Rafael Ferber

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone by Bruno CentroneRafael FerberBruno Centrone. La seconda polis: Introduzione alle Leggi di Platone. Rome: Carocci Editore, 2021. Pp. 348. Paperback, €32.30.After the death of some of the great Italian scholars who devoted a considerable part of their lifetimes to the study of Socrates and Plato, including Gabriele Giannantoni (1932–98), Margherita Isnardi Parente (1928–2008), Giovanni Reale (1931–2014), and Mario Vegetti (1937–2018), a new generation of Italian scholars has moved to center stage. One outstanding member of this group is Bruno Centrone of the University of Pisa, who has been productive for decades, even more so in recent years. After editing, inter alia, the collected articles of Gabriele Giannantoni in Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2005) and publishing numerous translations with commentary of Platonic dialogues, he has now also written an extensive introduction to Plato's Laws.The Laws is one of Plato's last dialogues. Its main speaker is an Athenian, in whose voice we may discover, at least in part, the voice of Plato. In his soul, according to a saying of Paul Friedländer (1882–1968), cohabited "Socrates and Solon" (Platone [Milan: Bompiano, 2004], 1127). On the one hand, Plato remains a loyal pupil of Socrates in the Laws, one who defends and refines the Socratic dicta that virtue is knowledge and that nobody does wrong willingly (see 731c1–5, 860d1). On the other hand, he lays out the laws for the imaginary city of Magnesia. Hence, Aristotle writes, "Most of the Laws consists, in fact of laws, and [Plato] has said little about the constitution. He wishes to make it more generally attainable by actual city-states, yet he gradually turns it back towards the Republic" (Politics 2, 1265a1–4). Surely, the Laws was also written for "actual city-states," and especially also "for the ears of the younger generation" and the "Guardians of the Laws in charge of education" (811d4–6, trans. Trevor Saunders [London: Penguin Books, 1970]). It is interesting to note in this context that the Athenian starts from an institutionalist view of the law as the "common dogma of a state [dogma poleôs koinon]" (644d3) before proceeding to his own conception of the law as "reason's distribution": "we should run our public and our private life, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what is immortal in us, and dignify this distribution of reason [tou nou dianomê] with the name of 'law' [nomos]" (713e8–714a2, trans. Trevor Saunders with modification).The Third Letter, whether or not it was written by Plato, tells us that Plato had been working with Dionysius on "preambles" (prooimia) (Ep. III, 316a3). In fact, in a passage in the Laws, we are told that the legislator ought to use two methods: persuasion and force (722b6). Force corresponds to the laws themselves and persuasion to the preambles to the laws (prooimia nomôn) (722d2). The Laws contains not only laws, but also prefaces to the laws, which are persuasive in a way that is similar to the discourses of the free physician addressed to his patients, with logoi "close to philosophizing" (tou philosophein engys chrômenon tois logois) (875d2). Notably, the word 'philosophy' (philosophia) does not appear in the Laws, which is not really a "pure" philosophical work and was not intended by its author to be so, with the exception of some passages in the tenth book, where the deus-mensura thesis is stated (716c) and which also contains proof of the priority of the soul (see 896a–d). The Laws represents Plato's descent into the cave.Centrone rightly draws our attention to the fact that Plato, who via Socrates in the famous digression in the Theaetetus recommends the flight from "here to there [enthenden ekeise]" [End Page 325] (176b8–c1), descends into the cave in the Laws, that is, addresses the details of legislation. But, as Centrone rightly observes, these are merely two sides of the same coin (321). In the Theaetetus, Plato, in the guise of the Platonic Socrates, recommends leaving the cave, while in the Laws, he returns...

Since 1976, when Thomas A. Szlezák held his inaugural lecture as a private lecturer at the University of Zurich entitled "The Dialogue Form and Esotericism: On the Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogue the Phaedrus", the now-emeritus professor at Tübingen has advocated a particular interpretation of the Platonic dialogues and especially of the Phaedrus: namely, that what is referred to in the latter dialogue—without further explanation—as "more valuable" than what is set down in writing corresponds to Plato's "so called unwritten doctrines", or for Szlezák, "unwritten...

This paper contains a proposal for a free, nonzero-rest-mass particle’s proper spacetime, determined exclusively by the particle’s rest mass \ and numbers. The approach defines proper time as de Broglie time, which is isomorphic to a sequence of natural numbers \ that count de Broglie time units \\). The approach is based on defining the spatial coordinate as proper following the constructive definition of positive and negative integers as all possible differences of ordered pairs of natural numbers multiplied by the Compton unit \\). The spatial and temporal coordinates that form the particle’s proper spacetime are constructed as Euclidean projections of the de Broglie time. The corresponding expression in the form of an energy-momentum relation reveals the existence, aside from the rest energy term \, of an additional energy term of the same order of magnitude, which is related to large intervals of the \-particle’s proper space. The relation of the numbers-based approach to the foundations of the special theory of relativity and of quantum mechanics is discussed.

This book provides an introduction to six key concepts within philosophy: philosophy itself, language, knowledge, truth, being and the good. At the same time, it aims to initiate its readers into the processes of philosophical thinking. The book is addressed to students and lay persons, but also contains new ideas for specialists. It is written in a clear, accessible and engaging style. The German version appeared in eight editions and the second revised and updated English editon has the potential to become a key textbook for an international audience.

This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images but that “consistency should suffice for truth” (‘the non-standard interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo.

