•  2
    Cournot and Renouvier on Scientific Revolutions
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 1-11. forthcoming.
    Historians of philosophy have hitherto either given scant attention to Cournot and Renouvier’s views on scientific revolution, tried to read Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolution back into their works, or did not fully appreciate the extent to which these philosophers were reflecting on the works of their predecessors as well as on developments in mathematics and the sciences. Cournot’s views on cumulative development through revolution resemble Comte’s more than Kuhn’s, and his notion of prog…Read more
  • Recent controversy over whether the Vienna Circle can provide a model for today’s political turn in the philosophy of science indicates the need to clarify just what is meant by the term political philosophy of science. This paper finds fourteen different meanings of the term, including both descriptive and normative usages, having to do with the roles of political values in the sciences, the political consequences and significance of the sciences and scientific modes of thought, and political p…Read more
  • Fraud and Misrepresentation in Research: Whose Rights?
    IRB: Ethics & Human Research 6 (5): 10. 1984.
  •  1
    Fraud and the Norms of Science
    Science, Technology, and Human Values 8 (4): 12-22. 1983.
  •  13
    From positivism to conventionalism: Comte, Renouvier, and Poincaré
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 80 102-109. 2020.
    Considered in its historical context, conventionalism is quite different from the way in which it has been caricatured in more recent philosophy of science, that is, as a conservative philosophy that allows the preservation of theories through arbitrary ad hoc stratagems. It is instead a liberal outgrowth of Comtean positivism, which broke with the Reidian interpretation of the Newtonian tradition in France and defended a role for hypotheses in the sciences. It also has roots in the social contr…Read more
  • Taylor ic Francis. London and Washington. Dc 0269-172bc1992) 6: 1-#
    with Sonia Ryang, Steven I. Miller, Carl Matheson, Harold Brown, Govindan Parayil, Steven Yearley, and Stephen Turner
    Social Epistemology 6 102. 1992.
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    Henri Poincaré and Charles Renouvier on Conventions; or, How Science Is Like Politics
    Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2): 182-198. 2017.
  • Method, Mind, and Mental Imagery in Auguste Comte
    Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 1980.
    We cannot accept wholly Comte's substantive claim that discovery is a purely non-verbal process. Still, Comte has given us a useful model. The analysis of case studies from the history of scientific method and discovery should serve to illustrate important operations of the human mind. Thus, any philosophy of mind must incorporate and account for such operations. ;Comte was indebted to Kant in his search for the necessary conditions for knowledge. Unlike Kant, Comte starts with an analysis of ou…Read more
  •  32
    Is Durkheim the enemy of evolutionary psychology?
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1): 25-52. 2003.
    an exemplar of an approach that takes the human mind to be largely the product of social and cultural factors with negligible contributions from biology. The author argues that on the contrary, his sociological theory of the categories is compatible with the possibility of innate cognitive capacities, taking causal cognition as his example. Whether and to what extent there are such innate capacities is a question for research in the cognitive neurosciences. The extent to which these innate capac…Read more
  •  3
    Review (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 11 (1): 203-208. 1995.
    The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory, Marwell Gerald and Oliver PamelaOn Social Facts, Gilbert Margaret.
  •  51
    : It has been said that Kant's critical philosophy made it impossible to pursue either the Cartesian rationalist or the Lockean empiricist program of providing a foundation for the sciences (e.g., Guyer 1992). This claim does not hold true for much of nineteenth century French philosophy, especially the eclectic spiritualist tradition that begins with Victor Cousin (1792-1867) and Pierre Maine de Biran (1766-1824) and continues through Paul Janet (1823-99). This tradition assimilated Kant's tran…Read more
  •  16
    Whither social epistemology? A reply to Fuller
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2): 196-202. 1991.
  •  46
    The empirical character of methodological rules
    Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 106. 1996.
    Critics of Laudan's normative naturalism have questioned whether methodological rules can be regarded as empirical hypotheses about relations between means and ends. Drawing on Laudan's defense that rules of method are contingent on assumptions about the world, I argue that even if such rules can be shown to be analytic in principle (Kaiser 1991), in practice the warrant for such rules will be empirical. Laudan's naturalism, however, acquires normative force only by construing both methods and e…Read more
  •  23
    A Reappraisal Of Comte's Three-state Law
    History and Theory 21 (2): 248-266. 1982.
    Comte's three-state law concerns the historical development of our methods of cognitive inquiry. Comte believes he can defend his three-state law either by :,rational proofs" based upon our knowledge of the human mind or upon 'historical verifications." Comte then uses the three-state law of scientific progress to argue for the existence of industrial and multistate political laws of progress. Here Comte strays from his positivism. He attributes a kind of causal efficacy to scientific progress w…Read more
  •  55
    Science and the Social Contract in Renouvier
    Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (1): 73-100. 2011.
    Renouvier criticized Comte’s positivist philosophy of science and proposed a social contract approach for dealing with normative questions in philosophy of science as well as moral philosophy. Renouvier then questioned Kant’s distinction between practical and theoretical reason and argued that judgments concerning epistemic warrant must be freely made in the same way that moral judgments are made. What counts as scientific knowledge depends on a consensus within the scientific community that dev…Read more
  • Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition
    Cambridge University Press. 2004.
    This book offers a reassessment of the work of Emile Durkheim in the context of a French philosophical tradition that had seriously misinterpreted Kant by interpreting his theory of the categories as psychological faculties. Durkheim's sociological theory of the categories, as revealed by Warren Schmaus, is an attempt to provide an alternative way of understanding Kant. For Durkheim the categories are necessary conditions for human society. The concepts of causality, space and time underpin the …Read more
  •  2
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 11 (1): 203-208. 1995.
    The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory, Marwell Gerald and Oliver PamelaOn Social Facts, Gilbert Margaret
  •  3
    The “demands of the day” to which the title refers concern the problems associated with doing ethical anthropology in the twenty-first century. Rabinow and Stavrianakis intend to draw lessons for anthropologists from their experiences as participant observers attempting to collaborate with scientists on analyzing ethical issues in biological research. But they come across as naive and inexperienced about engaging scientists in ethical discourse and recount an unhappy tale illustrating exactly th…Read more
  •  26
    Durkheim, Jamesian pragmatism and the normativity of truth
    History of the Human Sciences 23 (5): 1-16. 2010.
    In his lectures on pragmatism presented in the academic year 1913—14 at the Sorbonne, Durkheim argued that James’s pragmatist theory of truth, due to its emphasis on individual satisfaction, was unable to account for the obligatory, necessary and impersonal character of truth. But for Durkheim to make this charge is only to raise the question whether he himself could account for the morally obligatory or normative character of truth. Although rejecting individualism may be necessary for explaini…Read more
  •  6
    The Concept of Analysis in Comte’s Philosophy of Mathematics
    Philosophy Research Archives 8 205-222. 1982.
    This paper traces August Comte’s attempts to get clear about the concept of mathematical analysis at various stages in his intellectual development. Comte was especially concerned with distinguishing a method of analysis for the resolution of complex prolems from analysis in the sense of a method of drawing inferences. Geometrical analysis serves as his model for the former. In his attempt to get clear about this notion, he discovers an historical succession of different methods all of which may…Read more
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