Maria Gonzalez

RESUMEN Partiendo de algunas experiencias del presente, se retoma la interpretación nietzs cheana del resentimiento para explorar la complejidad y ambivalencia del fenómeno e iluminar cuestiones actuales. Así, se vinculan dos tendencias y sus implicaciones: cómo el resentimiento genera la fijación de una identidad amenazadora que lleva a la estigmatización de un otro, a la vez como una forma de rechazo de la contingencia histórica; y cómo el vínculo del resentimiento con la temporalidad, en particular con un tipo de memoria, produce una incapacidad para asumirla creadoramente. Esta reflexión deja abiertas preguntas sobre cómo los cuerpos afectados por el resen timiento pueden revertirlo y dar lugar a formas más vitales de relación con el mundo. ABSTRACT On the basis of selected experiences from the present, the article revisits the Nietzschean interpretation of resentment in order to explore the complexity and ambivalence of the phenomenon and shed light on current issues. To that effect, it connects two tendencies and their implications: the manner in which resentment generates the fixation of a threatening identity that leads to the stigmatization of an other, which, at the same time, involves a rejection of historical contingency; and the manner in which the link between resentment and temporality, in particular with a type of memory, produces an incapacity to assume it creatively. This reflec tion leaves questions open regarding how bodies affected by resentment can twist it around and give rise to more vital forms of relating to the world.

Contemporary Cognitive Psychology has developed a research program that has two assumptions: 1) superior cognitive functions are representations and 2) to know is to compute. Therefore representations are the main theorefical concept. Traditionally two theories argue about the status of imagery in cognitive process. Images are considered mere epiphenomena from the descriptionalistic point of view. By the contrary, the imaginistic theories support images as genuine phenomena to be explain. Different interpretations of empirical tests are claimed. In 1978 J. R. Anderson considered that it is impossible to settle the debate appealing to behavioural data. He proposed a general and formal argument to prove that given any pair is possible to build other pairs with different representations for the same behavioural data. Differences in representations are made amends for different processes. In this paper, consequences of Anderson´s argument are put into question and another strategy for considering imagery is suggested

M. A. Quintanilla described two different approaches concerning the relationship between science and technics: the intelectualist and the pragmatist. In this paper two different models of knowledge taken for granted by both approaches are identified and developed. Bunge´s and Villoro´s thesis about science and technics are used for filling out the models. They received critical commentaries which are analyzed. It is suggested that both models are lacking in a theory about representations as a previous step