Brandon Look

This chapter reconsiders the character of Baumgarten’s supposed place in the rationalist tradition by pointing out that the strict opposition usually thought to hold between rationalism, empiricism, and theologically based philosophies in the eighteenth century tends to obscure the complexity of much of the thought of this period. In particular, Look examines the historical context and substance of Baumgarten’s thought, focusing on the principle of sufficient reason and Baumgarten’s definition of philosophy, and shows how in various ways the _Metaphysics_ seeks to unify strands from all three traditions.

One of the central features of Kant’s epistemology and philosophy of mind is the distinction between sensibility and understanding, the two stems of human cognition that work in conjunction to form valid objective judgments. The distinction between sensibility and understanding also underlies Kant’s criticism of his philosophical predecessors in the dogmatic and empiricist traditions. According to Kant, Leibniz’s failure to see the true nature of sensibility and the mental representations derived therefrom led to his unique and uniquely flawed metaphysics. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Leibniz is weaker than normally thought.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Individuation und Einzelnsein: Nietzsche, Leibniz, AristotelesBrandon C. LookPaola-Ludovika Coriando. Individuation und Einzelnsein: Nietzsche, Leibniz, Aristoteles. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2003. Pp. ix. + 318. €28,00.What is a singular thing? Is there a first or last principle that allows us to call something an individual or one? What is the relation between the particular and the universal? Does the being of a particular mean the separation from the universal, or, on the contrary, is the universal a post facto aggregation of individual subjects? What constitutes the individuality of man? This book, based on a lecture course given at the University of Freiburg, addresses these difficult questions and their answers by Nietzsche, Leibniz, and Aristotle.The author claims to limit the discussion to these philosophers because their philosophies represent distinct stations in the development of the question of individuation and the nature of individuality and, at the same time, because their different positions are both explicitly and implicitly related to each other (15). Coriando begins her discussion with Nietzsche, a philosopher one might not have linked at all to the "problem of individuation" per se, and moves backward in time to Leibniz and finally to Aristotle. The point of this order of presentation, the reader is told, is to trace back the essentials of the question of individuation to its origin: Aristotle (16). This strategy is largely successful.Nietzsche's primary concern, of course, is with the nature of the individual, or more particularly, the individual Mensch, and how he is distinguished from or distinguishes himself from the rest of the world. The answer, for Nietzsche, is to be found in his concept of the "will to power," which provides what Coriando calls his "ontological principle of individuation": the inherent drive for perspectival self-affirmation and self-increase (131). There is also, however, an "ethical principle of individuation": the attitude of a person vis-à-vis the eternal recurrence of the same. In accepting and letting go of the entirety of the world and its eternal recurrence, one "becomes who one is," and one can know one's individuality.Whereas Nietzsche tries to approach the problem of individuation independently of the entire western tradition of metaphysics, Leibniz is squarely within this tradition. Indeed, [End Page 121] in his first philosophical work, the Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of Individuation, the sixteen-year-old Leibniz throws himself into a scholastic fray, carving out a strongly nominalist position. Leibniz's belief that only genuine individuals exist would, of course, stay with him throughout his career; the problem will be, as Coriando nicely shows, to give a precise account of the nature of individual substance. Coriando focuses on two works in her discussion, On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance and, to a much greater extent, the Monadology. The view that she extracts from these works should not be surprising. The principle of individuation, for Leibniz, rests in the active force of a monad and in the particular representation of the rest of the world from the monad's own point of view. Put this way, there is an interesting commonality with Nietzsche at work here.A similar commonality is shown with the thought of Aristotle. Here the principal concern is to explicate Aristotle's conception of ousia in De anima and MetaphysicsZ, H, and Q. Naturally, this leads into an account of how matter can be living and a further explication of Aristotle's energeia and entelecheia. In the end, it becomes clear that the set of concepts—energeia, conatus, will to power—are all, if not equivalent, at least performing largely the same role in guaranteeing the being of individuals. What has become "lost" in Aristotle's philosophy, however, is a notion like the perspectivalism present in Leibniz and Nietzsche, something that Coriando does not discuss at any length.This book offers a broad perspective on the question of individuation, and the choice of Nietzsche, Leibniz, and Aristotle allows Coriando to highlight interesting answers to this metaphysical problem. I do have two small quibbles. First, the problem of individuation, or the desire for a principium individuationis is so much a problem associated with medieval philosophy that...

