Manuel Dr. Knoll

This paper examines Aristotle’s two famous claims that man is by nature a political animal, and that he is the only animal who possesses speech and reason (logos). Aristotle’s thesis that man is by nature a political animal is inextricably linked with his thesis that the polis exists by nature. This paper examines the argument that Aristotle develops in Pol. I. 2 to support these two theses. It argues a) that the definition of man as an animal who possesses logos is part of this argument, b) that in the chapter Aristotle understands the term “political animal” not in a broad biological sense but in a narrow sense, c) that Aristotle’s thesis that the polis is “by nature prior to the household and to the individual” is not an independent third theorem – as David Keyt and Fred D. Miller claim – but is part of this argument.

The paper examines Martha Nussbaum’s «Aristotelian Social Democracy», and in particular her appropriation of Aristotle’s political philosophy. The paper questions Nussbaum’s claim that Aristotle’s account of human nature and her capabilities approach are not metaphysical. It critically analyses Nussbaum’s egalitarian interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of distributive justice, laying out the primary reasons supporting the thesis that Nussbaum’s «Aristotelian Social Democracy» is incompatible with Aristotle’s non-egalitarian political philosophy

The cardinal role that notions of respect and self-respect play in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has already been abundantly examined in the literature. However, it has hardly been noticed that these notions are also central for Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice. Respect and self-respect are not only central topics of his chapter on “recognition”, but constitute a central aim of his whole theory of justice. This paper substantiates this thesis and elucidates Walzer’s criticism of Rawls’s that we need to distinguish between “self-respect” and “self-esteem”.

After presenting an overview of the research on Nietzsche’s political thought, this article discusses Robert C. Holub’s book Nietzsche’s Jewish Problem. While Holub talks about Nietzsche’s “eugenic calculations”, he does not mention his notion of a “great politics”, which aims at breeding superior humans. This notion is central for Hugo Drochon’s Nietzsche’s Great Politics and Gary Shapiro’s Nietzsche’s Earth. Great Events, Great Politics, which are critically examined in the article. Shapiro’s “postmodern” interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought neglects Zarathustra’s crucial statement that “The Übermensch is the meaning of the earth”. Drochon uses Bernard Williams’s four criteria to define what a “coherent politics” is. Drochon’s arguments that Nietzsche is indeed a political thinker are persuasive. However, William’s criteria are not sufficient and need to be amended.

Die Forschung hat bislang entweder bemängelt, dass Nietzsches Philosophie ein Begriff von szialer Gerechtigkeit fehlt oder had einen solchen kaum in den Blick bekommen. Im Gegensatz dazu argumentiert der Aufsatz dafür, dass der sozialen Gerechtigkeit in Nietzsches politischem Denken eine zentrale Rolle zukommt. Er zeigt, dass das antike Vorbild seiner Gerechtigkeitsauffasseng Platons Begriff der politischen Gerechrigkeit ist. Die Kernthese des Aufsatzes ist, dass diese Gerechtigkeitsauffassung in Nietzsches Konzeption einer guten Ordnung des Staates und der Gesellschaft enthalten oder verkörpert ist. eine weitere These betrifft das anthropologische Fundament von Nietzsches Vision einer gerechten Gesellschaftsordnung. Dieses Fundament bildet seine Grundüberzegung, dass die Menschen nicht bloß fundamental ungleich sind, sondern dass ihnen auch ein äußerst ungleicher Wert und Rang zukommt.Up to now researchers have maintained that Nietzsche's philosophy has no concept of social justice or have hardly noticed such a concept. On the contrary, the essay argues that social justice plays an important role in Nietzsche's political thinking. It shows that his conception of justice is modelled after Plato's antique concept of political justice. The main thesis of the essay is that this conception is embodied in Nietzsche's notion of a well-ordered state or society. An additional thesis concerns the anthropological basis of what Nietzsche holds to be a just social order. This basis is constituted by his conviction that people are not only fundamentally unequal but also extremely different in worth and rank

This article starts off with a historical section showing that deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political thought. Since no agreement or consensus on distributive justice is possible, the article argues that political philosophers should – instead of continuously proposing new normative theories of justice – focus on analyzing the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagreements. The next two sections are analytical. The first sketches five possible reasons for deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice. The second discusses the meta-ethical relevance of the lack of consensus on justice and rejects ethical realism and cognitivism based on the argument from deep disagreements.

