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Massimo La Torre

University of Hull
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  •  Publications
    103
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  • University of Hull
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Philosophy of Law
  • All publications (103)
  •  13
    Frei sein Jenseits von negativer und positiver Freiheit
    Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 92 (2): 164-194. 2006.
  •  16
    Theories of Legal Argumentation and Concepts of Law: An Approximation
    European University Institute. 1998.
  •  69
    A flag in the Wind. In memoriam Professor Sir Donald Neil MacCormick (1941-2009)
    Rechtstheorie 41 (2): 277-284. 2010.
  •  25
    Rules, Institutions, Transformations: Considerations on the Evolution of Law Paradigm
    European University Institute. 1995.
    Recoge: 1.Conceps of law. A Proposal -- 2.Evolutionary concepts -- 3.Neo-evolutionary theories -- 4.Evolution as learning -- 5.Law as autopoiesis -- 6.Towards a critique of the "Evolution of law" paradigm.
  •  113
    Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law
    Ratio Juris 12 (2): 182-195. 1999.
    After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences the European Union can no longer be conceived as an intergovernmental arrangement: It is a polity founded on an “overlapping consensus.” Consequently, to reconstruct the relations between national and Community law, legal monism does not work, neither in its statist, nor in its international version: Legal pluralism is needed, not in a sociological‐descriptive sense, but as a normative criterion by which a judge (and a citizen) must refer to many an…Read more
    After the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences the European Union can no longer be conceived as an intergovernmental arrangement: It is a polity founded on an “overlapping consensus.” Consequently, to reconstruct the relations between national and Community law, legal monism does not work, neither in its statist, nor in its international version: Legal pluralism is needed, not in a sociological‐descriptive sense, but as a normative criterion by which a judge (and a citizen) must refer to many and various sources of law to settle a dispute. Legal pluralism, however, can operate only under a rule of recognition: a common normative framework within which a reasonable number of sources can be handled. What Europe needs, therefore, is an interactionist constitution, which should emerge through an “open‐ended”discursive process.
    Philosophy of LawEvolutionary BiologyThe Nature of Law and Legal Systems
  •  30
    Law and Power. Preface to a Non-prescrptivist Theory of Law
    European University Institute. 1997.
    Political Theory
  •  33
    Disavventure del diritto soggettivo: una vicenda teorica
    . 1996.
  • Two Essays on Liberalism and Utopia
    European University Institute. 1998.
  •  26
    Norme, istituzioni, valori: per una teoria istituzionalistica del diritto
    Laterza. 1999.
    Philosophy of Law
  •  30
    La "lotta contro il diritto soggettivo": Karl Larenz e la dottrina giuridica nazionalsocialista
    . 1988.
  •  73
    Hannah Arendt and the Concept of Law. Against the Tradition
    Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 99 (3): 400-416. 2013.
    A permanent approach to what law is has been that of interpreting it in terms of repression or reduction of chances or courses of conduct. This approach, however, is not able to render justice to fundamental moments of the legal practice, beginning with constitutional law and its empowering rules. Nonetheless, the mainstream in the philosophy of law and in the legal theory has not at all been worried about this strange inadequacy of imperativism to offer a complete view of legal practice and leg…Read more
    A permanent approach to what law is has been that of interpreting it in terms of repression or reduction of chances or courses of conduct. This approach, however, is not able to render justice to fundamental moments of the legal practice, beginning with constitutional law and its empowering rules. Nonetheless, the mainstream in the philosophy of law and in the legal theory has not at all been worried about this strange inadequacy of imperativism to offer a complete view of legal practice and legal institutions. Force, violence, sanction, prescription still are the basic conceptual knots used to weave the cloth of law and lawyers. Hannah Arendt perceptive though scanty remarks on law, within her wider reflections on action and judgment, offer a different view and open a new path for a jurisprudence less obsessed with coercion, and against the tradition supporting the centrality of command in the tlegal domain. Such view and that path this paper tries sympathetically to explore
    Value TheoryPolitical Theory
  •  25
    Il diritto come istituzione
    with Neil Maccormick and Ota Weinberger
    . 1990.
  •  35
    A National-socialist Jurist on Crime and Punishment: Karl Larenz and the So-called 'Deutsche Rechtserneuerung'
    European University Institute. 1992.
    Socialism and Marxism
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