Daniel Breazeale

Essays on one of Fichte's best known and most controversial works. One of J. G. Fichte’s best-known works, Addresses to the German Nation is based on a series of speeches he gave in Berlin when the city was under French occupation. They feature Fichte’s diagnosis of his own era in European history as well as his call for a new sense of German national identity, based upon a common language and culture rather than “blood and soil.” These speeches, often interpreted as key documents in the rise of modern nationalism, also contain Fichte’s most sustained reflections on pedagogical issues, including his ideas for a new egalitarian system of Prussian national education. The contributors’ reconsideration of the speeches deal not only with technical philosophical issues such as the relationship between language and identity, and the tensions between universal and particular motifs in the text, but also with issues of broader concern, including education, nationalism, and the connection between morality and politics. Daniel Breazeale is Professor of Philosophy and Distinguished Professor of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky. Tom Rockmore is Humanities Chair Professor and Professor of Philosophy at Peking University, China. Both have authored, edited, and translated many books. Together, they are the coeditors of Fichte’s Vocation of Man: New Interpretive and Critical Essays, also published by SUNY Press.

This issue 23 of FICHTEANA is dedicated to Daniel Breazeale, who passed away on 30 December 2023. "FICHTEANA Review of J.G. Fichte Research" is an annual online publication in English devoted to new scholarship on the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. It publishes information and reviews of the latest Fichte editions, books, publications, conferences, and Calls for Papers. Originally founded by Daniel Breazeale in 1993, since issue 22 (2022), FICHTEANA has appeared in an expanded form with book reviews. Editors: Daniel Breazeale (†) and David W. Wood; with associate editors Kienhow Goh and Gesa Wellmann.

The career of J. G. Fichte, a central figure in German idealism and in the history of philosophy, divides into two distinct phases: the first period, in which he occupied the chair of critical philosophy at the University of Jena (1794-1799); and the following period, after he left Jena for Berlin. Due in part to the inaccessibility of the German texts, Fichte scholarship in the English-speaking world has tended to focus on the Jena period, neglecting the development of this major thinker's mature development. The essays collected in this book begin to correct this imbalance. Concerned in a variety of ways with Fichte's post-Jena philosophy, these essays by distinguished and emerging scholars demonstrate the depth and breadth of Fichte scholarship being done in English. With an introduction that locates the essays in philosophical and historical terms, the book divides into three related categories: Fichte’s development, his view of religion, and other aspects of his "popular" (or not-so-popular) philosophy. From a wide range of perspectives, the essays show how Fichte’s later development reflects the philosophical concerns of his time, the specific debates in which he engaged, and the complex events of his philosophical career.

The German philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, has long been recognized as an important and original figure in the history of philosophy and Western thought and as a seminal influence upon the Romantic tradition. This book focuses on Fichte's contributions in political theory as set out in his Foundations of Natural Right. The essays, which examine such issues as Fichte as a social contract theorist, his theory of gender relations and his theories on punishment and the criminal law among many other topics, remedy what has been a striking lacuna in the existing scholarly literature.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte is a widely known transcendental philosopher and obviously a thinker of the first rank. Yet contemporary interest in and evaluation of "transcendental philosophy" as well as the precise meaning of the terms and its relation to "transcendental method" remains unclear. With renewed attention to German idealism in general and to Fichte in particular, this timely collection of new papers will be of interest to anyone concerned with transcendental philosophy, German idealism, modern German philosophy, and transcendental arguments.

First in the Phenomenology and then in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel rejects Fichte’s notion of conscience on the grounds that it leads to despair (since the agent can never be sufficiently well-informed to know that he is doing the “right” thing). He also criticizes Fichtean conscience as purely “formal” and “abstract” and compatible with any content, which it can obtain only arbitrarily from the manifold of one’s natural drives and inclinations. For Hegel, there is an unresolvable tension between the claimed “universality” of a conscientious deed and the natural particularity of every moral agent, which ultimately leads to ethical egoism and hypocrisy. The aim of this paper is to show, first, that Hegel misrepresents key aspects of Fichte’s position and, second, that Fichte possesses the resources to respond successfully to most of Hegel’s criticisms. In order to grasp this one must closely examine Fichte’s subtle and often misunderstand account of moral deliberation and conscientious decision-making and the relation of the same to his larger account of I-hood.

