Ai Yuan

Taking a comparative approach, this chapter argues that while Laozi’s thought contains a notion of toleration, it goes far beyond the Western conception of it. Laozi’s advocated care and love for all people is suggestive of his preferred attitude and style of toleration. The principled method of wuwei 無為 or “nonaction” suggests a kind of noninterference, which also contains a tendency toward toleration. However, Laozi’s purpose and highest goal is the peace and harmony of the whole world, which is all-inclusive and all-embracing. Advocacy of toleration cannot resolve the situation wherein almost everywhere in the world order and peace are threatened increasingly by terrorism and various forms of conflict. The world needs a broader vision and a more inclusive mind to deal with these problems, which may involve coordinating a variety of techniques, instruments and theories. Laozi’s philosophy, especially his vision and mind that embraces all things, offers an alternative approach to managing conflicting interests and promoting diversity that is particularly inspiring and meaningful.

The Wenzi (Master Wen or The Cultured Master) is traditionally attributed to its eponymous thinker, yet little is known about him. The absence of biographical information has led scholars to investigate his historical identity, but with no definitive results. This chapter takes a different approach by shifting the focus from Wenzi as a historical figure to the origins of the legend of his discipleship under Laozi (Master Lao or The Old Master). When and where did the idea of Wenzi as Laozi’s disciple emerge? The analysis unfolds in three main sections. The first surveys early Chinese texts for references to Wenzi as Laozi’s disciple. The second explores textual links between the Wenzi and the Laozi. The third examines the two central figures in the Wenzi to determine what they reveal about the master-disciple relationship. The conclusion reflects on the broader implications of these findings and proposes a hypothetical scenario for the legend’s emergence. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to illuminate how the legend of Wenzi’s discipleship relates to the origins of the Wenzi itself—its connections to the Laozi and its philosophical underpinnings. Positioned at the intersection of early Daoist history, mythology, intertextuality, and philosophy, this study clarifies what current evidence allows us to conclude while acknowledging the uncertainties that remain.

Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Daodejing presents a variety of approaches to the Daodejing and how it can productively engage with contemporary philosophical debates and explore perspectives on living a good life. This edited volume is not only for students and scholars who are interested in the Daodejing as situated in classical Chinese contexts. This edited volume also takes readers to explore how the Daodejing provide a different possibility for challenging our long-held assumptions and beliefs, dealing with practical concerns we have now and living in our contemporary world. Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Daodejing also presents possibilities of translating different kinds of textual studies into ways of philosophizing due to new ideas they deliver and questions they bring about.

The decisive feature of Classical Virtue Ethics as found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is that morally right action is finally determined neither by following moral rules nor in achieving desired consequences but rather by the very decision of the virtuous man (ho spoudaios) himself who acts according to his nature as virtuous. The decisive significance of the nature of the moral agent in determining moral rightness in action is the distinctive feature of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and this feature is also found in the natural virtue of the sage in the Laozi. By comparing the virtuous man as described by Aristotle in his NE with the description of the sage (sheng ren) in the Laozi, I defend the thesis that the Laozi can be read as a moral philosophy, and specifically a virtue ethics in its presentation of the virtue of the sage in non-action. In effect, the article argues that the Laozi presents a unique virtue ethics – a daoist virtue ethics comparable to the classical virtue ethics of Aristotle as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics.

In this paper, I rehearse briefly what we know about the nature and formation of the Liezi 列子. I take note of the extensive borrowing of materials employed by the editor(s) of the work, numbering nearly one hundred possible source texts. I modify ZHENG Liangshu’s 鄭良樹 typology for grouping literary correspondences between Chinese texts and identify two of the most extensive collections of parallel affiliations in LZ: Chapter One, “Tianrui 天瑞” (“Heavenly Portents”) and Chapter Two, “Huang Di 黃帝.” While “Huang Di” has been studied because of its technique of direct copying from the Zhuangzi 莊子, “Tianrui”‘s use of the Daodejing, has been largely neglected. I give attention specifically to the “Liezi said” (Liezi yue 列子曰) “zhang 章” or “text beads” in “Tianrui” and consider them as examples of “interpretive homilies” (jieshi chuandao 解释傳道) on passages from the Daodejing. Finally, in the conclusion, I revisit the possible source of the “Liezi said” passages in “Tianrui,” suggesting that their style and content indicate their probable source was in “Mysterious Learning” (Xuanxue 玄學) philosophical circles of the third or fourth centuries CE.

