Nadia Urbinati

In this paper I try to unpack the nest of issues that recent waves of migrations bring to the floor and show how immigration plays a crucial role in the making or unmaking democratic citizenship in post-national Europe. Although recurrent terrorist attacks make harder and harder for many opinion-makers and ordinary citizens to associate immigration with positive opportunity for European citizenship, the paper argues that the right to free movement and of emigration is embedded in the nucleus of principles and ideals that makes for European citizenship since the Treaty of Rome. Subsequently, the paper introduces the category of statelessness and uses it to tackle the problem of the legal and political evolution furthered by the practice of rights within the horizon that is defined by the ideal of a European post-national citizenship. Refugees and immigrants are interpreted as a challenge and an opportunity in the spirit of Hannah Arendt’s intuition that citizenship brings to the floor an unsolvable paradox between the human and the political. The conclusion of the paper argues that stateless people—the migrants—personify this paradox as they can be the locus of a new political practice that signals an incipient form of citizenship, truly disconnected from the nation as the European citizenship aspires to be. The denial of many civil and political rights to undocumented immigrants and the detention of thousands of migrants in the camps located at the peripheries of Europe contrast radically with the community of rights that Europe has sought to be since its inception.

The concept of individualism has gone through a fundamental change, according to distinguished political theorist Nadia Urbinati. In the nineteenth century, individualism was a philosophical and ethical perspective that permitted each person to respect and cooperate with others as equals in rights and dignity for the betterment of the community as a whole. Today, the individualist is a more self-interested entity whose maxim might best be expressed as “I don’t give a damn.” This contemporary form of individualism is possessive and conformist, litigious and docile, all too prone to manipulate norms and to submit to the tyrannical sway of private interests. As such, Urbinati believes, it represents the most radical risk that modern democracy currently faces. This well-reasoned and thought-provoking polemic is an attempt to detect the “tyranny of the moderns,” with the ultimate aim of recovering the role of the individual citizen as a free and equal agent of democratic society. It explores the concept of communitarianism as a form of individualism applied to the group itself, and advances the idea that the rescue of true individualism from the current ideology is a basic condition for the defense of democratic citizenship.

Speak your mind, always. Hypocrisy challenges this rule of authenticity, and for this very reason hypocrisy is judged negatively, as intentional inconsistency between thoughts and words, between belief and behaviour. Does this make the hypocrite a silent saboteur of the moral order? A person who hides in the shadows and erodes the foundations of trust? Without trust there is no society, no friendship, no love. But is hypocrisy always reprehensible? Nadia Urbinati argues that society, friendship and love all require a measure of hypocrisy – what she calls ‘virtuous hypocrisy’. If we were always uncompromisingly honest in public, it would be a disaster for everyone. Sometimes it is better to refrain from speaking your mind: hypocrisy can be a form of civility and a sign of maturity and autonomy. And in politics too, a degree of hypocrisy and inconsistency is essential. The important thing is to understand when and within what limits hypocrisy can be justified, and to avoid it becoming systematic and leading to outright lying and deception. Urbinati does not praise hypocrisy unconditionally but argues that a degree of hypocrisy is essential to the smooth functioning of our social and political life. This perceptive reappraisal of a much-maligned concept will be of interest to students and academics in politics and political theory and to a wide general readership.

This paper recovers and develops the normative justification of political parties that procedural democracy offers. In contrast to the prevalent neglect or grudging acceptance of parties as a necessary evil within democratic theory, we argue for the vital role of parties in ensuring equal political freedom. We expose the anti-party spirit of three core contemporary views of democracy—epistemic democracy, populism, and realism—and explain how their proposals to transcend, transform, or accept parties as sheer instruments threaten equal political freedom. We identify, instead, the key functions that, according to procedural democracy, parties perform for guaranteeing equal political freedom: ensuring citizen influence by rebalancing power relations, self-enforcing rules and controlling leadership, and practicing and educating in democratic mores. These functions may be used as criteria to judge existing parties and their capacity to strengthen democracy as well as to imagine and construct new and better ones. For each function, we specify its relation to equal political freedom, suggest what parties could do to better accomplish it, and indicate how their failure to do so can make democracy cease to be such.