Up to now researchers have maintained that Nietzsche’s philosophy has no concept of social justice or have hardly noticed such a concept. On the contrary, this article argues that social justice plays an important role in Nietzsche’s political thinking. It shows that his conception of justice is modelled after Plato’s antique concept of political justice. The main thesis of the paper is that this conception is embodied in Nietzsche’s notion of a well-ordered state or society. An additional thesis concerns the anthropological basis of what Nietzsche holds to be a just social order. This basis is constituted by his conviction that people are not only fundamentally unequal but also extremely different in worth and rank.

The cardinal role that notions of respect and self-respect play in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has already been abundantly examined in the literature. In contrast, it has hardly been noticed that these notions are also central to Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice. Respect and self-respect are not only central topics of his chapter “Recognition”, but constitute a central aim of a “complex egalitarian society” and of Walzer’s theory of justice. This paper substantiates this thesis and elucidates Walzer’s criticism of Rawls that we need to distinguish between “self-respect” and “self-esteem”.

This article examines Machiavelli’s image of humanity. It argues against the prevailing views that characterize it either as pessimistic or optimistic and defends the thesis that the Florentine has a realist image of humanity. Machiavelli is a psychological egoist who conceives of man as a being whose actions are motivated by his drives, appetites, and passions, which lead him often to immoral behavior. Man’s main drives are “ambition” (ambizione) and “avarice” (avarizia). This article also investigates Machiavelli’s concept of nature and shows that, for him, the constancy of human nature is the central premise that makes the scientific analysis of politics possible. Despite the fact that human drives and capabilities are the same at all times, good laws, military training, and religion allow man to be changed and educated toward “virtue” (virtù). To make such changes in man, however, presupposes a good legal and political order. Machiavelli justifies the state because of its capacity to reshape human nature and to improve man. The state is not only a coercive power but a moral institution. This leads to the conclusion that Machiavelli does not separate politics from morality as most scholars claim.

English summary: How Niccolo Machiavelli is to be understood is still passionately argued today. The many facets of his political thought correspond to the diversity of perspectives among his interpreters. The authors of this interdisciplinary volume analyze Machiavelli's works in connection with transformations of thought on policy, rule and morality from the beginning of the early modern period through to the present. In addition to the interpretation of Machiavelli through the lens of his time, effects of his writings and thought in contemporary discourse are focused upon. Topics not only include Machiavelli's relationship to the modern concept of the state and his experimental morality, but also his demonological style of reading and his presence amongst contemporary republicans and liberals, amongst thinkers such as Max Horkheimer and Michel Foucault, as well as in the empire debate. Additionally, the volume takes into account thus far little-explored aspects, such as Machiavelli's thinking style and methodology, as well as the literary-rhetorical dimension of his writings. German text. German description: Bis heute wird leidenschaftlich darueber gestritten, wie Niccolo Machiavelli verstanden werden muss. Dem Facettenreichtum seines politischen Denkens entspricht die Vielfalt der Perspektiven und Urteile seiner Interpreten. Die Autoren des interdisziplinar angelegten Bandes analysieren Machiavellis Werke im Zusammenhang mit den spiegelbildlichen Wandlungen des Denkens ueber Ordnung, Herrschaft und Moral zu Beginn der Neuzeit und in der Gegenwart. Ausser der Interpretation Machiavellis aus dem Horizont seiner Zeit stehen auch seine Wirkungen in zeitgenossischen Diskursen im Mittelpunkt. Themen sind nicht bloss Machiavellis Verhaltnis zum modernen Staatsbegriff und seine experimentelle Moral, sondern auch seine damonologische Leseweise und seine Prasenz bei zeitgenossischen Republikanern und Liberalisten, bei Denkern wie Max Horkheimer und Michel Foucault sowie in der Empire-Debatte. Zudem beruecksichtigt der Band bislang wenig erforschte Aspekte wie Machiavellis Denkstil und Methode sowie die literarisch-rhetorische Dimension seiner Schriften.