Connections between the philosophies of Machiavelli and the Daodejing have been ignored in the comparative literature for far too long. Despite their many differences, these philosophies revolve around the concern for survival, both of the ruler and the state. This should not be surprising as each philosophy arose out of historical circumstances, Warring States China and the Italian Renaissance, that were violent and tumultuous. Further, each philosophy posits a worldview that is driven by a fundamental concept—the Dao or Fortune—which while different, are similar in significant ways. In order to successfully navigate the world (driven by either principle), each philosophy encourages a ruler to thoroughly manage their desires and the desires of the people. Not only do properly controlled desires prevent personal vice, corruption, and social instability, but restrained desire is the foundation for the key to success: flexibility of thought and action, as epitomized in the image of the dragon, associated with Laozi through his biography in the Records of the Historian, and the image of the centaur employed by Machiavelli in The Prince. Despite promising indefinite success, each philosophy has its limitations. The Daodejing allows for maximum flexibility through offering a path to cultivating a state of mind characterized by emptiness, but it’s political ideals are unlikely to work in a large state or one that is technologically advanced, and is noticeably silent on the idea of succession in leadership. Machiavelli’s philosophy, in contrast, is intended for large states, deals with succession through transforming a principality into a republic, and recognizes the need to remain flexible, but is unable to conceive of a way to achieve the state of emptiness that makes such flexibility possible.

This article compares Laozi’s political thought with that of Hegel’s. The comparison will be conducted on four different levels: the relation between metaphysical and practical levels of their respective thinking, individual consciousness and freedom, private property, civil society, ethics and the existence of the state. It concludes with the following points: first, beyond their obvious differences, it is shown that Laozi and Hegel share a similar, although reversed, hierarchical deduction of freedom: one from the ruler to the people, the other from individuals to the state. Both are, however, aware of the ethical limits to freedom. Second, both share a similar concern about unequal distribution of wealth, luxury, squandering, jealousy and the danger of political chaos these might entail. As solutions, Laozi advocates for the simplicity of the ruler’s life and political practice, while Hegel talks about the ethical duty of the intermediate class between the ruler and the ruled. Third, in terms of their views about society, or Hegel’s “civil society,” both recognize that ethics is the pillar for the state, and they share the idea of an ethical state, although the role played by ethics is different. Finally, as far as the reason for the existence of the state is concerned, they share comparable, although reversed, views about the relation between ethics and the state. While Laozi believes that the people will become ethical when the state adheres to non-action, Hegel argues that the existence of the state is the highest expression of freedom, reason and the ethical consciousness of society.

This chapter discusses the problematics involved in what I call the “Heideggerian Laozi.” By this term I mean: The notions from the Daodejing adduced in comparative studies in relation to Heidegger are often adapted to Heidegger’s key terms in isolation from the complexity of his philosophy as a whole. First, I review the early history in which the “Heideggerian Laozi” emerged. I show that the alleged affinity between Laozi and Heidegger was influenced by the concrete history of reception of Heidegger in America and was subject to the dubious translations as well as to the inadequacy of interpretations of the Daodejing. Then, I examine the true meaning of Laozi’s notion of wu and display its crucial difference from Heidegger’s “das Nichts.” The word heng 恆 from the Mawangdui Laozi has been highlighted as a most fundamental notion that indicates the “temporality” of dao. In the last section, building on insights and arguments from scholars from a variety of fields, I show that this claim is far from self-evident.

In addressing “oneness” (yi 一) in the Daodejing there are two distinct but overlapping challenges. The first is semantic and the second is hermeneutic. These must be resolved together when approaching “oneness” in the Daodejing. Given its evolving historical nature, the text contains no single, correct set of meanings invoking “oneness.” There are, however, concrete historical situations in which different meanings of “oneness” were actually interpreted and mobilized for specific philosophical purposes. Variants in terminology and editorial structure in recently unearthed versions of the text provide insights into the various situations in which such meanings were understood. Specifically, Chapter 22 of the Mawangdui version shows evidence of being modified for a purpose, and through the analysis of its variants I hope to reconstruct a specific historical reading. Relying on relevant archeological finds for support, this reading will be developed in both cosmogonic and cosmological terms. It will be show that phrases such as “embracing the one” (baoyi 抱一), “dao produces one” (daoshengyi 道生一), and “attaining oneness” (deyi 得一) in the Daodejing, along with the term “great continuum” (taiyi 太一) which does not appear in the received text, can be understood within a single interpretative framework with supporting textual evidence.

