Theo Kobusch

English summary: The blooming of ancient thought throughout the Renaissance and the Early Modern Age took place mainly in the shape of late antique philosophy. Many of its characteristic main features have influenced modern thought in a defining manner. In the present book, Theo Kobusch addresses those features which still determine our thinking today. Although this intellectual heritage, both in its ancient and modern forms, has largely been forgotten, it is however worth remembering that modern thought is indebted to an intellectual transformation on a large scale. The author shows how this becomes evident by focusing on key aspects such as the concept of philosophy, universal Christendom, the inner man, awareness, rational faith, creatio ex nihilo, the concept of god, practical metaphysics, univocity of morality, and the theory of mind and will. German description: Das Denken der Antike ist, vor allem in der Gestalt der spatantiken Philosophie, der paganen wie der christlichen, in Renaissance und Neuzeit wieder aufgebluht. Es sind charakteristische Grundzuge der spatantiken Philosophie, die bestimmend auf das Denken der Moderne gewirkt haben. Theo Kobusch befasst sich im vorliegenden Band mit diesen Grundzugen, die unser Denken bis heute bestimmen. Dieses geistige Erbe, sei es in seiner modernen oder in der spatantiken Form, haben wir jedoch grosstenteils vergessen. Doch es ist der Erinnerung wurdig, dass das Denken der Neuzeit sich einer Transformation grossen Stils verdankt. Der Autor verdeutlich dies, indem er unter anderem die Schwerpunkte Philosophiebegriff, das universale Christentum, den inneren Menschen, die Aufmerksamkeit, den Vernunftglauben, die Schopfung aus Nichts, den Gottesbegriff, praktische Metaphysik, Univozitat des Moralischen und die Geist- und Willenslehre herausarbeitet.

This paper tries to show that Western conceptions of reason from Plato to Wittgen stein have always included a consciousness of the conditionality of one’s own standpoint. This consciousness of standing on a certain ground and of having been born and raised into some historically grown convictions is traditionally called belief or trust. This form of belief is an inextricable part of reason itself. This is shown with regard to the philosophy of Plato and the Christian philosophy of the church fathers in antiquity, and to Kant, Jacobi and Wittgenstein in modern times. Contemporary rationalism, however, tries to dissolve this standing in a certain historically conditioned universality which requires reason in order to be perceptible at all into a purely rational thinking.

Ricoeur’s critique of the analytical philosophy of the person is directed against the tendency of reification inherent in this kind of philosophy. To bring out the »ipseidentity« against the »idem-identity« also means to accentuate the type of identity which is characteristic of a person as such, in contrast to the identity of a thing. Due to this self-identity of persons, a particular kind of beings which are different from the self, namely others, gain special importance for the self – in contrast to that which is different from a thing, for which nothing can be important. This important other is but another self, another person. It is in the light of this special relationship of one person to another that the full meaning of the new concept of responsibility emerges, which has replaced the notion of imputability.

In the history of the reception and interpretation of the metaphysics or the “First Philosophy” according to Aristotle, the contribution of authors like Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus is nowadays well known. However, in those conceptions which tend to conceive metaphysics as or to ground it on a theory of transcendental concepts, understanding that discipline then either as onto-theology or as ontology, the contributions of Henry of Ghent and Master Eckhart are still little known. The present study focuses on the doctrine of transcendentals of these two authors, with a particular interest on the influence of Henry of Ghent over Duns Scotus. KEY WORDS – Henry of Ghent. Master Eckhart. John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics. Object of Metaphysics. Transcendentals. Knowledge of God

The present paper seeks to show that “subjectivity”—even though the notion itself has been shaped only at the end of the eighteenth century—has always been a major topic of philosophy of nearly all centuries. In our case, the “subjective” is the collective term for all that which eludes the objectifying grasp of science. History of philosophy shows many attempts to subordinate everything subjective to the objective approach of science. However, down to the present day, it also shows a common convincement existing in all areas of human life, in religion and politics, aesthetics, as well as science, technology, and the life-world, aiming to assert subjectivity as an equal point of view next to objective thought. Only the two combined reveal the truth of things.

The notion of “human dignity” is on everybody’s lips. More importantly, it has become a fundamental concept in all areas of life, in politics and society, in technology and science, in religion and the world of work. This chapter seeks to uncover the philosophical groundwork recognizable in the history of philosophy before the notion of “human dignity” was adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other protocols spread around the world. That includes the close connection of the two notions “dignity” and “person” in medieval theology, ultimately leading to Kant’s prominent concept of “person” and “dignity.” It includes further the idea that human dignity is rooted in human freedom. Finally, human dignity could not be thought of as a universal value, if the idea of the “human as human” had not been developed during the enlightenment.

The modern concept of personhood as it is used e.g. in national constitutions and international agrecments is closely tied to the idea of freedom: thus understood, the person is the proper object of a »metaphysics of morals« (Kant) the roots of which go back to the Middle Ages. Hegel's philosophy of right, which takes up this tradition, and the »spcculative ethics« which followed his Iine of thinking havc tobe regardcd as philosophies of personhood because they understand the being of the person essentially as a kind of communicative freedom.- The prcsent discussions ccntering on freedom ofthe will are obviously unawae of this tradition although they might profit a Iot from taking it into consideration.

“Contemporary Social Ontology and its historical background.” Contemporary social ontology, particularly in the works of J. R. Searle, appeared on the scene with the claim to have opened up a new area of human reality: the one of so-called social or institutional facts. The present paper shows that, and in how far, analytic social ontology in its central assumptions has taken up, and in a certain sense at the same time narrowed down, the traditional doctrine of the entia moralia. It is precisely the mainstay of contemporary social ontology, its theory of speech acts, of performatives, of intentionality - including collective intentionality - and last but not least of institutional facts themselves that has already been prefigured by the medieval and early modern ontological tradition of the entia moralia - this being the case without analytic social ontology having developed an awareness of the historical well it drank from unknowingly.