Murray Smith

Characters—those imaginary agents populating the fictional worlds we spend so much time absorbed in—are ubiquitous in our lives. We track their fortunes, judge their actions and attitudes, and respond to them with anger, amusement, and affection—indeed, the whole palette of human emotions. Often enough, powerfully drawn characters transcend the stories to which they owe their genesis, migrating into our imaginations and deliberations about the actual world. And yet there has been remarkably little sustained and systematic reflection on these creatures that engage our minds and shape our feelings in equal measure. In Engaging Characters, Murray Smith sets out a comprehensive theory of character, exploring the role of characters in our experience of narrative and fiction. While focussing on film, Smith’s analysis also illuminates character in literature, opera, song, cartoons, new media, and social media. At the heart of Smith’s account is an explanation of the capacity of characters to move us. Teasing out the different dimensions of character, Smith explores the means by which films draw us close to characters, or hold us at a distance from them, and how our beliefs and attitudes are formed (and sometimes reformed) by these encounters. Integrating these arguments with research on emotion in philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and anthropology, Engaging Characters advances an account of the nature of fictional characters and their functions in fiction, imagination, and human experience as a whole. Opening with a Foreword by David Bordwell, in this revised, twenty-fifth anniversary edition of Engaging Characters, Smith refines and extends the arguments of the first edition, with a substantial new Afterword reviewing the debates on emotion, empathy, and character inspired by the book.

We hypothesize that fictional stories are highly successful in human cultures partly because they activate evolved cognitive mechanisms, for instance for finding mates (e.g., in romance fiction), exploring the world (e.g., in adventure and speculative fiction), or avoiding predators (e.g., in horror fiction). In this paper, we put forward a comprehensive framework to study fiction through this evolutionary lens. The primary goal of this framework is to carve fictional stories at their cognitive joints using an evolutionary framework. Reviewing a wide range of adaptive variations in human psychology–in personality and developmental psychology, behavioral ecology, and evolutionary biology, among other disciplines –, this framework also addresses the question of interindividual differences in preferences for different features in fictional stories. It generates a wide range of predictions about the patterns of combinations of such features, according to the patterns of variations in the mechanisms triggered by fictional stories. As a result of a highly collaborative effort, we present a comprehensive review of evolved cognitive mechanisms that fictional stories activate. To generate this review, we (1) listed more than 70adaptivechallengeshumans faced in the course of their evolution, (2) identified the adaptive psychological mechanisms that evolved in response to such challenges, (3) specified four sources of adaptive variability for the sensitivity of each mechanism(i.e., personality traits, sex, age, and ecological conditions), and (4) linked these mechanisms to the story features that trigger them. This comprehensive framework lays the ground for a theory-driven research program for the study of fictional stories, their content, distribution, structure, and cultural evolution.

This chapter maps out a variety of historical and contemporary debates concerning the values embodied by film and other arts. I hold that a proper understanding of aesthetic value sees it as a core member of that family of values—epistemic, ethical, political, and aesthetic—collectively essential to human flourishing, rather than peripheral to it. In this sense, the aesthetic dimension is not only an essential aspect of film as an art, but a crucial aspect of life well-lived and fully realized. I also address a related methodological question: what is the relationship between the descriptive and explanatory nature of (positive) psychology, and the normative character of claims about human flourishing? I argue in favour of a broad, “co-operative naturalism” to defend the relevance of scientific psychology to value-laden domains. Throughout, I develop these arguments in relation to _Remain in Light_, the 1980 album by Talking Heads.

This chapter advances a definition of empathy as *other‐focussed personal imagining,* a definition which at once distinguishes empathy from various lower‐level phenomena such as affective mimicry and emotional contagion, and specifies the relationship between such processes and fully‐fledged empathy. This account of empathy is then contextualized and developed further in relation to two other recent proposals. The theory of the *extended mind* stresses the way in which the human mind amplifies its capacities by the exploiting the world beyond the physical boundaries of the body; empathy may be both a mechanism and a beneficiary of such extension, its power being enhanced through the practice of narration. The theory of *expanded cognition* lays a related emphasis on the way in which everyday perceptual and cognitive routines are often stretched in the context of art; the scope and intensity of empathy may be expanded by narrative artworks in just this way.

_The collection brings together a wide range of contributors, including both philosophers and film scholars. All of them address the question of whether philosophy can take the form of, or be articulated through, film._ A new text for the growing field of philosophy of film, engaging with a variety of questions concerning the relationship between film and art, aesthetics and philosophy. Explores a wide variety of forms and periods of film, such as the avant-garde, continental film and popular American cinema, to present diverse answers to this question. Draws on a range of films, from the works of Hitchcock to _Mission: Impossible_ and _Being John Malkovich_.

