Jonathan Jacobs

Are principles of criminal justice derived from a broader conception of justice, or does criminal justice involve some of its own distinctive principles such that it is not—for example—an aspect of distributive justice? Examining considerations regarding luck and desert provides an illuminating approach to this issue. The notion of desert has largely been excised from a great deal of recent political theorizing, and in particular, it has been eliminated from many influential conceptions of distributive justice. It is widely held that the pervasiveness of luck renders desert inappropriate to contexts of distributive justice, and incompatible with the freedom and equality of persons in a just political community. Should considerations of desert also have a minimal role in criminal justice—where they seem to still be important? Are considerations of desert in the context of criminal justice consistent with persons being free and equal participants in a just political community? How are principles of criminal justice related to principles of distributive justice and political justice in an overall just society? Many scholars agree that criminal justice presupposes an adequately just society. Still, that leaves open just how criminal justice relates to justice overall. That is the present topic.

Recent developments in philosophy and in criminology indicate that there are significant respects in which the two disciplines can be mutually informing. Many philosophers are increasingly interested in exploring empirical aspects of philosophical claims, and criminologists are finding their way past the alleged fact/value distinction and are rediscovering the moral significance of facts, especially regarding punishment and desistance. In some recent criminological studies there are implicit links to the British moralists such as David Hume and Adam Smith, and to Aristotle as well. This paper explicates those links and some of the possibilities for philosophy and criminology to be mutually informing.

This response questions whether human relationships are morally basic in the manner the author suggests, and also whether reference to human relationships is necessary for explaining moral principles, obligations, and judgments. I argue that, often, those can be explicated without essential reference to human relationships, except perhaps in the respect that the moral issues concern human beings. Also, Kellenberger maintains that immorality is to be understood in terms of “violations” of human relationships. However, features other than facts about human relationships often do the main explanatory work in accounting for the wrongness of immoral actions. Indeed, it is often the case that facts about human beings are the basis for ascertaining the moral significance of human relationshipsand actions. Translation of moral principles into an idiom of human relationships would not be illuminating in a significant, novel manner. We already possess conceptual resources for explicating the moral phenomena with which Kellenberger is concerned. Those resources include concepts of elements other than, and more basic than, human relationships.

Jonathan Jacobs reviews The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand, in which David Kelley responds to Objectivists who refuse to dialogue with libertarians, and examines the debate among Objectivists over the interpretation of Rand's thinking. Kelley argues that Rand presents crucial insights and claims and that these need to be developed and elaborated and not viewed as a fixed doctrine. Jacobs focuses on where Kelley situates himself among Objectivists, and raises critical concerns about the effectiveness with which Rand's philosophy is articulated and defended. He questions how effectively Objectivism enters into philosophical debates to which it claims to contribute.

The article explores an intersection of moral psychology and political principles regarding criminal sanction. A liberal state cannot require that persons acquire certain states of character or lead certain specific kinds of lives; it cannot require virtue. Moreover, it would be wrong for the state to punish offenders in ways that damage their capacities for agency, and in ways that encourage vice. In the U.S. the terms and conditions of punishment often have deleterious effects on agential capacities, undermining the ability to reintegrate in civil society. Prison experience is often antithetical to maintaining or acquiring the dispositions of prudence, accountability, trust, and trustworthiness needed for participation in civil society, raising significant questions concerning the legitimacy of punishment.

The notions of autonomy and self-governance each capture something crucial about the moral dimensions of agents and actions. These notions are central to the ways in which we conceptualize ourselves and others. The concept of autonomy is especially crucial to understanding the distinct status of moral agents. For its part, self-governance has a significant relation to the evaluation of agents as individuals with particular characters, leading particular sorts of lives, and performing particular actions. Neither notion—autonomy nor self-governance—fully assimilates or dominates the other. Moreover, there are some important strains between them. There are certain forms of regard that the autonomy of an agent demands that are at odds with what an agent's exercise of self-governance merits. In this essay I plan to show this, and offer a diagnosis of why this is the case