The Cambridge Companion to Humanism. Jill Kraye. Cambridge Companions to Literature. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xvii + 320. £35.00 hbk, £12.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–43038–0, 0–521–43624–9. Scepticism in the History of Philosophy ‐ A Pan‐American Dialogue. Edited by Richard H. Popkin. Dordrecht‐Boston‐London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. pp. xxii + 285, hbk, £99.00, ISBN 0–7923–3769–7 Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. David B. Ruderman. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995. pp. xi + 392. ISBN 0–300–06112–9 Pluralism and The Personality of the State. David Runciman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. xiv + 279. £35.00. ISBN 0521–55191–9 Gassendi et L'Europe. Edited by Sylvia Murr. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1997. pp. 494. FF 240. ISBN 2–7116–1306–2 Nicholas Malebranche: Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion. Edited by Nicholas Jolley, trans. by David Scott. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. xlii + 287. John Locke: Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes. Eine Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. In der Übersetzung Königsberg 1755 von Georg David Kypke, edited by Terry Boswell, Riccardo Pozzo and Clemens Schwaiger. Stuttgart‐Bad Cannstatt, 1996, 2 vols., pp. xxviii + 2187pp. viii + 140. DM 186. ISBN 3–7728–1711–4 Leibniz's ‘New System’. Edited by Roger S. Woolhouse, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1996. pp. x + 201. ISBN 88–222–4454–0. Mary Astell: Political Writings. Edited by Patricia Springborg. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xlviii + 286. £45.00 £15.95 ISBN 0–521–41800–3 0–521–42845–9 Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Edited by Sylvana Tomaselli. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. xxxvii + 349. £35.00, £8.95 ISBN 0–521–43053–4 0–521–43633–8 Knud Haakonssen: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. x + 386. £45.00 hbk. ISBN 0–521–49686–1. £15.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–49802–3 Hartwig Wiedebach: Die Bedeutung der Nationalität für Hermann Cohen. Europaea Memororia. Studien und Texte zur Geschichte der europäischen Ideen. Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1997. pp. viii + 340.

Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses presents students of his thought with a problem. It contains some of Leibniz's longest and most detailed discussions of the nature of substance while at the same time introducing two concepts into Leibniz's metaphysics that continually baffle commentators: scientia visionis and the vinculum substantiale. The aim of this paper is to explicate the relationship between scientia visionis, or God's knowledge by vision, and the vinculum substantiale, or the substantial bond, and to show how these concepts are used by Leibniz in the correspondence with Des Bosses to account for the unity and reality of corporal substances. In my view, the vinculum substantiale and scientia visionis do not represent rival strategies, as they have been recently portrayed in the literature; rather, they work together. But scientia visionis, when applied to questions of ontology, gives us a rather vacuous kind of reality, while the vinculum substantiale represents a much more significant, albeit problematic, account of the nature of substance.

Philosophers are often thought to be aloof, unworldly, and perhaps even boring people, who, at least from the time of Aristophanes’ characterization of Socrates, have been frequently represented as having their heads or their whole beings in the clouds. Add to these qualities, the dryness that appears in many of Immanuel Kant’s works and the primness and propriety associated with Prussia, and one gets a picture of Immanuel Kant that is not very appealing and certainly not one that would make one wish to read a detailed story of his life. However, in this wonderful book Manfred Kuehn does what many might have considered impossible: he makes the life of Kant fascinating. Indeed, he attains the ideal that he sets out for any biography of a philosopher: to “be both philosophically and historically interesting” and to “integrate the story of the philosopher’s life with a philosophically interesting perspective on his work”.

In the last twenty-five years, Jean-Luc Marion has established himself as the preeminent interpreter of the philosophy of Descartes as well as one of the most interesting philosophers working in the phenomenological tradition. His earlier books, Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, and Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes, are all subtle and provocative examinations of Descartes’s philosophy, informed by an unparalleled knowledge of the history of ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy.

