Ai Yuan

This chapter explores how the authors of the Lüshi Chunqiu (LSCQ) employed passages, concepts, and images from the Daodejing (DDJ) to create the LSCQ’s unique political philosophy. Passages from both of those texts show that at least some of the authors of the LSCQ were influenced by the DDJ. Those authors praise and quote various figures who were labeled “Daoists” in the Han Dynasty. The LSCQ cites the DDJ, and its art of efficient and effective governing utilizes DDJ concepts. The DDJ influences various forms of Huang-Lao political philosophy. The LSCQ deploys DDJ concepts, while claiming to transmit teachings attributed to the Yellow Emperor. The LSCQ’s authors welded DDJ ideas to concepts from other philosophers, especially the Yin-Yang Wuxing (陰陽五行 Yin-Yang Five Phases) philosophy along with concepts from other philosophers and disciplines. The LSCQ’s political philosophy is based on the Dao-centered self-cultivation of the ruler, and the ruler and ministers engaging in timely projects, especially the performance of complex calendric, seasonal, ritual-technology. The performance of timely ritual-technology was considered crucial for good government by many pre-Qin philosophers. The chapter shows that ritual-technology was believed to control the climate, and the LSCQ provides one of the earliest proposals that human actions can and do impact climate change. Key words: Huang-Lao, political order, wuwei, ritual technology, self-cultivation, quiescence

This chapter provides an introduction to the four surviving imperial commentaries to the Laozi, an aspect of the commentarial tradition that has very little representation within English language scholarship. Written by emperors from the Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties, these commentaries offer readings of the text from the very political role the text addresses; the ruler. Key themes such as politics and spirituality, strategy and cultivation, along with central topics like Dao, wuwei, guarding frugality, nurturing life, and spiritual exercise are uniquely extrapolated upon through the lens of those intimately involved in the practical affairs of governance at the highest level. Moreover, these imperial commentaries reflect the historical, intellectual, and cultural shifts spanning nearly a millennium, particularly insofar as they legitimated the syncretic fusion of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, or “the unification of the three doctrines.” The emperor’s interpretations of the Laozi offers a distinctive and important layer of nuance to both the text itself as well as its historical reception and function.

Xiaogan Liu shows that the term wu, or “nonbeing,” is a concept particular to the Laozi and the Daoist tradition. Four philosophical senses of the concept of wu in the Laozi itself and in Wang Bi’s annotations of the Daodejing can be summarized: Wu is the source of the universe, or the state before anything has emerged. This wu relates to cosmology and has nothing to do with the affairs of the mundane world. Wu, together with you 有, expressed as both “nameless” (wuming 無名) and “named” (youming 有名), reflects the conceivability and incomprehensibility of Dao 道. In this sense, wu and you are two aspects of Dao. Neither of the two is directly related to issues of the physical or human world. Wu is a notion or phenomenon that is opposite to you in the empirical world. At this level, wu and you transform out of and into each other. These three meanings of wu belong to different realms, but Wang Bi fuses all of them into one abstract and universal concept, namely the nonbeing of Dao, which is the origin and ground of the universe and human society. Wang Bi’s theory is an early peak of abstract thought in the history of Chinese philosophy, that is both coherent and comprehensive. Liu further argues for wu’s significance in social and political life, as suggested by the Laozi’s and Wang Bi’s conception of it.

The Heshang Gong commentary to the Laozi, likely a work of the Later Han period, played a critical role in shaping Laozi learning in pre-modern China. This chapter seeks to delineate the interpretive approach and logic of its reading of the Laozi. Grounded in a basic understanding of the world as being constituted by vital qi, it shows how the Laozi offers a coherent and powerful vision of the Dao and its full realization in both self-cultivation and political governance. Key concepts in the Laozi such as emptiness, the “One,” and naturalness and nonaction find their place in this interpretive framework.

