Gregory B Sadler

My paper was commissioned by Journal of Philosophy to provide a piece adequately explaining the significance of the Lacanian Mirror stage within Lacan's larger work. I focus on the transition from the mirror stage to the incorporation of the subject into the symbolic order. I argue that the mirror stage is transitional and that its significance lies in what of it is incorporated into and transformed within the more complex structures of the subject and the unconscious. Implicit in my claim is that "lacanian" theories which hypostatize the mirror stage into a determinate structure of adult consciousness are misinterpreting Lacan. I use Seminars 1 and 2 to make fuller sense the mirror stage as presented in his Ecrits

Passages in Aristotle’s Politics Book 3 are cited in discussions of the “rule of law”, most particularly sections in 1287a where the famous characterization of law as “mind without desire” occurs and in 1286a where Aristotle raises and explores the question whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws. My paper aims, by exegetically culling out Aristotle’s position in the Politics, Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric, to argue that his view on the rule of law and its relations to human subjects is considerably more complex and considerably more interesting. Despite Aristotle’s dictum, laws are not expressions or institutions of a pure and passionless rationality, and in order to be framed, understood and administered well, one must both have the sort of solid understanding of virtues, vices, passions, and motives of human action that Aristotle’s moral philosophy provides and have developed, at least to some degree, certain virtues. My paper focuses particularly on three themes: the role of the passions and desires in judgment, action, virtues and vices; the inescapability of passions and desires in the functioning of law; the possibility for rule of law and a certain level of virtue to be mutually supporting.

An important issue raised and resolved in St. Anselm’s Proslogion is the compatibility between justice and mercy as divine attributes. In this paper I argue (1) that Anselm’s discussion of divine justice and mercy is an exploration of God’s nature as quo maius cogitari non potest, and (2) that his discussion contributes to a better understanding of the complicated relationship between God and creatures—including the creatures attempting to know or argue about God. It seems at first that God’s mercy must be in contradiction with God’s justice. On the basis of a more adequate way of framing the issue, however—one that requires reference to other parts of the Proslogion and is supported by the Monologion—we can grasp, though not fully comprehend, the harmony between divine justice and divine mercy.

This volume of translations of early Kant reception, both of critics and of a few defenders, makes available important texts, both for study of modern philosophy and for contemporary discussion of the relevance of Kant’s immense historical influence. The volume’s five sections address several of the main problems posed by the theoretical part of Kant’s Critical Philosophy to his contemporaries, in particular the three central discussions centered on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Idealism, and the Categories. The volume is heavily endnoted, providing many useful supplementary discussions and a wealth of references to other relevant works; two appendices give short sketches of the authors and other important figures in early Kant reception, and there is a glossary of German terms.

In Maurice Blondel’s work, the problem of immortality is dealt with in terms of one’s resolution of the problem of human destiny articulated in the form of a self-determinative option. Although this option can take many determinate forms, it is ultimately one between egoism and selfishness or mortification and charity. In the course of this paper, I outline this opposition and indicate in particular how it bears on intellectual life and culture. For Blondel, the theoretical and the practical could not be neatly separated; thinking and expression are forms of action, and action requires structuring for its intelligibility and fruition. One commits oneself and forms the elements of one’s ultimate judgment, not only by what one does, but also by what one says or thinks, what doctrines and institutions one commits oneself to.

Aristotle figures significantly in the recent boom of literature on forgiveness, particularly accounts wishing to construe forgiveness as a virtue. While his definition of anger is often invoked, he is also a foil for accounts valuing forgiveness more than did Aristotle. I argue through interpretive exegesis of Aristotle’s texts that, while there are definite limits on forgiveness in his thought, so that his notion of forgiveness does not extend as far as in Christian ethics, it does play a significant role in his ethics. Forgiveness is particularly connected with the emotion and dynamic of anger, and my paper examines Aristotle’s discussions of anger, hatred and righteous indignation, indicating how forgiveness fits into these. Finally, I express my suspicions of recent accounts attempting to construe forgiveness itself as a virtue, arguing it is traditionally and more adequately understood as governed by virtues, in particular mildness (praōtēs) as Aristotle articulates it.

A prominent theme of Jacques Derrida's recent work has been that of responsibility. He has attempted to approach moral issues and philosophy without abandoning his philosophical project of deconstruction, a project that in the past has seemed critical if not outright hostile to moral philosophy. Moral and philosophical reflection is situated, and by the time one can even start posing questions, one is already embroiled for better or for worse, in a moral situation for which one bears some responsibility, and which also involve a responsibility of reflection as well as action. Adopting a confessedly conservative reading of Derrida, I argue that his recent philosophy does allow for the possibility of morality to be realized through philosophical and moral projects, and that the ever-present possibility of these lapsing into irresponsibility does not undermine the positive, though contingent and gratuitous, achievement of responsibility when it does take place.