It is common in the history of philosophy to view the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence as essentially a debate between Leibniz and Newton. According to this view, Clarke was merely Newton’s mouthpiece, or perhaps his amanuensis taking dictation from the “incomparable Mr. Newton” as Newton sought to demolish the philosophical views of his archenemy, Leibniz. In his new book, however, Ezio Vailati argues that we abandon this simplified view, first, because there is little historical evidence proving Newton’s role in the correspondence, and second, because this common view does Clarke himself, described by Voltaire as “a veritable thinking machine”, a great injustice. Vailati’s approach is, then, to consider “the correspondence essentially as a confrontation between Leibniz and Clarke, the most important exponent of Newtonianism”.

In this book, Pierre Keller addresses some of the most difficult issues in Kant scholarship and provides us with an interesting and new interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of self-consciousness and its relation to the Critical project. In the process of doing so, he skillfully steers between the now treacherous reefs of rival interpretations of Kant. Just as the Critique of Pure Reason is difficult because Kant has so many opponents on so many different issues, so Keller’s book is difficult and demanding because he is trying to give us an interpretation of self-consciousness, while at the same time arguing against the major figures in Kant scholarship on a variety of issues.

Roger Ariew begins this book with the following sensible claim: “A philosophical system cannot be studied adequately apart from the intellectual context in which it is situated”. His book, naturally enough, attempts to demonstrate the way in which Descartes responded to and affected the philosophical world of late Scholasticism. The ten chapters themselves are all previously, or soon to be, published essays, unified by the view that our knowledge of late Scholasticism is deeply imperfect and that our resulting picture of Descartes is also imperfect. Each chapter provides an example of how, with a proper understanding of Scholastic philosophy, we arrive at a slightly different and more refined picture of Descartes. Indeed, Ariew’s work is the product of an admirably broad and detailed knowledge of the works of the major thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; Toletus, Suarez, Eustachius, Basso, Clavius, Dupleix, Mersenne, Arnauld, and many others are the actors in this drama of the rise of Cartesianism.

One of the most curious features of Leibniz's late metaphysics is no doubt the idea of the vinculum substantiale, or substantial bond, found principally in the correspondence with Des Bosses. Apparently out of the blue, Leibniz posits some kind of thing that will help account for transubstantiation, "realize" phenomena and ground the reality of corporeal or composite substances. This dissertation is the first extended treatment of Leibniz's doctrine of the vinculum substantiale in English. It begins with an examination of Leibniz's general theory of the nature of composite substance and explains the tension in Leibniz's system regarding the unity of composite substance. It then analyzes Leibniz's correspondence with Des Bosses and other related texts and situates the doctrine of the vinculum substantiale against the backdrop of these difficulties regarding the nature of composite substance. The analysis shows that the standard interpretations of the vinculum substantiale are wrong on a number of important fronts. First, the doctrine of the vinculum substantiale has, in the end, little to do with transubstantiation. Second, although it has little to do with transubstantiation in the end, its nature is determined in large part by Leibniz's account of transubstantiation. Third, the vinculum substantiale is some substance-like thing that exists apart from the monads in a composite; it is not a relation , a dominant monad , a substantial form or the entire composite substance . Fourth, the doctrine of the vinculum substantiale cannot be simply the result of Leibniz's attempts to placate his religious friend , for at one point in the correspondence, Leibniz argues against Des Bosses, who had claimed that the vinculum should be a relation or a mode of a substance, and suggests that the vinculum must indeed be a substance. Fifth, the vinculum substantiale is not found only in the correspondence with Des Bosses, but in a handful of other tests of the same period. These five points ought to be seen as a genuine contribution to the study of Leibniz's metaphysics

One of the more interesting topics debated by Leibniz and Locke and one that has received comparatively little critical commentary is the nature of essences and the classification of the natural world.1 This topic, moreover, is of tremendous importance, occupying a position at the intersection of the metaphysics of individual beings, modality, epistemology, and philosophy of language. And, while it goes back to Plato, who wondered if we could cut nature at its joints, as Nicholas Jolley has pointed out, the debate between Leibniz and Locke has very clear similarities to the topic that has dominated the philosophy of language from the 1970s on: namely, the challenge mounted by Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam, and others against Russellian and Fregean descriptivist accounts of meaning. Yet, this topic is also, as Jolley writes, one of the “most elusive” in the debate between Leibniz and Locke.2 The purpose of this paper is to examine in detail Leibniz’s critique of Locke’s distinction between real and nominal essences. In doing so, I hope to show certain virtues in Leibniz’s account of metaphysics and philosophy of language that usually escape notice. While I wish to provide a general account of Leibniz’s disagreement with Locke, I also plan to focus on the nature of species and natural kinds. In my opinion, those who have treated this topic have not paid sufficient attention to Leibniz’s claims that “Essence is fundamentally nothing but the possibility of the thing under consideration” and “essences are everlasting because they only concern.