I explore the relevance of reflective equilibrium to aesthetic experience, judgement, and appreciation, framing this project in both descriptive and normative terms. I begin with an exposition of reflective equilibrium, construed as a theory of epistemic justification, and of aesthetic appreciation, characterised as an activity with an epistemic goal—namely, achieving an optimal understanding of an artwork or aesthetic object. I stress the broad purview of reflective equilibrium, as well as Rawls’ arguments on the importance of aesthetic activity in human experience, and thus its place in a theory of justice. These preliminary considerations set up a more detailed exploration of reflective equilibrium in action in the aesthetic domain. I develop the argument with reference to a range of cases, from mainstream filmmaking to twelve-tone composition, considering the place of reflective equilibrium in aesthetic appreciation in both its individual and collective guises, as well as its “wide” and “narrow” forms. I demonstrate how the application of reflective equilibrium in the context of the critical appreciation of art relates to a range of significant issues in aesthetics, via the examination of arguments from Sontag, Sibley, Walton, Carroll, and Gaut (among others). Finally I assess various objections to, and extensions of, the main argument, including the objection that aesthetic appreciation does not aim at understanding, and the proposal that the embodied, emotional dimension of aesthetic experience, which must be accommodated by reflective equilibrium in the context of aesthetics, may shed light on its nature and operation in other domains.

Aesthetic Cognitivism posits that artworks have the potential to enhance open-mindedness. However, this claim has not yet been explored empirically. Here, we present two experiments that investigate the extent to which two formal features of film – temporal and perspectival complexity - can ‘open our minds’. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the temporal complexity of film. Participants (Ntotal=100) watched a film (Memento) either in its original non-chronological order or the same film in a chronological order. In Experiment 2, we manipulated perspectival complexity in film. Participants (Ntotal=100) watched an excerpt from a film (Jackie Brown) that either included the perspectives of multiple characters on an event or a single character’s perspective on the same event. Film conditions in both experiments were further compared with a control condition in which participants did not watch a film (N=50). Participants’ open-mindedness was assessed in both experiments through four empirical indicators (creativity, imaginability, cognitive flexibility, openness to new evidence), and in Experiment 2 participants’ eye movements, heart rate and electrodermal activity were measured while watching the film. Results showed that watching films, regardless of their temporal or perspectival complexity, modulated only one facet of open-mindedness —cognitive flexibility— when compared to the no-film control condition, providing only limited support for the aesthetic cognitivist claim that artistic films can ‘open our minds’. Real-time measures in Experiment 2 revealed that pupil size and number of fixations were modulated by perspectival complexity: both were smaller when watching a film from multiple perspectives compared to a single perspective. Possible explanations for this difference are examined in relation to the viewers' cognitive processes involved in understanding and interpreting film content.

Što je manje ograničenja s kojima se susrećemo u umjetničkom stvaranju, to je veća naša umjetnička sloboda; kako tehnologija napreduje i pruža nam sve više opcija i sve veću kreativnu fleksibilnost, tako naša umjetnička sloboda cvjeta. Tako glasi narodna mudrost o ovom fenomenu. No je li ta mudrost doista mudra? Mnogi umjetnici i teoretičari umjetnosti smatraju da nije; za Stravinskog, “[š]to više ograničenja namećemo, to se više oslobađamo lanaca koji sputavaju duh”. U radu razmatram ortodoksno gledište i ovu alternativnu perspektivu kroz analizu ograničenja koja proizlaze iz fizičkih, psiholoških i tehnoloških čimbenika, kao i iz heterogene skupine rutinskih praksi koje nazivamo "konvencijama". Kako bih produbio analizu, oslanjam se na perspektivu "rješavanja problema" u umjetničkoj kreativnosti, ispitujući međudjelovanje između izuma i konvencija u umjetnosti, koristeći različite primjere iz filma i rock glazbe. Prema teoriji Jona Elstera, problemi s kojima se umjetnici suočavaju proizlaze iz mješavine izabranih, nametnutih i izmišljenih ograničenja; prema teoriji Davida Bordwella, ti se problemi mogu riješiti replikacijom, revizijom, sintezom ili odbacivanjem postojećih rješenja. Zaključujem da ni pučka teorija, ni alternativna teorija nisu točne; umjesto toga, postoji "idealna zona" umjetničke kreativnosti smještena između onemogućujućeg viška opcija i sputavajuće oskudice istih. Tvrdim da Stravinskijeva protu-teorija umjetničke kreativnosti, iako nije doslovno istinita, djeluje kao "sretna neistina" – epistemološki vrijedna pretjerana korekcija.

The medium of film is used for a wide range of purposes – not only for art and entertainment, but as a tool of information dissemination, scientific enquiry, advertising, and political campaigning. While having received most attention in the context of film art, imagination and creativity are relevant to the use of film for all these purposes, because both are ubiquitously relevant to purposeful behavior and problem-solving cognition across all domains of human activity. Various modes of imagining (propositional, sensory-experiential, and empathic), along with the relationship between imagination and creativity, different types of creativity, and the importance of constraints and problems in spurring creative agency, are explored in the light of their pertinence to film. The distinction and the symbiotic relationship between creative and recreative imagining are outlined. The dynamic, embedded, and extended nature of the creative imagination in the context of filmmaking is limned, and an argument concerning the authentic mark of the creative presented.