Over the past several decades, the origins and formation of the Laozi have come into sharper relief through the discovery of early manuscript witnesses to the text, including those of the Warring-States–era Chu-tomb Bamboo Manuscripts of Guodian 郭店楚墓竹簡 and the Han-era Mawangdui silk manuscripts 馬王堆漢墓帛書 and “Beijing University” bamboo manuscripts 北京大學藏西漢竹書. This chapter takes the reader through the nature and importance of those manuscripts, both from the standpoint of textual formation and the philosophical implications they hold by way of ideologically significant textual variants. It asks, and attempts to provide preliminary answers for, such questions as what kind of relationship the earliest manuscripts might have to the received 81–chapter work we now know as the Daodejing; under what circumstances and for what purposes might intentional alterations have been introduced into the text; how might certain graphic variations point toward a different, and in some cases even improved reading of the text; how might certain passages have been divided or combined differently in earlier versions of the text; and at what point did the work come to achieve its final and definitive form.

The purpose of this article is to delve into explanations of key passages containing the term “sage” with a special focus on interpreting this notion. Without seeking to propose and defend a definitive view of the role and character of the sage, our core argument is that the sage, however one construes it, can and should serve as an interpretive tool in elucidating the thought, logic, concepts, and observations found in the Laozi as well as their implementation in concrete practice. To this end, we review various possible interpretations and highlight those we think are most significant and compelling when considering the text as a whole. The chapters we consider are organized according to thematic consistencies that arise in prioritizing the “sage” in reading the Laozi. While many studies start with other significant concepts in the text, such as being “self-so” (ziran 自然)and “non-action” (wuwei 無為), and view the sage’s significance as derivative of these concepts—an exemplar of them, for instance—we start with the sage as a significant concept itself, and from here interpret major ideas and themes in light of it. Read in this way, we see that the text emphasizes various consistent themes that are generally underappreciated in current scholarship, though clearly substantial. We look specifically at paradoxical logic, fear and manipulation, humanism and simplicity, desires and knowing contentment, morality and context, politics and self-transformation, as well as disorder and caution. By concentrating on the “sage,” these themes reveal themselves as central consistencies across the text.

The Daode jing or Laozi is the most translated work after the Bible. More than 800 versions into European languages have appeared, about half English. However, most are not “translations” but rewordings based directly or indirectly on earlier learned translations. These tend to be interpretive paraphrases by those who cannot read the original and thus often depart greatly from its literal meaning. These “scriptual” versions aim only at telling the reader what the text means to those who might use it today and are usually separated from its cultural and historical contexts. What passes for “translations” of the Laozi are based, by contrast, on a range of different “historical” approaches: (1) Scholarly translation, word for word, critically edited, arrived at with lingusitic and philological expertise and attention to literary, philosophical/religious, and historical contexts, aimed at recovering the original meaning and intent of the text. (2) Scholary translation with added explanatory material—usually a mixture of references (sometimes unacknowledged) to Chinese and/or Japanese commentaries and the translator’s own interpretations. (3) Yet another approach combines the first and second approaches and presents both an integral translation of an early Chinese commentary and a new translation of the classic text interpreted in light of and integrated with the commentary. Ideally, the text of the Daode jing and the commentary are thus fully integrated so that the interpretation of the one depends on interpretation of the other. As such, the two complement each other and are not at odds. Such a technique precludes independent presentation of the commentary: a translation of the commentary cannot be attached to some other translation of the Daode jing—it just would not fit. Western translations range from good to bad, from genuine authenticity to misleading paraphrase. The text obviously has a mysterious charm that inspires trained Sinologists and armchair Daoists alike to engage with it and render it in ever newer and hoped-for better words—a process for which there seems to be no end in sight.