The paper gives (I) a short introduction to Aristotle’s theory of the soul in distinction to Plato’s and tries again (II) to answer the question of whether the individual or the general active mind of human beings is immortal by interpreting “When separated (χωρισθεìς)” (de An. III, 5, 430a22) as the decisive argument for the latter view. This strategy of limiting the question has the advantage of avoiding the probably undecidable question of whether this active νοῦς is human or divine. The paper closes with an outlook (III) on the Christian belief in the resurrection of body and soul in a spiritual body (σῶμα πνευματικóν) (1 Corinthians: 15, 44) by accentuating the ethical aspect of the belief in individual immortality as a “need of reason” (Vernunftbedürfnis) (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, A 256–258).

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good.

The article treats again the question of whether «the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent ?» (Rufus Jones, 1863 1948). Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940 2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) in dignity and power, but on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first (I.) the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then (II.), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third (III.), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9 10 and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good.

The paper deals with the "deuteros plous", literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s "Phaedo", the key passage being Phd. 99e4–100a3. The second voyage refers to what Plato’s Socrates calls his “flight into the logoi”. Elaborating on the subject, the author first (I) provides a non-standard interpretation of the passage in question, and then (II) outlines the philosophical problem that it seems to imply, and, finally, (III) tries to apply this philosophical problem to the "ultimate final proof" of immortality and to draw an analogy with the ontological argument for the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th "Meditation". The main points are as follows: (a) the “flight into the logoi” can have two different interpretations, a common one and an astonishing one, and (b) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th "Meditation" and the "ultimate final proof" for the immortality of the soul in the "Phaedo".

The article again treats the question of whether ≪the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent?≫. Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being in dignity and power, but, on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then, it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third, it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9‑10, and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good.

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms “the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori” in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence and the form of a fact. Both transform the identity of thinking and being first formulated by Parmenides “... to gar auto noein estin te kai einai“ (D/K.B3)

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word "is", their theories share a common feature: "is" does not have a normative meaning, but a constative meaning. This paper, however, shows (1) that there is a normative meaning of "is" (and correspondingly a constative meaning of the word "ought") and (2) that the ambiguity of "is" is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, the paper proposes (3) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and normative "is". Thereby, it is possible to attack Searle's famous argument against Hume's law.

Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory theories: If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y” means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. In “Key concepts in philosophy”, Sankt Augustin 2015, institutionalism is explained further (p.184-191) and confined to what Hegel has called “Sittlichkeit” that is customary morality in in distinction to the “morality” of my personal consciousness (p.212-213):

What distinguishes the Socrates of the early from the Socrates of the middle dialogues? According to a well-known opinion, the “dividing line” lies in the difference between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of action. Whereas for the Platonic Socrates of the early dialogues, all desires are good-dependent, for the Platonic Socrates of the middle dialogues, there are good-independent desires. The paper argues first that this “dividing line” is blurred in the "Symposium", and second that we have in the "Symposium" a more distinctive dividing line, namely the introduction of the separate existence of the idea of beauty. This introduction by Diotima/Plato of separate ideas and the lack of understanding of separate ideas – here the idea of beauty – by Socrates may have been the limit not only of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues, but of the historical Socrates as well.

The paper puts forward that the basic principle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (4.0312) transforms the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments a priori in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (A158/B197) from a level of reason to the level of language. Both philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, put forward a transcendental principle and both hold a formal identity true, Kant an identity between the form of experience and the form of the object of experience, Wittgenstein an identity between the form of a sentence and the form of a fact.

The article is the shortened English version of the article “Was und wie hat Sokrates gewusst?” Elenchos: Rivista di studi sul pensiero antico, 28, 5-39. First, it states a set of seven “knowledge-claims” made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge. 2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody willingly does wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. 7. The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the “few” but “very important” things that Socrates claims to know. Second, it tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed “knowledge” of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paper is the comparison of the Socratic knowledge-claims with the upper states of the mind symbolized in the Divided Line, noesis and dianoia.

In the whole Corpus Platonicum, we find in principle only one "direct argument" (Charles Kahn) for the existence of the ideas (Tim.51d3-51e6). The purpose of the article is to analyse this argument and to answer the question of why Plato in the Timaeus again defended the existence of the ideas despite the objections in the Parmenides. He defended it again because the latent presupposition of the apories in the Parmenides, the substantial view of sensibles, is removed through the introduction of space as "substantialized extension". First (I) it is shown that Plato remained in dialogues, like the Sophist and Politicus, faithful to the "theory of ideas" despite his criticism in the Parmenides. The common theme in the trilogy of the Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus is to refute relativism by showing that any relativism presupposes something absolute that is something like the "theory of ideas". The second part of the paper (II) examines closely the logical structure of the argument for the existence of ideas in the Timaeus (51d3-52a7). The third part (III) shows how this argument can avoid the criticism of ideas in the Parmenides. In the Parmenides, sensibles are treated as substantial entities. But, as the Timaeus shows, sensibles are not substantial entities but merely qualities, namely qualities of space, which is the only substance in the sensible world. A shortened English version of the paper appeared in Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum, Granada, Selected papers, ed. by T. Calvo/L. Brisson, Academia Verlag, St. Augustin, 1997, 179-186. But the only "direct argument" (Tim.51d3-51e6) seems to be interestingly flawed. Cf. Ferber, Rafael; Hiltbrunner, Thomas, (2005).