In his recent All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 2005), Paul Franks defends Maimonian skepticism and explicitly criticizes Fichte’s response to the same. I argue that Franks’ interpretation of Fichte’s response to skepticism is fundamentally flawed in that it ignores or misinterprets the critically important practical/moral dimension of Fichte’s response. I also challenge Franks’ interpretation of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre as a »derivation holistic monism« and argue for a more modest interpretation of the same and one more in keeping with Fichte’s appreciation of the force of philosophical skepticism and the limits of transcendental philosophizing.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 268-270 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Fichte: The Self and the Calling of Philosophy, 1762-1799 Anthony J. La Vopa. Fichte: The Self and the Calling of Philosophy, 1762-1799. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xiv + 449. Cloth, $54.95. Few philosophers have led more dramatic lives than J. G. Fichte, whose serendipitous ascent from rural poverty to academic celebrity was only the beginning of a career filled with conflict and punctuated by moments of public triumph and failure. Though Fichte's philosophical writings are among the most abstract and difficult in the history of modern philosophy, it is nevertheless possible to observe certain parallels between his technical "philosophy of striving" and his personal striving to establish himself financially and professionally, [End Page 268] to win an audience for his thought, and, above all, to have an effect upon his age. The links between Fichte's "times," career, and philosophy are the topic of Anthony La Vopa's fine new study of the first thirty-eight years of the philosopher's life. La Vopa is a historian, not a philosopher, and he has little to say about the specific details and originality of Fichte's philosophical contributions, and what he does say on this subject--for example, his claim that one of Fichte's advances over Kant was to assign the productive imagination a central role in cognition, or his assertion that Fichte collapsed the Kantian distinction between willing and cognizing--often betrays a certain naiveté on his part and an unfamiliarity with the specifically philosophical context of Fichte's project.Though La Vopa is not interested in the complex details of the foundational portion of Fichte's system and has nothing to say about the important evolution of the same during Fichte's tenure at Jena, he is quite concerned with Fichte's social, legal, and economic theories, as articulated in the Grundlage des Naturrechts and the ClosedCommercial State (despite the fact that the latter work really falls outside the "Jena period"), and he provides a detailed and enlightening account of Fichte's eccentric labor-based neo-mercantilism and its relationship to other economic theories. Even here, though, La Vopa is less interested in Fichte's own ideas than in the relation of the same to his life and the relation of both his life and his thought to larger intellectual and social currents. It is in this spirit that he attempts to show, for example, that Fichte's strategy of grounding both theoretical and practical reason upon an analysis of the "pure I" is best understood as a continuation of the "subjective turn" characteristic of Protestantism as a whole and that his Sisyphean efforts to create a Publikum for his philosophy were deeply rooted in the Protestant conception of a "calling."The aim of this volume, according to its author, is to "contextualize Fichte's construal of selfhood" and to view his thought through eighteenth-century lenses, rather than through "the distorting lenses of modern ideologies." La Vopa thus interprets the development of Fichte's thought as "a series of moments in the secularization of Lutheranism," a project that he finds most clearly expressed in Fichte's vision of spiritual regeneration and in his uncompromising moral rigor. This experiment in historical contextualization largely avoids the kind of anti-philosophical reductionism common to such efforts, and La Vopa never claims to have "explained" Fichte's philosophy simply by placing it so squarely in the context of its age. On the contrary, he displays a fine sensitivity to questions concerning the relationship between history and philosophy, and he wisely leaves it to his readers to judge for themselves the philosophical value of his enterprise. As an intellectual biography, this book is reliable, expertly informed, and genuinely readable. Any philosopher interested in early post-Kantianism will learn a great deal from La Vopa's account of the larger intellectual, social, economic, and political landscape of the period. To take but two examples: La Vopa's detailed discussion of...

As is indicated by its ungainly title, this is a monograph devoted to the first published version of J. G. Fichte's transcendental philosophy, and specifically to what is certainly his most famous and influential work, the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/5. Though few philosophical classics cry out more loudly for commentary and explication than Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, Hohler's new book is neither a commentary nor an introduction. Instead, it is a detailed study of several closely related themes in Fichte's early writings. All of these themes revolve around the central problem of "subjectivity." The issues addressed include: What was Fichte's understanding of the goal and method of philosophy? What is the "starting point" of philosophy, and must it begin with an "intellectual intuition"? If so, what is the nature of this "intellectual intuition," and does this imply that everything is ultimately comprised within or deducible from some "absolute I"? What are the transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience, and what is the specific function of the transcendental imagination in the "constitution" thereof? How is the I related to what is not-I, and, more importantly, how is one I related to another?

Fichte’s Ethical Thought follows a format familiar to those who have read Allen Wood’s books on the ethical thought of Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel: Wood integrates Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s work into topical chapters, each discussing an important component of Fichte’s ethical system. The text he focuses on, of course, is Fichte’s 1798 System of Ethics, but Fichte scholars will likely be pleased to find that Wood discusses a wide range of Fichte’s Jena-era writings. Wood makes use of Addresses to the German Nation, The Closed Commercial State, and earlier works such as Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s Vocation, especially in the final two chapters, which cover Fichte’s thought on public life, the...

Peu de philosophes ont autant insisté sur la différence entre la lettre et l’esprit d’une philosophie que Fichte. Breazeale prend Fichte au mot concernant cette distinction et tente de reconstituer ce qu’il appelle l’esprit de la philosophie d’Iéna, soit la première version de la philosophie que Fichte construisit entre 1793 et 1799. L’auteur montre combien Fichte est loin de la caricature de l’idéalisme débridé, interprétation qui prévalut chez les commentateurs classiques comme dans une certaine philosophie analytique. Il montre aussi comment une vulgate plus contemporaine qui tend à surinvestir l’aspect religieux (en valorisant notamment ce qu’on appelle la dernière philosophie) manque le sens et l’esprit de la philosophie d’Iéna et renoue ainsi avec l’interprétation traditionnelle d’un Fichte dogmatique et métaphysicien.