The concept of de 德, most often translated as “Virtue” or “moral power,” has long been the subject of debate and scrutiny by traditional East Asian commentators and contemporary scholars of the Daodejing. This study of de examines its use and meaning in the text, contextualized against the background of its history and use in other early Chinese sources. Some of the most influential understandings of the concept both by traditional Chinese commentators on the Daodejing and contemporary scholars are examined, with a focus on those who have studied the philosophical view that is presented in the text. The fact that de has a multifaceted meaning, denoting both virtue or moral excellence and the power to attract and influence others, is explored, as is its centrality to a number of themes in the Daodejing, including the conceptions of the sage and the ideal society. It is argued that de has both practical and mystical dimensions, and that the text extends earlier understandings of de when it comes to the question of where it comes from and how it accrues.

This chapter argues that the notion of the feminine in the Daodejing represents an abstract philosophical ideal with contemporary theoretical and practical significance. The first section analyzes the multi-layered attributes associated with the terms—mu 母, ci 雌, and pin 牝-- in the text, and demonstrates how the Daodejing treats the notion of the feminine as both metaphysically and normatively salient while not directly involving the stereotyping of women. The second section further clarifies the textual connotations of the feminine by giving a critical review of three dominant interpretations, namely, the matriarchal reading (worshiping the female gender), the political reading (supposing a political strategy for conquering), and the androgynous reading (integrating the masculine and the feminine into an androgynous form). The third section explores the philosophical implications of the notion of the feminine in the Daodejing, aiming to shed light on key debates between equality feminism and difference feminism. Rejecting the assimilation of the Daoist feminine notion into difference feminism, the chapter contends that while the values of the feminine in the Daodejing do not directly contest historical male dominance, the former nevertheless offer a critical perspective for modern feminism, both in the sense of rejecting the one-sided complementarity of equality feminism and avoiding the problematic masculine-feminine dichotomy inherent in difference feminism. Finally, in the fourth section, this chapter discusses the feasibility of applying the Daoist feminine notion through examining its potential to inform practices of gender justice, both in individual life and broader societal contexts.

In this chapter, I intend to explicate the philosophical concept of peace from the perspective of Daoism implied in the Laozi. The discussion consists of three aspects: (1) the concepts of peace in various philosophical schools during the Warring States period of ancient China, (2) the anti-war sentiment and its indications to the Laozi’s view concerning war and peace, and (3) possible contemporary implications of the Laozi’s idea of peace for peace studies. I will submit that the argument on peace in the Laozi is more complicated than simply labelling it as “pacifism” in a sense of an absolute refusal to bear arms. I will contend that peace in the Laozi is closer to “pacificism,” a term employed in contemporary discourse of peace, indicating a commitment to peace and peacefulness but not a principled or absolute rejection of war. Meanwhile, I will explain how the Daoist idea of peace or peace-making implies the mechanism of seeking effective ways to deal with the underlying causes and dynamics that create conflicts and violence.

This chapter demonstrates two common tendencies in the textual history of the Laozi/Daodejing, namely, “linguistic assimilation” and “conceptual focusing,” which call for a new approach to understanding the transformation and distribution of the various versions and editions. “Linguistic assimilation” describes the general tendency of editors to replace words, phrases, or passages with common terms or patterns according to their understanding of the meaning and style of a text. Thus, within the modification and dissimilation of varying versions of a text, there is a historical trend towards convergence on certain linguistic features. “Conceptual focusing” indicates that in received versions, some key concepts, such as wuwei 無為 or Dao 道, come to replace general expressions found in older versions, with their positions in passages re-arranged so that the intellectual insights of the text becomes more, rather than less distinctly pronounced. Conceptual focusing is the effort of editors of later versions to highlight key concepts of a transmitted text.

This chapter examines the idea of silent teaching in the Daodejing from the perspective of “rhetorical questions” (RQs). Yuan disagrees with reading silence in opposition to language and debate. The Daodejing shows that the importance of silence in RQs does not lie in telling people what ought to be done. Instead, RQs repeat the literary expressions already present in propositions that we put forward within the same context, calling for a recognition of the proposition’s universal validity without directly uttering it. Thus, silence invoked by RQs reveals the authority of knowledge. Arguments elicited through RQs confront audiences with problematic actions and choices that violate accepted principles. Thus, they demonstrate the emotive power of the arguments. RQs invoke new conceptual images. Their use anticipates an awareness of a more prevalent use of a shared image while inviting readers to entertain the new construction of that conceptual image. The Daodejing criticizes language oppositions and conceptual contrasts. Within this context, RQs invite a reflective attitude, leaving questions and answers open. RQs evoke a conversational feeling and facilitate a sense of self-discovery.

