 27 (6). 1967.
  •  39
    Some recollections of Ryle and remarks on his notion of negative action
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3). 1982.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  18
    In Sensible Judgement
    Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 16 (1): 203-225. 2012.
    Only in being pleased at what is done can I judge it as right. Kant is correct, nevertheless, then my motive is not the object of my judgment's concern. In working to make a good judgment, it is not pleasure but die right result that one seeks. In taking the jury's decision to be right, one is pleased at it—one takes pleasure in it. At the same time, it would shift attention from judgment's proper object to find the point of die justice of the decision in one's having been pleased.
  •  7
    Developing a reading of some of Beauvoir and Sartre's most influential writings in philosophy, Max Deutscher explores contemporary philosophy in the light of the phenomenological tradition within which Being and Nothingness and The Second Sex occurred as striking events operating on the border of the modern and the 'post-modern'. Deutscher traces the shifts of genre that produce their gendered philosophies, and responds in terms of contemporary experience to the mood and the arguments of their w…Read more
  •  24
    ARMSTRONG, D. M.: "Belief, Truth and Knowledge"
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (n/a): 162. 1976.