Delphine Antoine-Mahut

La revendication de la capacité de la science mécaniste nouvelle à prolonger la vie, dans des proportions dont on s’est souvent complu à exhiber le caractère irrationnel, est plus complexe qu’il n’y paraît. L’étude du détail des textes de Descartes, en particulier de la correspondance, montre ainsi que ce n’est pas d’abord l’étude de la médecine, si parfaite et démonstrative soit-elle, qui peut fournir à l’homme les moyens de vivre mieux et plus longtemps. C’est, inversement, la mise au jour des pouvoirs de l’âme sur ses représentations, donc sur le corps auquel elle est jointe, qu’il faut privilégier. La problématique de la conservation de la santé se résout ainsi dans une éthique de la joie entée sur une psychophysiologie radicalement singulière

L’historiographie récente présente le débat sur les caméléons entre Perrault et Scudéry comme une opposition statique entre deux épistémologies : un empirisme mécaniste contre un empirisme a priori moral et, de ce fait, plus respectueux de l’intégrité de son objet. L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que c’est, au contraire, l’empirisme rigoureux de Scudéry qui fonde sa morale. En réinvestissant deux critères essentiels de cet empirisme : la préparation et la variation, et en discutant l’étiologie qui en résulte, Scudéry montre en effet, sur le même terrain que Perrault, que ce dernier ne fait pas un usage conséquent des principes épistémologiques faisant consensus dans la communauté savante qu’il représente. C’est pourquoi elle peut, selon ses propres termes, le mettre au « défi ».

The lasting effects of the debate over canon-formation during the 1980s affected the whole field of Humanities, which became increasingly engaged in interrogating the origin and function of the Western canon. In philosophy, a great deal of criticism was, as a result, directed at the traditional narrative of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century philosophies—a critique informed by postcolonialism as well as feminist historiography. D. F. Norton, L. Loeb and many others1 attempted to demonstrate the weaknesses of the tripartite division between rationalism, empiricism and critical philosophy.2 As time went on, symptoms of dissatisfaction with what has...

This volume explores the philosophy of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac. It presents, for the first time, English-language essays on Condillac's philosophy, making the complexity and sophistication of his arguments and their influence on early modern philosophy accessible to a wider readership. Condillac's reflections on the origin and nature of human abilities, such as the ability to reason, reflect and use language, took philosophy in distinctly new directions. This volume showcases the diversity of themes and methods inspired by Condillac's work. The chapters are divided into four thematic sections. Part 1 highlights themes and discussions that were central to Condillac's own philosophical thinking, thus laying the ground for the subsequent discussions that trace Condillac's influence in the 19th century and beyond. Part 2 focuses on the different ways in which Condillac's philosophy has been taken up, criticised and further developed in France. Part 3 discusses thinkers working in other European countries and parts of the world who took up Condillac's work. Finally, Part 4 looks at the practical applications of Condillac's philosophy in a variety of different fields, such as economics, psychology, psychopathology and deaf studies. Condillac and His Reception will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on early modern philosophy, history of science and intellectual history.

The term “coenesthesia” was introduced at the end of the eighteenth century by the German physiologist Johann Christian Reil to designate the general perception of the living body through the nerves. Over the course of the nineteenth century, this notion circulated widely not only in Germany, but also in France, where it was developed in particular by Théodule Ribot. However, a good sixty years before Ribot, Maine de Biran had already employed the notion of “coenesthesia” to indicate the “immediate feeling of existence,” which he distinguished from the apperception of the self in relation to the body. What Biran emphasized, in his philosophical appropriation of “coenesthesia,” is the impersonal and mostly unconscious nature of this feeling, which never leaves us and plays a key role in the shaping of our personal and conscious life, unnoticeably influencing the course of our ideas, our character, and the emotional tone of our perception of the world. The purpose of this article is to study Biran’s philosophical use of the notion of “coenesthesia” in the last phase of his philosophical reflection (1823–1824) in relation to the emergence of the problem of the unconscious.

René Descartes (1596-1650) is often presented as the founder of the "dualistic" thesis radically separating the soul from the body, in early modern philosophy. As such, he is likely to have initiated two kinds of revolutions: a revolution in the study of nature and living being(understood as inanimate), on the one hand; and a revolution in the study of the human mind(understood as the foundation of all knowledge), on the other. This entry focuses on his scientific work and overall reception, as a way of understanding the interaction of these two fields.