My paper begins by examining why Thoreau stands out among early American writers and thinkers drawn to Asia, particularly China. It focuses on several points of convergence between Thoreau’s political views as expressed in his Journal paradoxes and essay “Resistance to Civil Government” and the universe of discourse on key political ideas found in the Daodejing (DDJ). The paper calls attention to how the positions Thoreau undertook informed and inspired parts of the American public consciousness, making it more natural for Americans familiar with his work to embrace the DDJ and establish the DDJ’s prominent place among philosophical writings Americans have appropriated from Asian traditions. It considers various positions attempting to show that Thoreau was directly dependent on the DDJ but finds them largely unconvincing. Nevertheless, the position that Thoreau was a Daoist “before any direct acquaintance with the tradition” (avant la lettre) is an interpretation of the substantial set of converging sentiments and positions that exist between Thoreau’s practices and political writing, and the DDJ is one that represents a viable interpretation of his work. The paper concludes that Thoreau may be defensibly understood to stand within a universe of ideas and practices that are found in the DDJ even if the text itself cannot be absolutely confirmed to be the source of his views.

Unsurprisingly for a text of its sophistication and depth, the Daodejing in general, and its concept of “wuwei 無為” in particular, have been subject to a variety of applications, both popular and scholarly. Perhaps the most common topic to which the Laozian concept of wuwei has been applied is the issue of ecological degradation and the global environmental crisis. Taking wuwei and environmentalism as an important case study of applied wuwei, this chapter provides an overview of scholarly efforts to integrate the two topics. More specifically, this chapter discusses English-language works on environmentalism and wuwei from the 1980s onward. The chapter first provides a brief overview of the history of English-language discussions of early Chinese thought and modern environmentalism before moving on to a more detailed consideration of the place of wuwei within those discussions. It further argues that scholarship on wuwei can be broadly divided into a variety of approaches that differ in their understanding of “nature,” their characterization of wuwei and their views on how early Chinese Daoist thought relates to Western thought and the environmental movement, but which end up making arguments that overlap in significant ways.

The purpose of this essay is to explain a Daoist holistic vision and approach on the fundamental relation between language, thought, and the world, as highlighted in the opening message of the classical Daoist text Dao-De-Jing 《道德經》and suggested in its whole text. I examine and explain how the points of the opening message and relevant messages in the context of the Dao-De-Jing concerning three closely related reflective pursuits in the Dao-De-Jing (that is, the pursuit of the Dao (道), its language engagement, and a strategic semantic-truth approach) are unified into a Daoist holistic account. My strategy is this. First, through examining the opening message of the Dao-De-Jing in its whole context, I spell out one of the fundamental insights in the Dao-De-Jing on the pursuit of the genuine Dao through its language engagement (i.e., pursuing the Dao through language as powerful means and media in hooking up to the world and capturing the way things are). Second, I explain how the addressed insight on the Dao pursuit through its language engagement is intrinsically related to, and further enhanced by, a Daoist semantic-truth approach that makes the Dao pursuit through its strategic truth concern. From a broader and higher vantage point of cross-tradition engagement, I thus explain how the addressed Daoist approach unifies the three closely related reflective pursuits in the Dao-De-Jing, i.e., the Dao pursuit, its language engagement, and the strategic truth concern, into one holistic outlook on the fundamental relation between language, thought, and the world. In so doing, I also explain how the addressed Daoist approach is philosophically interesting and significant, and how it can contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue under examination.