This chapter shows that Dao 道 is described as the source of the universe as well as the ground of the myriad things. As the source, it generates the myriad things; as the ground, it continues to support and rear them after they are generated. In addition to defining and explaining this philosophical concept, they summarize the four main features of Dao as seen in the Laozi: (1) Dao is both being and non-being; (2) Dao is absolute and permanent; (3) Dao is beyond sense-perception; and (4) Dao is spontaneous and un-self-aware.

This chapter examines the hermeneutic method of WANG Bi’s interpretation and demonstrates how it is used in his interpretation of classical texts from the perspectives of the Daoist annotation tradition and the development of Confucian classics studies in the Han Dynasty.Jiang shows that WANG Bi’s discourse on the relationship between words and ideas emphasizes the significance of textual meaning and expands the scope of hermeneutics. WANG Bi’s transition from cosmology to ontology disrupted the theoretical framework of Han Dynasty exegetics that was built on qi 氣-theory, enabling him to perceive the true existence of all things from the ontological perspective of Dao 道 or “Non-being” (wu 無). Breaking the boundary between Confucianism and Daoism, WANG Bi endeavored to reconcile their conflicts. It can be largely attributed to WANG Bi’s efforts that Daoism transformed from “Huang-Lao 黃老” thought in the Han Dynasty to “Lao-Zhuang 老莊” thought in the Wei-Jin dynasties period.

Yan Zun’s Purport of the Laozi (老子指归) and Commentary on the Laozi (老子注), the oldest extant annotations on the classic, construct a metaphysical system centered on chaos (hundun 混沌), synthesizing the Zhuangzi to formulate a Daoist cosmology. The Purport asserts that the Way (dao 道) is rooted in “emptiness” (xuwu 虚无)—a boundless, unknowable chaos transcending distinctions of being (you 有) and nonbeing (wu 无). Emptiness constitutes the ontological foundation of the Way and Virtue (daode 道德), while “naturalness” (ziran 自然) defines their intrinsic nature. Together, dao, emptiness, and naturalness form a triadic structure, where emptiness grounds existence, naturalness governs spontaneous order. Contrasting the Zhuangzi, where order displaces chaos, Yan Zun’s cosmology posits chaos as the eternal substrate of transformation. The Way does not directly generate the myriad things but endows them with self-generating “natures” (xing 性). Guided by the purposelessness and uncertainty of emptiness, these natures manifest naturalness through non-interference (wuwei 无为). Politically, rulers must embody “selflessness” (wuwo 无我), abandoning prediction and rigid planning to align with emergent complexity. Yan Zun’s thought resonates with modern complexity theory, particularly in its emphasis on uncertainty, self-organization, and the limits of rational design. By defining naturalness as both the autonomy of things and the transcendence of fixed boundaries, the Purport critiques deterministic systems while affirming chaos as the source of vitality. This Han-era synthesis bridges the Laozi and Zhuangzi, offering a premodern paradigm for contemporary discourses on spontaneous order and nonlinear dynamics.

This chapter develops an account of human agency in the Daodejing that focuses on the text’s elaborations of the ideal human agent, or the sage, broadly conceived. It focuses on the crucial attributes of responsiveness, adaptability, and alignment with the patterns and processes of the cosmos—attributes that have come to the fore in many recent discussions of early Chinese ethics more generally—and thus highlights the way in which the human agent is embedded in a web of relations with other beings and is interdependent with the world. Such attributes, it will be shown, do not eliminate the possibility of agency but represent the inescapable fact that human beings are situated in the world, and are faced with the predicament of navigating its complex forces in a way that is favorable. Moreover, the chapter emphasizes that human agency in the Daodejing is not limited to the sphere of practical action but extends to the realm of cognition as well. It argues that the Daodejing offers a robust account of agency in a cognitive and evaluative sense, forwarding an ideal vision of the human agent as one who is marked by a capacity for perspicacious understanding (ming 明) and right forms of volition. This dimension of ideal human agency is inseparable from the practical and prescriptive orientation of the text.

