Jonathan Jacobs

Claims from apophatic, or negative, theology—that God is ineffable, inconceivable, and incomprehensible, for example—are deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. But they are also deeply puzzling, perhaps even inconsistent. This chapter, focusing on claims of divine ineffability, defends their consistency by appealing to some ideas in contemporary metaphysics about fundamentality. In section 1, the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental truths is explained. Then, in section 2, the distinction is used to give a defense of divine ineffability. According to this defense, all truths about how God is intrinsically are non-fundamental. He is ineffable in the sense that one cannot assert any true, fundamental propositions about Him. Section 3 considers some objections and replies.

Medieval thought concerning motivation includes Platonic and Aristotelian elements integrated with theistic commitments. Often the view includes two fundamental sources of motivation: reason (love of the good) and inclination (desire for baser goods). Reason is widely held to have authority through understanding true goods, while inclination often leads us toward apparent or base goods. Gratitude toward God and free will are fundamental to medieval conceptions of moral motivation. Gratitude is owed to God for humans’ ability to know and to do what is perfective naturally and supernaturally. It helps shape morally sound motivation. Free will makes persons accountable for how they respond to different possible action-guiding considerations. In possessing intellect and will humans are created in the image of God, and capable of volition informed by knowledge. The discussion focuses on the relation between intellect and will, and on the role of responsiveness to God as crucial to moral motivation.

Are there key respects in which character and character defects are voluntary? Can agents with serious vices be rational agents? Jonathan Jacobs answers in the affirmative. Moral character is shaped through voluntary habits, including the ways we habituate ourselves, Jacobs believes. Just as individuals can voluntarily lead unhappy lives without making unhappiness an end, so can they degrade their ethical characters through voluntary action that does not have establishment of vice as its end. Choosing Character presents an account of ethical disability, expanding the domain of responsibility and explicating the role of character in ethical cognition. Jacobs contends that agents become ethically disabled voluntarily when their habits impair their ability to properly appreciate ethical considerations. Such agents are rational, responsible individuals who are yet incapable of virtuous action. The view develops and modifies Aristotelian claims concerning the fixity of character. Jacobs' interpretation is developed in contrast to the overlooked work of Maimonides, who also used Aristotelian resources but argued for the possibility of character change. The notion of ethical disability has profound ramifications for ethics and for current debates about blame and punishment.

Aristotle's ethical theorizing contains resources for explaining what I call ‘ethical disability’. In theories such as Kant's and Mill's it is important that criteria of right action be accessible to anyone. Aristotle's moral psychology yields a plausible account of how they are not available to everyone. Unless a correct appreciation of good is part of the agent's second nature, the agent will not recognize ethical requirements, and will not have the resources to alter his judgments. Often, bad action is not a matter of agents' flouting or violating criteria of right action that they recognize, but is a matter of agents' regarding as choiceworthy things that are in fact no good, and the agents are unable to appreciate this because of their vices. However, on the Aristotelian view, this is not a condition that diminishes responsibility, because of how voluntariness is interpreted. Some of the views of Susan Wolf and Bernard Williams are discussed in the development of this view of the moral landscape.

The enormous financial cost of criminal justice has motivated increased scrutiny and recognition of the need for constructive change, but what of the ethical costs of current practices and policies? Moreover, if we seriously value the principles of liberal democracy then there is no question that the ethics of criminal justice are everybody’s business, concerns for the entire society. _The Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics_ brings together international scholars to explore the most significant ethical issues throughout their many areas of expertise, anchoring their discussions in the empirical realities of the issues faced rather than applying moral theory at a distance. Contributions from philosophers, legal scholars, criminologists and psychologists bring a fresh and interdisciplinary approach to the field. The _Handbook _is divided into three parts: Part I addresses the core issues concerning criminal sanction, the moral and political aspects of the justification of punishment, and the relationship between law and morality. Part II examines criminalization and criminal liability, and the assumptions and attitudes shaping those aspects of contemporary criminal justice. Part III evaluates current policies and practices of criminal procedure, exploring the roles of police, prosecutors, judges, and juries and suggesting directions for revising how criminal justice is achieved. Throughout, scholars seek pathways for change and suggest new solutions to address the central concerns of criminal justice ethics. This book is an ideal resource for upper-undergraduate and postgraduate students taking courses in criminal justice ethics, criminology, and criminal justice theory, and also for students of philosophy interested in punishment, law and society, and law and ethics

Maimonides uses Aristotelian philosophical idiom to articulate his moral philosophy, but there are fundamental differences between his and Aristotle’s conceptions of moral psychology and the nature of the moral agent. The Maimonidean conception of volition and its role in repentance and ethical self-correction are quite un-Aristotelian. The relation between this capacity to alter one’s character and the accessibility of ethical requirements given in the Law is explored. This relation helps explain why for Maimonides practical wisdom is not recognized as a virtue, and why ethical perfection (a requirement for human perfection) is achievable even by those long-established in ethically unsound dispositions. The power of will to “restore the soul” (by following the prescriptions of the Law) when character is disordered is a significant departure from Aristotelian philosophical anthropology.

There are several reasonable conceptions of liberalism. A liberal polity can survive a measure of disagreement over just what constitutes liberalism. In part, this is because of the way a liberal order makes possible a dynamic, heterogeneous civil society and how that, in turn, can supply participants with reasons to support a liberal political order. Despite the different conceptions of justice associated with different conceptions of liberalism, there are reasons to distinguish the normative focus of criminal justice from other aspects of justice in a liberal polity. Given the fundamental commitments of liberalism?of whatever variant?there are reasons for criminal justice not to be assimilated to wider conceptions of justice overall. Such assimilation risks undermining some of liberalism's distinctive commitments concerning the standing of individuals as voluntary, responsible agents. Criminal justice is not independent of other aspects of justice but has a distinct focus in a liberal polity

Religious traditions can be sources of values and attitudes supporting the liberal polity in ways that political theorizing and conceptions of public reason often fail to recognize. moreover, religious traditions can give support through the ways reason is crucial to their self-understanding. one understanding of Judaism is examined as an example. Also, the particularism of traditions can encourage commitment to universally valid values and ideals. reason’s role in Judaism and other religious traditions makes possible constructive interaction between those traditions and between religious and secular thought. exclusion of religiously grounded considerations from the discourse and deliberations of liberal polities can be counterproductively illiberal.

The chapter explores the impact of long-term incarceration on an intersection of character, rational agency, and the ability to participate successfully in the civil society of a liberal polity. The chief claims are that (i) the concept of character does indeed have explanatory and ethical significance, and (ii) prevailing conditions of long-term incarceration in the US and UK often harm and worsen prisoners through their impact on dispositions constitutive of character. While a liberal polity should not require individuals to acquire virtues, neither should it cause them to have vices (or worsen their vices) in known and regular ways. The ways that prison conditions produce that result are considered, along with the respects in which this disables ex-prisoners for re-entering society. The relations between states of character and capacities for prudential self-determination are an important focus of the analysis.