The relationship that the great realist political philosopher Han Fei had with the Laozi has long been discussed by scholars and the conclusions drawn run a wide gamut. Some argue that Han Fei cynically (mis)appropriated the Laozian vision for “Legalist” ends. Others argue that we find within the Han Feizi the correct interpretation of the Laozi’s teachings. And still others argue that those chapters of the Han Feizi that comment upon the Laozi or draw upon its ideas must not have come from Han Fei’s own hand, for the positions advocated therein conflict with the overarching political philosophy that can be gleaned from the Han Feizi. This chapter will provide little for those concerned with the authenticity debate, for its focus is more on philosophical questions. However, I shall suggest that it may be a useful heuristic to read “Explaining the Laozi” (“Jie Lao 解老”) chapter of the Han Feizi, which constitutes the earliest extant commentary on the Laozi, as if were written by Han Fei. Following this heuristic allows one to more clearly see the connections between the broader Han Feizi and the “Jie Lao” itself. More importantly, it aids us in seeing the extent to which the Han Feizi may have been inspired and influenced by the Laozi. Further, the “Jie Lao” provides us with an additional lens through which to view the Laozi itself—and yet another interpretation of the protean text that is the Laozi. And finally, it provides us with reasons to prefer certain interpretations of the broader Han Feizi, those that read the text as not simply a handbook for a totalitarian ruler but rather as a text that grapples with coming to an understanding of the world around us and how most effectively to survive in such a world.

In this paper, I demonstrate how the analysis of metaphorical expressions in the Laozi 老子 can facilitate our understanding of this enigmatic text. First, I introduce the notion of metaphor and why their study is nowadays considered a suitable tool to elucidate the meaning of an ancient text—the product of a temporally distant intellectual discourse which relies on fundamentally different cultural assumptions. Following that, I discuss the state of the field, introducing the most notable academic works on figurative speech in theLaozi. Subsequently, I introduce my own classification of the main metaphors of the text and investigate them in the context of its central philosophical notions (which are, themselves, metaphors). Here, I also attempt to show how metaphors were instrumental for the formulation of the Laozi’s distinct worldview and its characteristic paradoxes.

While the primacy of dao 道 as both an ethical and metaphysical concept in the Laozi is clear, the Laozi’s cosmology involves several other key terms: de 德 (potency, virtuosity, efficacy), yi 一 (the one, unity), tian 天 (heaven, the heavens, sky), and di 地 (earth). This chapter focuses on the role of tian, which I follow convention in translating as heaven. More specifically, I examine what initially appear to be two distinct discourses involving tian. One of them pairs heaven with earth and explicitly subordinates both to dao. This view appears in the Guodian Laozi materials and is often taken as the default view of the Laozi as a whole. The other discourse speaks of heaven or the way of heaven as a dominant force, often in ethical terms, without pairing it with earth or subordinating it to dao. The latter appears primarily in the last 15 chapters of the Laozi. I begin by examining these discourses separately, without insisting that all of the passages express a single authorial intention. In the last part of the chapter, I draw on various commentaries to suggest how the passages might cohere together. The chapter begins by considering the likely background for the Laozi’s views of heaven.

In this chapter based on textual evidence, I argue that, Laozi’s key word “dao” 道is not a single, clear and distinct concept, but an assemble concept which is embedded with various imports in ontology and cosmology.In the text, the dao or ‘tian-dao 天道’ as an ultimate principle plays a dual role to regulate both the natural world and the human world. So, in some contexts, the term “dao” or “tian-dao” can be used to refer to a natural principle; but in some other, to refer to a normative principle. Moreover, it is also used to refer to an ontological or cosmological entity in different contexts. I demonstrate that there are gaps in the package concept which is difficult to bridge.In terms of methodology, this is an analytical and logical approach to analyze Laozi’s idea of dao and its related conceptual and semantical problems. I argue that the pragmatic cum anti-metaphysical reading of Laozi’s idea is not in accordance with the text; I also argue that the dialectical cum paradoxical reading is also inaccurate. I conclude that the idea of dao in the text is an assemble concept which includes different semantic imports. To treat it as a single concept or theoretical concept cannot be used to explain the thought in the text.