Au cœur de la pensée philosophique, une tension essentielle : des textes écrits dans une conjoncture donnée et incarnés dans des hommes singuliers conquièrent progressivement une forme d'intemporalité. Ils deviennent «classiques». L'objectif de ce volume collectif, réunissant une vingtaine d'études de cas, est de soumettre ces classiques à une double épreuve. D'une part, l'étude des réceptions et médiations intellectuelles montre que le travail de l'historien de la philosophie ne se résume pas à celui d'un antiquaire. D'autre part, la mise au jour des mécanismes d'activations et d'actualisations intellectuelles des classiques atteste de ce que la pensée philosophique ne saurait se réduire à un inventaire d'arguments décontextualisés. Il s'agit, en somme, de proposer une approche anthropologique de la pensée philosophique.

This volume explores the relationship between physics and metaphysics in Descartes' philosophy. According to the standard account, Descartes modified the objects of metaphysics and physics and inverted the order in which these two disciplines were traditionally studied. This book challenges the standard account in which Descartes prioritizes metaphysics over physics. It does so by taking into consideration the historical reception of Descartes and the ways in which Descartes himself reacted to these receptions in his own lifetime. The book stresses the diversity of these receptions by taking into account not only Cartesianisms but also anti-Cartesianisms, and by showing how they retroactively highlighted different aspects of Descartes' works and theoretical choices. The historical aspect of the volume is unique in that it not only analyzes different constructions of Descartes that emerged in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, but also reflects on how his work was first read by philosophers across Europe. Taken together, the essays in this volume offer a fresh and up-to-date contribution to this important debate in early modern philosophy.

The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism comprises fifty specially written chapters on Rene Descartes and Cartesianism, the dominant paradigm for philosophy and science in the seventeenth century, written by an international group of leading scholars of early modern philosophy. The first part focuses on the various aspects of Descartes's biography and philosophy, with chapters on his epistemology, method, metaphysics, physics, mathematics, moral philosophy, political thought, medical thought, and aesthetics. The chapters of the second part are devoted to the defense, development and modification of Descartes's ideas by later generations of Cartesian philosophers in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere. The third and final part considers the opposition to Cartesian philosophy by other philosophers, as well as by civil, ecclesiastic, and academic authorities. This handbook provides an extensive overview of Cartesianism - its doctrines, its legacies and its fortunes - in the period based on the latest research.

The Malebranchian Reception of Pascal’s Anthropology. The Question of the Transmission of Original Sin. The comparison between the theoretical positions of Pascal and Malebranche on the opportunity to shed light rationally on the ways of original sin proves to be highly instructive from three perspectives. On the one hand, it enlightens us on the strategy adopted in each of these apologetic projects towards the mobilization of physiological arguments with strong materialistic undertones. In return, it injects a little dynamism into their thwarted reception, especially at the time of the Enlightenment. Finally, this comparison establishes a subtle link between two authors who have been dealt with very sparsely by traditional commentaries, concerning their conception of the use of skepticism in epistemology. Thus, through the problem of the ways of sin transmission, this is not a rethinking of the relationships between reason and faith, but is, rather, a particular use of reason and of Descartes’ analyses.

This edited volume features 20 essays written by leading scholars that provide a detailed examination of L’Homme by René Descartes. It explores the way in which this work developed themes not just on questions such as the circulation of the blood, but also on central questions of perception and our knowledge of the world. Coverage first offers a critical discussion on the different versions of L'Homme, including the Latin, French, and English translations and the 1664 editions. Next, the authors examine the early reception of the work, from the connection of L'Homme to early-modern Dutch Cartesianism to Nicolas Steno's criticism of the work and how Descartes' clock analogy is used to defend two different conceptions of the articulation between anatomical observations and functional hypotheses. The book then goes on to explore L'Homme and early-modern anthropology as well as the how the work has been understood and incorporated into the works of scientists, physicians, and philosophers over the last 150 years. Overall, readers will discover how the trend over the last few decades to understand human cognition in neuro-physiological terms can be seen to be not something unprecedented, but rather a revival of a way of dealing with these fundamental questions that was pioneered by Descartes.