Freedom, justice, and inclinations of the will have significant roles in St. Anselm’s moral theory, as does, I argue, virtues and vices, which can be understoodin relation to freedom and justice and as inclinations of the will. The first section of the paper discusses the relationship between freedom, justice, and the will inAnselm’s works. The second part explores Anselm’s distinctions between different aspects of the human will, as will-as-instrument, will-as-use, and will-as-inclination, then examines his further distinction of the latter into the will-for-justice and will-for-benefit. The third part then argues that the will-as-inclination-for-justice takes determinate forms as virtues, which may be understood as ways of properly using and preserving human freedom.

In this paper, I distinguish four ways to ask the question whether morality must be grounded in God. One asks whether or not God is the ultimate source for moral goodness, values, or standards. A second way asks whether a minimal morality, purified of any explicit reference to God, could not be worked out on bases of common human experience and rational reflection. A third way asks whether some kind of divine revelation is required for morality to be adequately understood or worked out. A fourth way asks whether a person requires practical engagement with God in adequately live out a sufficiently moral life. I then examine Anselm of Canterbury's responses to each of these questions. The first part examines the issue of God as the origin of moral value and standards. The second part shift to a vantage point taking Anselm’s God out of the picture, in order to outline a morality based upon the exercise of a natural human practical rationality. The third and fourth part address what Anselm would see as shortcomings of such an approach to morality. The third part focuses on guidance and assistance Anselm thinks Christianity provides to human reason in developing a more adequate morality. The fourth part looks at the indispensable role Anselm accords to God and to Christianity, understood not only as belief or practice, but as community and experience.

Maurice Blondel's later works address the problem of the relationship between the Catholic Church and tradition and modernity. This dissertation situates Blondel's developed position between the analyses of modern philosophy and culture developed in the encyclicals Pascendi Dominicus Gregis and Fides et Ratio. Modernism in Catholic circles bears implications for philosophy in general, since modernism has its source in modern philosophy and the culture it gives rise to and reinforces. Three key concepts operating in Blondel's later works are the concrete logic, the philosophy of insufficiency, and the option between egoism and charity. The concrete logic is a logic of the moral life, a logic in which opposition is fundamentally on the basis of hexis and steresis instead of the apophasis and kataphasis , equivalent to the inclusion and exclusion of abstract logic. Use of a logic in philosophy is unavoidable, and inadequate philosophical positions are the result of reliance on abstract logic where a concrete logic is both required and secretly relied upon. The philosophy of insufficiency works within the concrete logic. It has a critical function of assessing and uncovering the insufficiency of the claims made by other philosophical systems, and it has a reconstructive function of leading the human subject towards what could allow it to be rendered sufficient, a supernatural order. This supernatural order imposes a requirement for the human subject to make an option either for egoism of for charity. Modernism represents one modality of the option for egoism, and the option for charity can lead not only to the supernatural order but also to recognition of the continued importance of the Catholic tradition in supporting and keeping intelligible the option for charity

My paper highlights one Personalist aspect of St. Anselm's Platonic perspective, namely the ontological priority and interpenetration of persons. The paper first discusses Anselm's metaphysical Platonism, then charts the Anselmian path towards God, through participation in the divine attributes. It then focuses on images of persons, and their degree of being. I argue that, at least for certain human relationships marked by strong love or friendship, Anselm regards the image of the person as mediating the being of the person imaged

The Four ages contains a brief explicit discussion of the issue of Christian philosophy, referencing the Middle Ages and the 1930s French debates about Christian philosophy. Closer attention to the debates reveals a plurality of positions rather than unanimous agreement on Christian philosophy, indicating that the quite complex issues were not resolved. In this review article, I contest Deely’s interpretation of Maritian’s position, provide an exegesis of Maritain’s position, argue that Deely’s explicit position is identifiable as very close to Neo-Scholastic opponents of Christian philosophy during the debates, and briefly discuss Gilson’s and Blondel’s criticisms of such positions articulated during the 1930s debates. I also indicate that despite his opposition to Christian philosophy, Deely shares several key insights with its proponents, and I end by suggesting but not developing a few ways Deely’s semiotic approach could bear additional fruit for postmodern Christian philosophy’s ongoing projects of self-understanding.