The Daodejing is a complex text with multiple layers of meaning embedded within various traditions of interpretation. One constant theme attended to by commentators and other philosophically minded writers dealing with the thought of the text, both modern and pre-modern, is rulership and government, however, framing the political thought of the Daodejing in this way often bungles the deeper reaches of the human political experience that the text explores. The present contribution attempts to reframe approaches to the text’s political thought by directly homing in on its discussions of authority, rather than rulership and/or government. Next to the Daodejing’s cutting criticisms and condemnations of various styles of authority stemming from coercion and other forms of political violence that it adamantly rejects, it also articulates distinct notions of what may be called a specific style of Daoist authority. The present contribution finds that the Daodejing not only shares a similar value system with that which course through the writings of Hannah Arendt, namely one that is committed to a system of authority oriented by a political justice that allows for the protection, well-being, and flourishing of the common people, but they also have similar critiques of coercive forms of authority. This contribution also finds that the Daodejing’s notions of authority can be more clearly demonstrated by a comparative approach that engages the language developed by Arendt that is directed to authority, most notably her notions of coercion, tyranny, power, and legitimate authority.

This chapter explores Lévinas’s philosophical reflection upon the feminine and bring it to bear upon renewed interpretation of the central notion of ci 雌 in the Daodejing. On the one hand, the early Levinas emphasizes an asymmetrical, even an absolute idea of the feminine and highlights it as the very quality of difference that cannot be subsumed into the totality of the same. On the other hand, although the philosophical ideas of the Daodejing have often been characterized as “feminine” in terms of its orientation, current readings of it have weakened and curtailed, if not diminished, its significance and radicality by either assigning it a role in a ci-xiong 雌雄 correlation, or by treating it as a strategy, as a ci-means to a xiong-end. In this connection, Levinas’s radical ideas concerning the feminine can very well encourage and help illuminate the uniqueness and importance of ci in the Daodejing.

This chapter explores how the authors of the Lüshi Chunqiu (LSCQ) employed passages, concepts, and images from the Daodejing (DDJ) to create the LSCQ’s unique political philosophy. Passages from both of those texts show that at least some of the authors of the LSCQ were influenced by the DDJ. Those authors praise and quote various figures who were labeled “Daoists” in the Han Dynasty. The LSCQ cites the DDJ, and its art of efficient and effective governing utilizes DDJ concepts. The DDJ influences various forms of Huang-Lao political philosophy. The LSCQ deploys DDJ concepts, while claiming to transmit teachings attributed to the Yellow Emperor. The LSCQ’s authors welded DDJ ideas to concepts from other philosophers, especially the Yin-Yang Wuxing (陰陽五行 Yin-Yang Five Phases) philosophy along with concepts from other philosophers and disciplines. The LSCQ’s political philosophy is based on the Dao-centered self-cultivation of the ruler, and the ruler and ministers engaging in timely projects, especially the performance of complex calendric, seasonal, ritual-technology. The performance of timely ritual-technology was considered crucial for good government by many pre-Qin philosophers. The chapter shows that ritual-technology was believed to control the climate, and the LSCQ provides one of the earliest proposals that human actions can and do impact climate change.