Justice as equality of political rights, not just civil liberties, is at the heart of Elisabetta Galeotti’s theory of recognition, a component of liberalism and a “positive” form of toleration. However, recognition is an eminently political issue, a claim of representation. Placing it within the liberal model of toleration involves asking liberalism more than it can give and recognition less than it can provide. Toleration is a liberal policy of non-interference and containment of political power. However, recognition demands more politics and, in this sense, is more inclined toward democratic participation and, as a claim of representation, is primed to generate rather than sedate conflicts.

This article focuses on the relationship between ‘the social’ and ‘the political’, or more precisely, between a society of individuals and associations on the one hand and the domain of political deliberation on the other. Its main goal is to understand whether the transformation of intermediary bodies in politics (the parties) reflects a transformation of intermediary bodies in society; its hypothesis is that society does not experience a decline of intermediary bodies, but rather their unequal distribution among citizens, whereby, to be schematic, the ‘strong’ parts of society enjoy more power of intermediation than the ‘weak’ parts, with predictable effects as regards the power to influence politics and determine policy choices; its main idea is that the erosion of political moderation and the growth of radicalization start outside parties, in the extra-institutional socio-political relations between citizens or where social intermediate bodies grow and operate.

More than five hundred years after Machiavelli wrote The Prince, his landmark treatise on the pragmatic application of power remains a pivot point for debates on political thought. While scholars continue to investigate interpretations of The Prince in different contexts throughout history, from the Renaissance to the Risorgimento and Italian unification, other fruitful lines of research explore how Machiavelli’s ideas about power and leadership can further our understanding of contemporary political circumstances. With Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict, David Johnston, Nadia Urbinati, and Camila Vergara have brought together the most recent research on The Prince, with contributions from many of the leading scholars of Machiavelli, including Quentin Skinner, Harvey Mansfield, Erica Benner, John McCormick, and Giovanni Giorgini. Organized into four sections, the book focuses first on Machiavelli’s place in the history of political thought: Is he the last of the ancients or the creator of a new, distinctly modern conception of politics? And what might the answer to this question reveal about the impact of these disparate traditions on the founding of modern political philosophy? The second section contrasts current understandings of Machiavelli’s view of virtues in The Prince. The relationship between political leaders, popular power, and liberty is another perennial problem in studies of Machiavelli, and the third section develops several claims about that relationship. Finally, the fourth section explores the legacy of Machiavelli within the republican tradition of political thought and his relevance to enduring political issues.

In the context of the ongoing Common Knowledge symposium “Antipolitics,” this article responds skeptically to the numerous contributions calling for the supplanting of elections by sortition. While lottocracy is proposed as a solution to the flaws of electoral democracy — notably, corruption and violent partisanship — this response focuses on a single theoretical issue: the logic of chance or randomness, which, according to its proponents, should rid politics of corruption and relieve representation of partisanship so as to ultimately prevent the formation of a ruling class separate from the rest of society. The problem with the solution, according to this essay, is that, however useful in many ways, the lottery system of lawmaking is not democratic.

On September 3, 2015, the Political Epistemology/ideas, Knowledge, and Politics section of the American Political Science Association sponsored a roundtable on epistemic democracy as part of the APSA’s annual meetings. Chairing the roundtable was Daniel Viehoff, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. The other participants were Jack Knight, Department of Political Science and the Law School, Duke University; Hélène Landemore, Department of Political Science, Yale University; and Nadia Urbinati, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. We thank the participants for permission to republish their remarks, which they edited for clarity after the fact.

Before proceeding, I would like to clarify briefly two interpretative premises, one methodological and one normative, which sustain my argument. Understanding the transformations facing constitutional democratic societies is a demanding task. These transformations, whose multiple causes are socio-economic not merely political, reflect on the one hand in the decline of mass party form of organization and on the other in the success of populism as not simply a movement of contestation but as a ruling power. In this article, I will suggest that the successes of populism are connected to the decline of organized parties, the pillar of constitutional democracy as it emerged after 1945. It is impossible to predict whether populism will succeed in becoming the new form of democracy. It is, however, certain that contemporary representative governments are facing astonishing mutations and the decline of the party form of representative unification of claims and ideas is one of them. My argument relies upon a phenomenology of populism as a movement that is strong in proportion as organized parties are weak, which actually capitalizes on a revolt against intermediary bodies such as parties. 1