That Leibniz finds the philosophy of Spinoza horrifyingly wrong is obvious to anyone who reads Leibniz’s work; that Leibniz finds Spinozism so seductive that his own system is in danger of collapsing into it is less obvious but, I believe, equally true. The difference here is not so much between an exoteric and an esoteric philosophy suggested by Russell2 but between a thorough-going rationalism on the part of Spinoza and Leibniz’s “mitigated rationalism” – mitigated by the exigencies of his orthodox Christianity. In other words, it is Leibniz’s traditional view of the nature of God and his creatures that leads him to abhor Spinoza’s vision, while his own commitment to a number of principles and ideas pushes him to rationalism. And if Kant is right that the mind naturally desires a system, then Leibniz ought to see the Spinozistic consequences of many of his philosophical principles. Of course, there is nothing new in saying that the God of Spinoza and the God of Leibniz are fundamentally different, but I believe that if we focus on Leibniz’s critique of Spinoza’s account of the nature of God and a constellation of related concepts, we can come to a deeper understanding of the thought of both philosophers

In a short piece written most likely in the 1690s and given the title by Loemker of “On Wisdom,” Leibniz says the following: “...we see that happiness, pleasure, love, perfection, being, power, freedom, harmony, order, and beauty are all tied to each other, a truth which is rightly perceived by few.”1 Why is this? That is, why or how are these concepts tied to each other? And, why have so few understood this relation? Historians of philosophy are familiar with the fact that both Spinoza and Leibniz place strong emphasis on the notion of power in giving their accounts of the human passions. But, while many scholars have explicated the relation between power and the passions (especially in Spinoza’s philosophy), there has been considerably less attention given to the nature of perfection and its relation to both power and the passions.2 Consider the following passages from Spinoza and Leibniz in which these two thinkers seem to bring together the issue of perfection and passion. In Ethics IIIp11s, Spinoza says the following: We see, then, that the Mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passions, indeed, explain to us the affects of Joy and Sadness. By Joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that passion by which the Mind passes to a greater perfection. And by Sadness, that passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection. The affect of Joy which is related to the Mind and Body at once I call Pleasure or Cheerfulness, and that of Sadness, Pain or Melancholy.3 And, in the Monadology §49, Leibniz says this: “The creature is said to act externally insofar as it is perfect, and to be acted upon [patir] by another, insofar as it is imperfect.”4 In other words, for Spinoza, the primitive passions of joy and sadness are cases in which a being’s perfection is increasing or decreasing, while, for Leibniz, any passion, it would..

According to the standard view of his metaphysics, Leibniz endorses idealism: the thesis that the world is made up solely of minds or monads and their perceptual and appetitive states. Recently,this view has been challenged by some scholars, who argue that Leibniz can be seen as admitting corporeal substances, that is, animals or embodied souls, into his ontology, and that, therefore, it is false to attribute a strict idealism to him. Subtler accounts suggest that Leibniz begins his philosophical career as an advocate of (some form of) the modern ‘mechanical’ philosophy and ends his career as an idealist, raising the issue when and why Leibniz adopts his monadological metaphysics. This article argues that, given a constellation of metaphysical, logical, and theological views, Leibniz is committed to the ontological primacy of mind or form even in his ‘middle years’.

Contrary to most interpretations of the transcendental deduction that take it to depend upon the ideas of personal identity, the “ownership” of mental states, or the ontological unity of the mind, the author argues that Kant’s principal concern is to show how the objective reality of a complex representation is consistent with the spontaneity of the mind. The short answer to this question is that objective reality is consistent with spontaneity precisely because the categories are universal and necessary. Ultimately, as Dickerson emphasizes—and this is the novel claim of the book—the problem addressed within the B-deduction ought to be seen as the representationalist parallel to the semantic question of what it is to understand a complex sign or the question of the unity of a proposition.