Daoist practice connects adepts to Dao; it comes in two forms, self-cultivation and ritual. Self-cultivation centers on the concept of cosmic or vital energy (qi) and works through healing, longevity, and immortality. Besides techniques of nourishing life, such as diet, sexual hygiene, and exercise, self-cultivation involves breath work and various forms of meditation. Through these methods, Daoists align with Dao in the natural patterns of life and merge with it to people of spirit.Ritual works through a galactic level of existence that is part of pure Dao but not ineffable or formless, a celestial dimension that houses an extensive otherworldly bureaucracy managing human affairs. It modifies the actions of supernatural administrators by placing priests into their midst and empowering them as celestial bureaucrats to exert control over time, space, and life. Sacred texts are the manuals and passports to this empowerment, recited on a regular basis and transmitted in formal ordination ceremonies.The Daodejing plays a role in both these dimensions. Rather than a philosophical text, in the religious Daoist vision it a core scripture stored in the heavens, created by pure Dao. Its meditative recitation thus conveys cosmic energy and spiritual advancement and supernatural powers. Accompanied by purifications and visualizations, this is a key practice both in cultivation and ritual as a fundamental way of aligning oneself with Dao.This alignment is further formalized in Daoist ordination, where the Daodejing is studied and activated at the basic rank of all major systems developed over the millennia. Last but not least, many Daodejing concepts play a role in personal transformation, beginning with ideals of no-desire, simplicity, and frugality and moving on to methods of concentration and mental focus. Advanced meditation practices reverse ordinary development and aid the recovery of Dao in oblivion and through alchemical refinement.

In this chapter I draw attention to the common ground between Nietzsche and the Laozi 老子 on the all-important and ever-widening discrepancy between human hubris and cosmic humility. Since there has been little to no direct influence of classical Chinese sources on the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the debate has to be simulated. This will be done by invoking the modern phenomena of transhumanism and posthumanism. A meaningful dialogue then takes shape between Nietzsche and the Laozi on the future of humankind as it trails the meanders of the dialectic between human hubris and cosmic humility. Although the status of Nietzsche as intellectual godfather of the transhumanist movement can be disputed, a fresh look at scholarship on the topic unearths important congruities between his philosophy and contemporary transhumanism. At the same time, the link between the Laozi and what we now call posthumanism is not yet fully appreciated in contemporary academic discourse. The present chapter therefore seeks to explore both key affinities between Nietzsche’s work and various transhumanist pursuits as well as the contemporary relevance of the Laozi for posthumanism. The functional—but often overlooked—divide between trans- and posthumanism that this study reveals, contributes to a welcome critique of the twenty-first century Mass Media Human.

This chapter reconstructs the significance of wuwei 無為 and ziran 自然 in the Daodejing and explores their contemporary biopolitical and ecological consequences. It differentiates alternative environmental implications of different readings of wuwei as apathetic indifference, cruel lack of benevolence, amoral situational adaptation and playing, biospiritual self-preservation, mystical fusion, and (as proposed here) nurturing life (yangsheng 養生) through practices of shifting responsive care (ci 慈) and non-preferential and non-benevolent love (ai 愛). Each interpretation is necessarily a contemporary reimagining and entails different responses or non-responses to current climate and ecological conditions.

This chapter examines Wang Fuzhi’s (1619–1692) critique of the Laozi, particularly in its metaphysical and ethical dimensions. Wang Fuzhi grouped Laozi’s philosophy, Buddhist teachings, and Legalism together as the three most damaging theories in Chinese intellectual history and claimed that their combined influence led to great calamities in Chinese society. Such a harsh assessment of Laozi has raised strong reactions among contemporary scholars. Even specialists in Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy have widely regarded his critique as unjust, biased toward Confucianism, and lacking in a genuine understanding of the Laozi. One of the most pointed attacks comes from contemporary Wang Fuzhi scholar Mingran Tan, who argues that Wang Fuzhi’s critique of the Laozi stemmed from his own Confucian prejudice and that Wang failed to grasp the profound and subtle brilliance of Laozi’s thought.This chapter counters such criticisms by offering a philosophical defense of Wang Fuzhi’s critique of Laozi. It argues that Wang Fuzhi’s opposition to Laozi’s teachings was grounded in their fundamentally divergent metaphysical standpoints and ethical orientations. Wang Fuzhi viewed the Laozi’s conception of Dao as an abstract construct detached from human reality. This transcendent Dao has no direct relevance to practical human concerns and concrete moral life. On ethical grounds, Wang Fuzhi condemned Laozi for promoting apathy and inaction (wu wei), which he saw as fostering moral detachment and ethical irresponsibility. By analyzing Wang Fuzhi’s writings across his complete works, this chapter demonstrates that Wang Fuzhi’s critique of Laozi was consistent with his broader philosophical commitments to moral realism and his mission to uphold humanistic values. Ultimately, Wang Fuzhi’s rejection of Laozi reflects his conviction that philosophy must serve a practical role in shaping moral individuals for the establishment of a moral world.