This comprehensive collection introduces the rich and deep textual and philosophical ideas related to the received Daodejing. Readers will find out, for example, why Daodejing continues to greatly influence our ways of thinking and living worldwide. How can ancient Chinese philosophy respond to contemporary cultural concerns and interests? How can we develop a philosophy of the Daodejing while critically engaging with textual resources? And finally, how can future research benefit and develop from current debates? This volume has eight parts, collecting 41 chapters. Part 1 discusses textual and historical issues of excavated texts and received versions of the Daodejing, its linguistic features in these different versions, and influential translations. Part 2 examines key ideas in the Daodejing. Part 3 asks how other early Chinese texts debate with, and develop the Daodejing-related texts. Part 4 introduces several influential commentaries on the Daodejing. Part 5 highlights ancient intellectual and religious interactions with the Daodejing that are overlooked in contemporary philosophical inquiry. Part 6 brings new questions to the ancient texts, and explores how they can respond to contemporary concerns on the basis of textual studies. Part 7 turns to modern perspectives on the Daodejing. Part 8 presents comparative studies of the Daodejing.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toleration and Justice in the Laozi:Engaging with Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early ChinaAi Yuan (bio)IntroductionThis review article engages with Tao Jiang's ground-breaking monograph on the Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China with particular focus on the articulation of toleration and justice in the Laozi (otherwise called the Daodejing).1 Jiang discusses a naturalistic turn and the re-alignment of values in the Laozi, resulting in a naturalization of justice (impartiality) by rejecting artificial humaneness and rigid hierarchical moral-political structures. In this Laozian just world, there is no room for human intervention and rigid top-down enforcement of values, thus leaving justice to naturalized Heaven or Dao as the ultimate source of the cosmos.Based on Jiang's interpretative context, I show that there is a twofold justification for the "paradoxical" and "elusive"2 value of political toleration.3 A negative expression of toleration focuses on non-interference with choices, and non-enforcement of values toward those whom one reasonably disagrees with and regards as morally wrong. Such an attitude of toleration results in practical advantages such as avoiding entrenchment in bloodshed, abandonment, and deprivation.A positive expression of toleration operating in the Laozian ideal world requires equal protection of people as capable knowers, including those to whom we object. Such protection includes their ways of expression and an unbiased recognition of them as equally capable knowers so that they are heard without bias and prejudice. Such a kind of toleration is revealed as a constituent component of justice since it enables equal contribution toward the shaping of society without discrimination. In other words, toleration is seen as naturalized justice in a Laozian world within which no one is "being wronged with the capacity as a knower"—a kind of epistemic justice articulated by Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007).4 [End Page 466]This article discusses how Jiang's political reconstruction of Laozian philosophy contains the seeds for a discussion of toleration, a value associated with distributive justice and against epistemic injustice. First, it introduces Jiang's arguments on a naturalization of justice and impartiality as Heavenly attributes in the Laozi. Second, it articulates the value of tolerance in the Laozi. Finally, I compare Laozian toleration with Confucian toleration using youwei- wuwei metaethical criticism.Moral-Political Philosophy in the LaoziJiang's interpretative framework about the origins of distributive justice in the Laozi starts with a discussion of the cosmogonic-mystical worldviews that signal "a new understanding of the nature of the cosmos, as well as a broad reorientation in the Heaven-human relationship in the mid-Warring States period" (p. 192). Differing from the interests in the origins of human culture or civilization in the Ru and Mo traditions, Jiang agrees with Franklin Perkins and identifies a "cosmogonic turn" in the late fourth century b.c. that reveals a demotion of anthropomorphic Heaven. By paring Heaven with earth and accordingly decentering human beings in the intellectual discourse, the Laozi directs equal values to the ten thousand things, with humans as just one among them (Perkins 2016, quoted in Jiang 2021, p. 196).5 Laozi's philosophy thus stands out by rejecting Heaven as caring for human affairs while taking Dao as the ultimate origin of the cosmos, as claimed in chapter 5 of the received text: "Heaven and earth are not humane; they treat ten-thousand things in the world as straw dogs; the sage is not humane; he treats people as straw dogs" (p. 199).With Jiang's reading of a naturalistic heaven, we see a re-alignment between cosmos and the human since sage-rulers follow the Heaven-Dao. The Laozian Dao is "self-so-ing" (ziran 自然), "accommodating" (rong 容), and "impartial" (gong 公), and thus marks a sharp contrast to Confucian familial bias resulting in "actively intervening in human affairs on behalf of the (certain) humans by appointing them to carry out its mission" (p. 200). With the sage emulating the ultimate Dao, the Laozi replaces the Confucian anthropocentric Heaven, which focuses on partiality (qin 親) and humaneness (ren 仁).This Laozian understanding of the cosmos also grounds its philosophical departure from Mohism despite both having a political...