Warren Schmaus

In this demonstration of the link between philosophy of science and scientific practice, Warren Schmaus argues that Durkheim's philosophy is crucial to his sociology. Through a reinterpretation of the relation between Durkheim's major philosophical and sociological works, Schmaus argues that Durkheim's sociology is more than a collection of general observations about society—it reflects a richly constructed theory of the meanings and causes of social life. Schmaus shows how Durkheim sought to make sociology more rigorous by introducing scientific methods of analysis and explanation into the study of society. Durkheim tried to reveal how implicit, commonly held beliefs actually govern people's lives. Through an original interpretation of Durkheim's landmark writings, Schmaus argues that Durkheim, in his empirical studies, refined both the methods of sociology and a theory about society's shared knowledge and practices. This book opens a new window on the development of Durkheim's thought and demonstrates how a philosophy of science can inspire the rise of a new science.

This paper defends a social functionalist interpretation, modeled on psychological functionalism, of the meanings of social facts. Social functionalism provides a better explanation of the possibility of interpreting other cultures than approaches that identify the meanings of social facts with either mental states or behavior. I support this claim through a functionalist reinterpretation of sociological accounts of the categories that identify them with their collective representations. Taking the category of causality as my example, I show that if we define it instead in terms of its functional relations to moral rules, it becomes easier to recognize in other cultures

Although standpoint theorists tend to characterize a scientist’s social situation in terms of her position in a hierarchy of power within the larger society, her social situation could also be characterized in terms of the degree to which she is integrated into the scientific community. The latter concept of social location may prove helpful in explaining a scientist’s potential for contributing to the growth of knowledge. It may also provide an independent measure of marginalization that makes it possible to ascertain the extent to which those who are marginalized in the larger society are also marginalized in science.

: It has been said that Kant's critical philosophy made it impossible to pursue either the Cartesian rationalist or the Lockean empiricist program of providing a foundation for the sciences (e.g., Guyer 1992). This claim does not hold true for much of nineteenth century French philosophy, especially the eclectic spiritualist tradition that begins with Victor Cousin (1792-1867) and Pierre Maine de Biran (1766-1824) and continues through Paul Janet (1823-99). This tradition assimilated Kant's transcendental apperception of the unity of experience to Descartes's cogito. They then took this to be the method of a philosophical psychology that reveals the active self as substance or cause and thus provides the epistemological grounding for these categories. However, to dismiss these philosophers as simply confused or mistaken would be to overlook the historical role that their interpretations of Kant played in the subsequent development of philosophy and the social sciences in France. Specifically, Émile Durkheim's (1858-1917) sociological theory of the categories was deeply influenced by the eclectic spiritualist tradition and yet at the same time developed in reaction to it, as he thought that its psychological account of the categories failed to bring out their shared or universal character and the extent to which our conceptions of the categories are cultural products

There is a lack of connection between the cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary approaches to the study of the mind, in philosophy as well as the sciences. For instance, although Millikan may display a thorough understanding of evolutionary theory in her arguments for the adaptive value of substance concepts, she gives scant attention to what could be the neural substrates of these concepts. Neuroscience research calls into question her assumption that substance concepts play a role in practical skills and suggests that conceptual knowledge in the brain may be organized by perceptual features rather than by individuals and natural kinds.

Although Longino and Solomon are interested in what social conditions will produce better science, neither philosopher has provided a sufficient analysis of the social character of science. For instance, neither considers the social character of discovery as well as that of justification, or that an individual scientist’s social status and social relations may be important for understanding her role in both processes. The contributors to Schmitt’s volume are interested in whether the terms that refer to social entities can be reduced to or eliminated in favor of terms referring to individuals. Their analyses, which proceed largely by testing their intuitions against imaginary examples, could benefit from paying more attention to actual social science and real-world social problems. Ideally, these social metaphysicians should be engaged with philosophers of science in a joint effort to investigate whether a social account of scientific knowledge can explain something that an individualist account leaves out

For Hacking, the word "real", like the sexist expression "wear the trousers", takes its meaning from its negative uses. In this essay, I criticize Hacking's reasons for believing that the objects of study of the social sciences are not real. First I argue that the realism issue in the social sciences concerns not unobservable entities but systems of social classification. I then argue that Hacking's social science nominalism derives from his considering social groups in isolation from the entire social system. I conclude that the objects of study of the social sciences do not relegate them to an inferior status.

Renouvier was among the first philosophers in France to break with the nineteenth-century inductivist tradition and defend the use of hypotheses in science. Earlier in the century, the humanistically-educated eclectic spiritualist philosophers who dominated French academic life had followed Reid in proscribing the use of hypotheses. Renouvier, who was educated in the sciences, took up the Comtean positivist alternative and developed it further. He began by defending hypotheses that anticipate laws governing the phenomena, but then eventually adopted a more liberal attitude towards hypotheses that postulate unobservable entities and processes as well. He also came to the realization that, from an epistemological point of view, all of empirical science is hypothetical. Renouvier used the tentative character of scientific knowledge as a premise from which to critique those who would claim scientific status for their social philosophies, and maintained a distinction between normative philosophical and empirical scientific inquiries.Keywords: Charles Renouvier; Auguste Comte; Positivism; Hypothesis; Eclectic spiritualism

This paper traces August Comte’s attempts to get clear about the concept of mathematical analysis at various stages in his intellectual development. Comte was especially concerned with distinguishing a method of analysis for the resolution of complex prolems from analysis in the sense of a method of drawing inferences. Geometrical analysis serves as his model for the former. In his attempt to get clear about this notion, he discovers an historical succession of different methods all of which may be labeled “analytic.” In modern terms, Comte reveals how each of these methods of analysis characterizes a research program in mathematics, even showing us how more powerful methods came to supplant less powerful methods of analysis.

Comte's three-state law concerns the historical development of our methods of cognitive inquiry. Comte believes he can defend his three-state law either by :,rational proofs" based upon our knowledge of the human mind or upon 'historical verifications." Comte then uses the three-state law of scientific progress to argue for the existence of industrial and multistate political laws of progress. Here Comte strays from his positivism. He attributes a kind of causal efficacy to scientific progress which leads him to look for laws of social dynamics describing the social progress which result from the scientific. Here Comte is guilty of Popper's "poverty of historicism" charge. Comte's three-state law of scientific development is more easily defended than his concept of historical method