The Sunzi bingfa or The Methods of War by Master Sun (better known as The Art of War), is probably the most important treatise in the genre of ancient Chinese military corpus. Yet Its popularity goes beyond the Chinese culture today since it has been linked with famous and infamous military figures throughout world history, from Genghis Khan to Napoleon, from Ho Chi-Minh to Mao Zedong, and from General McArthur to General Westmoreland. In many US military schools today, Sunzi’s art of war is read as a core textbook on strategic theory in conjunction with the military text by Carl von Clausewitzz. In this chapter, I will explore the idea of leadership in war advocated in the Sunzi in the light of the art of governance explicated in the Laozi. The focus of the discussion will be on what I will call “the yin-method” in terms of strategic leadership that emphasizes “virtuosic engagement and responsiveness.” It is my intention to argue that the yin-strategy in the Sunzi does not simply denote skillful methods (i.e., “shock and awe”) but bear an ethical consideration.

This chapter examines the political philosophy of the Daodejing, showing that it is a fundamental component grounded in its metaphysical framework. It explores how core Daoist concepts—such as Dao (Way), naturalness (ziran), and non-action (wuwei)—form the foundation of its political thought. The first section explores the problem of the oppressiveness of the government. It is divided into a general criticism and criticism of specific aspects of the government and society. The general criticism rests on the fact that the rulers govern with too much activity (youwei). It is exactly because the ruler does too many things that the people are difficult to rule. The specific aspects of criticism are the excessive taxation, harsh punishments, and frequent warfare. The second section elaborates on the theory of governing through wuwei. The best ruler is the sage, that is, the one who understands the natural working of Dao. The sage is a kind of embodiment of Dao in society and politics, and since Dao does nothing and leaves nothing undone, so does the sage. This section also examines two key political precepts from the Daodejing: first, that the sage has no fixed ideas or thoughts, but adopts the ideas and thoughts of the people as his own (Chapter 49); and second, that governing a big state is like cooking a small fish (Chapter 60). The section concludes with the Daodejing’s criticism of Confucianism and the vision of a state in accordance with Dao. The final section briefly discusses some common interpretations in the contemporary scholarship, such as those related to anarchism and utopianism.

The Daodejing is a foundational text in the Chinese tradition, in large part because its vision of a cosmogony that describes the origins of the world, its vision of a cosmology that describes the functioning of the world, and its vision of a ruler who governs the world, deeply influenced traditional Chinese understandings of each. Relying on the Daodejing text and commentary attributed to Heshang Gong because it is the earliest to have been faithfully transmitted to us today, the present contribution reframes common approaches to this totalizing worldview by situating it in terms of a cosmogonic past, a cosmological present, and a utopian future, with particular emphasis on the latter. This is because the text’s vision of a perfect government depends on and emerges from the cosmogonic and cosmological structures, and its utopian vision always remains futural. However, because its utopian vision is not simply relegated to the human order but rather encompasses a complete synthesis between the human and natural orders, it transcends anything that a one-dimensional approach to a strictly political order can manage. The present contribution examines the processes whereby this utopian order can be realized and its distinctive structures in contrast to those of the cosmogony and cosmology by paying close attention to the Daodejing’s innovative uses of three terms that are often reduced to near misrecognition by traditional and modern commentaries: fa 法 or “modelling,” tong 通 or “penetration,” and ziran 自然 or “spontaneity.”