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9Chapter Six. “Consciousness... is inseparable from thinking”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 42-49. 2011.
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9Chapter Two. “Person”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 5-16. 2011.
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8Chapter Sixteen. A Fatal Error of Locke’s?In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 125-130. 2011.
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8Chapter Five. ConsciousnessIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 30-41. 2011.
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8Chapter Eight. “Person”—Locke’s DefinitionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 58-71. 2011.
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7Chapter Eleven. Psychological ConnectednessIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 88-92. 2011.
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6Chapter Fourteen. “And therefore... ”: [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfersIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 110-118. 2011.
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4Chapter Seven. “From the inside”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 50-57. 2011.
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4Chapter Eighteen. The Distinction between [P] and [S]In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 135-138. 2011.
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4SelvesIn B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, . pp. 541-564. 2009.
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4Chapter Twenty. ConclusionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 150-156. 2011.
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4Chapter Nineteen. Concernment and RepentanceIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 139-149. 2011.
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4Chapter Seventeen. Circularity?In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 131-134. 2011.
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4Chapter Fifteen. “A fatal error of theirs”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 119-124. 2011.
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4ReferencesIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 253-258. 2011.
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3Chapter Four. ConcernmentIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 22-29. 2011.
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3Chapter Twelve. TransitionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 93-96. 2011.
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3IndexIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 259-261. 2011.
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2David Hume: Objects and PowerIn Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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Dreams of final responsibilityIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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The Secrets of All Hearts' : Locke on personal identityIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind, Self and Person, Cambridge University Press. 2015.
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Hume on Personal IdentityIn Lorne Falkenstein (ed.), Hume and the Contemporary 'Common Sense' Critique of Hume, Oxford University Press. 2016.This paper considers Hume’s account of personal identity in his Treatise of Human Nature. It argues for three connected claims. Hume does not endorse a “bundle theory” of mind, according to which the mind or self is simply a “bundle” of perceptions; he thinks that “the essence of the mind [is] unknown to us.” Hume does not deny the existence of subjects of experience; he does not endorse a “no self” or “no ownership” view. Hume does not claim that the subject of experience is not encountered in …Read more