David Martínez

This paper argues that there is a thread in the philosophy of E. Tugendhat binding together his moral and justice theories with his conceptual analysis. Oriented by the thesis that a conceptual analysis is necessary to explain what justice is, this paper reconstructs some aspects of Tugendhat’s philosophy. It is divided in four sections: First, I delve into the author’s definition and use of conceptual analysis. Second, I describe some features of Tugendhat’s moral theory of contractualism. Third, I examine his theory of justice. Fourth, I conclude by framing my analysis within the debate between Rawls’s and Tugendhat’s theories of justice.

Resumen: El artículo discute el componente kantiano en la teoría democrática deliberativa. Parte sosteniendo que Kant no solo incorpora derechos individuales sino que también la idea de soberanía popular. Este pensador considera la democracia, pero un sistema de principios tiene prioridad normativa respecto de la práctica de autolegislación colectiva. Después, el escrito muestra que la teoría democrática habermasiana elabora un argumento similar al kantiano. Por tanto, no reconstruye el balance entre derechos y democracia como pretende sino de forma similar a como lo hace Kant.: This article discusses the Kantian component in the theory of deliberative democracy. It begins claiming that Kant not only incorporates individual rights but also the idea of popular sovereignty: This author values democracy; however, a system of principles has normative priority over the practice of collective self-determination. The text later shows that Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy elaborates a Kantian justification. Thus, it does not reconstruct the balance between rights and democracy as it claims to do; it rather builds an argument similar to Kant’s.