What is the relationship between detailed critical analysis and the background assumptions made by a given theory of film spectatorship? In this article, I approach this question by looking at Vittorio Gallese and Michele Guerra's The Empathic Screen in the light of the method of triangulation—the coordination and integration of phenomenological, psychological, and neuroscientific evidence, as set out in my Film, Art, and the Third Culture. In particular, I examine Gallese and Guerra's arguments concerning the role of camera movement in prompting immersive, embodied simulation, as well as critiques of these arguments from David Bordwell and Malcolm Turvey. I focus on the special, irreducible role of critical analysis in these arguments. Detailed analysis of film form and style plays an essential role, I argue, in demonstrating the plausibility (or otherwise) of the thesis advanced by Gallese and Guerra. Such analysis is where the rubber of theoretical assumptions meets the road of the material work.

Philosophers and other scholars have often claimed that the arts are not only cognitively valuable but also morally improving (e.g., Nussbaum, 1997). However, their arguments often proceed with little attention to empirical evidence. At the same time, filmmakers and media creators deliberately use devices to direct their audience’s attention, with the intention of impacting viewers’ cognitive, affective, and neurological responses in meaningful ways (Carroll & Seeley, 2013). Whether these devices have the desired effects, and on whom, also remains largely untested. If we want to understand the ways that film and media can have moral impacts, we must step out of our disciplinary siloes. It is not enough for film experts, philosophers, and experimentalists to merely take note of each other’s work; collaborative interdisciplinary research is required, both to improve methods and to examine questions that have not yet been empirically explored. In this article we propose a model for this kind of research, focusing on how media can influence moral understanding. We first outline the challenges that must be met for such research to be successful, including clarifying and operationalizing concepts, measuring moral understanding, and applying empirical methods to media and the arts. We then describe the advantages of interdisciplinary collaboration for meeting these challenges, in the context of some recent examples of interdisciplinary projects on related themes.

In ‘Rethinking Nature,’ Shaun Gallagher makes the case for a non-reductive, naturalized phenomenology. In doing so, he seeks to close the metaphysical gap between world and mind by pursuing a ‘world > mind’ strategy, conforming the natural world to the world of reason and experience. Here I assess the merits of this approach by comparison with the alternative ‘mind > world’ strategy, whereby the the world of reason and experience is conformed to the natural world. This latter approach is exemplified by the method of ‘triangulating’ the mind through the integration of experiential, psychological, and neurophysiological evidence. While sympathetic to Gallagher’s ambition and aspects of his approach, I raise some doubts about the anti- or non-representational model of mind that he believes his revisionist metaphysics of nature supports. Arguably, representational assumptions are built into the concepts of perception, the senses, and the mind itself. Thus, even if the metaphysical gap between mind and world can be closed, the epistemic gap between an agent and its environment must still be bridged by the engine of representation that is the extended and embodied mind.

The symposium published here began life as a somewhat unusual ‘author meets critics’ session at the British Society of Aesthetics annual conference, at St Anne’s College, Oxford, on 16 September 2016 – unusual inasmuch as the focus was not on a single book, but on two books (Bence Nanay’s Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception and Murray Smith’s Film, Art, and the Third Culture) exploring different but related themes. In addition, rather than encompassing all the issues these two books address, the session focused on one general question that both books explore in some depth: is psychology relevant to aesthetics?

A few years ago I gave a paper on the aesthetics of ‘noise,’ that is, on the ways in which non-musical sounds can be given aesthetic shape and structure, and thereby form the basis of significant aesthetic experience. Along the way I made reference to Arnold Schoenberg's musical theory, in particular his notion of Klangfarbenmelodie, literally ‘sound colour melody,’ or musical form based on timbre or tonal colour rather than on melody, harmony or rhythm. Schoenberg articulated his ideas about Klangfarbenmelodie in the final section of his Harmonielehre. ‘Pitch is nothing else but tone colour measured in one direction,’ wrote Schoenberg. ‘Now, if it is possible to create patterns out of tone colours that are differentiated according to pitch, patterns we call ‘melodies’…then it must also be possible to make such progressions out of the tone colours of the other dimension, out of that which we simply call “tone colour.”’ In other words, traditional melodies work by abstracting and structuring the dominant pitch characterizing a musical sound, while ‘sound colour melodies’ work, Schoenberg argues, by structuring the combined set of pitches contained in a given musical sound. Schoenberg is emphatic that, although a neglected and underdeveloped possibility within Western classical music, ‘sound colour melody’ is a perfectly legitimate and viable form of musical expression; indeed for Schoenberg it is a musical form with enormous potential.