The story of L’Homme is a true novel. Its plot weaves itself along three intersecting points: an unfinished text, a copied or plagiarised text, and a corrected text. Telling this whole and complex story helps us to understand the true place of Descartes in the history of modern anthropology and in the contemporary attempt to explain cognition, memory, sensation and human health. In a nutshell, it is probably the best way to understand the Cartesian contribution to the vast philosophical programme of seeking to know oneself.

This paper studies Francisque Bouillier’s contribution to cousinian Spiritualism, from his first text on the History of Cartesian Philosophy from 1839 (revised version from 1842) to the publication of Du principe vital et de l’âme pensante (1864), a work which was likewise considerably amended as a result of the polemics it gave rise to. The paper is concerned with the reception of Leibniz in a double sense. In a positive sense, Bouillier managed to reintegrate in the caricature of the Cartesian soul conceived by the Cousinians, a force that was criticized by the latter. In a negative sense to the extent that, for Bouillier, the direct re-appropriation of Leibniz’s dynamic ontology was impossible without completely breaking with Cousin himself. Hence, Bouillier’s reception of Leibniz took the form of a progressive suppression of a monadological tendency in favor of a rehabilitation of a theory of minute perceptions. The primacy of the interior sense that results from this allowed him to construct a Descartes who is different from Cousin’s but without completely rejecting Cousin. This Descartes is probably closer to Malebranche than to Leibniz. In order, however, to understand this movement in the history of ideas and its lasting echoes in the history of philosophy, a simply study of the reception does not suffice. One must moreover study the importance of a whole series of mediations and prisms that constitute Bouillier’s intellectual framework. Here, I have focused on three such prisms : (1) the Cartesian prism itself, which has contributed to the identification of animism as a regression into scholasticism; (2) the Cousinian, prism, which assimilate all resurgence to culpable pantheism ; (3) the prism of the first translations and uses of the polemic between the major figure of Stahl and the way they are refracted in each other. This study is a contribution to a more general reflection on the categories and «labels» that we employ when telling, and telling ourselves, the histories of philosophy.

Resituating Descartes in any historical framework allows one to show how a radical philosophy was built against, but also along with, current and past doctrines. Taking seriously this intellectual struggle is worthwhile. But genetic analysis of the Cartesian corpus presents a real challenge. One pragmatic way of doing it is to begin with lexical clarification as proposed by Palkoska. His aim is to understand Descartes's conception of scientia, and to explain how cognition produces certain and evident true judgments. The main contribution of the book is to carefully point out all the "inconsistencies" and even "conflicting...

The writings by the 'state philosophers' of nineteenth-century France are often seen, either as entirely driven by political or ideological concerns, or reduced to mere history of philosophy. Hence, ironically, those who established the philosophical canon that still now informs philosophy teaching in France were themselves excluded from that canon. Using the heuristic concept of a philosophical figure, this contribution intends to show how, for these philosophers, historiography represented a seemingly inoffensive, but in reality extremely efficient, means of searching out philosophical alternatives to the institutionally dominant philosophy of Victor Cousin (1792-1867). Focalizing on the almost forgotten case of Joseph-Marie Degérando (1772-1842), I show how he used the philosophical figure of Descartes and how he used it to counter Cousin.

Spiritualism designates a philosophy that lays claim to the separation of mind and body and the ontological and epistemological primacy of the former. In France, it is associated with the names of Victor Cousin and René Descartes, or more precisely with what Cousin made of Descartes as the founding father of a brittle rational psychology, closed off from the positive sciences, and as a critic in respect to the empiricist legacy of the idéologues. Moreover, by considering merely the end result, severed from its polemical genesis, we are prevented from understanding how the category of experience constituted a crucial question for spiritualism itself. Through returning to the origin of these discussions in the 1826 preface to Cousin’s Fragments philosophiques, this essay pursues a threefold path: to show that the public birth of Cousinian spiritualism coincides with the affirmation of applying the experimental method, issuing from Bacon, to the study of facts of consciousness; that Cousin’s later evolution follows a process of radicalization—that is, in this context, of ontologization and of reduction; and that by recovering this genesis, we can distinguish many forms of spiritualisms committed to the experimental method, both in alliance with the early Cousin and against the later Cousin. In this way, we can rediscover the interwoven philosophical links, lost in the process of institutionalization, between metaphysical demands and empiricist concerns, or between “French” philosophy and the legacy of Condillac.