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1030Tyler Burge on disjunctivismPhilosophical Explorations 13 (3): 243-255. 2010.In Burge 2005, Tyler Burge reads disjunctivism as the denial that there are explanatorily relevant states in common between veridical perceptions and corresponding illusions. He rejects the position as plainly inconsistent with what is known about perception. I describe a disjunctive approach to perceptual experience that is immune to Burge's attack. The main positive moral concerns how to think about fallibility.
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161Tyler Burge on disjunctivismPhilosophical Explorations 16 (3): 259-279. 2010.In McDowell, I responded to Burge's attack on disjunctivism. In Burge Burge rejects my response. He stands by his main claim that disjunctivism is incompatible with the science of perception, and in a supplementary spirit he argues against the detail of my attempt to defend disjunctivism. Here I explain how disjunctivism is compatible with the science, and I respond to some of Burge's supplementary arguments.
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29Response to Stephen HoulgateThe Owl of Minerva 41 (1-2): 27-38. 2009.I argue that Stephen Houlgate misstates an element in the Kantian background to my reading of “Lordship and Bondage” (§2). He misreads my remarks about the need to see Hegel’s moves there in the context of the progression towards absolute knowing (§3), and, partly consequently, he fails to engage with the motivation for my reading (§4). And he does not understand the way my reading exploits the concept of allegory (§5).
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198Response to Stephen HoulgateThe Owl of Minerva 41 (1/2): 27-38. 2009.I argue that Stephen Houlgate misstates an element in the Kantian background to my reading of “Lordship and Bondage” (§2). He misreads my remarks about the need to see Hegel’s moves there in the context of the progression towards absolute knowing (§3), and, partly consequently, he fails to engage with the motivation for my reading (§4). And he does not understand the way my reading exploits the concept of allegory (§5).
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448Response to DreyfusInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4). 2007.In previous work I urged that the perceptual experience we rational animals enjoy is informed by capacities that belong to our rationality, and - in passing - that something similar holds for our intentional action. In his Presidential Address, Hubert Dreyfus argued that I thereby embraced a myth, "the Myth of the Mental". According to Dreyfus, I cannot accommodate the phenomenology of unreflective bodily coping, and its importance as a background for the conceptual capacities exercised in refle…Read more
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17Precis of Mind and WorldMind and WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 365. 1998.
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49Precis of Mind and worldIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 231--9. 1996.
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627Perceptual Experience: Both Relational and ContentfulEuropean Journal of Philosophy 21 (1): 144-157. 2013.
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815 Naturalism in the Philosophy of MindIn Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question, Harvard University Press. pp. 91-105. 2004.
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446Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein's later philosophyMidwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1): 40-52. 1992.
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339Mind and WorldPhilosophical Books 38 (3): 169-181. 1994.How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable conception of experience w…Read more
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34Perception and Rational ConstraintMind and WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 369. 1998.
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1Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledgeIn Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual knowledge, Oxford University Press. 1988.
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87Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledgeIn Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79. 1988.
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735Mind and WorldHarvard University Press. 1994.Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...
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55Theaetetus (edited book)Clarendon Press. 1973.The Theaetetus is a remarkably rich dialogue that raises any number of important epistemological questions, and it rewards careful study. By systematically and thoroughly examining the text and by exploring the issues Plato raises in terms of modern epistemic concerns, Platos Theaetetus adds anew and helpful perspective to the ever growing body of scholarship on this pivotal dialogue.-Ancient Philosophy.
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Truth and Meaning. Essays in SemanticsRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (4): 435-437. 1976.
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258Knowledge and the internal revisitedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1): 97-105. 2002.In “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Robert Brandom reads my “Knowledge and the Internal” as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social-perspectival conception of knowledge . But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in “Knowledge and the Internal.” Seeing that P constitutes falseho…Read more
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98Mind and world: with a new introductionHarvard University Press. 1994.Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...
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100Perception as a Capacity for KnowledgeMarquette University Press. 2011.This is the 2011 Aquinas Lecture delivered by John McDowell on February 27, 2011 at Marquette University. A central theme in much of Professor McDowell's work is the harmful effect, in modern philosophy and in the modern reception of pre-modern philosophy, of a conception of nature that reflects an understanding, in itself perfectly correct, of the proper goals of the natural sciences. He has argued that we can free ourselves from the characteristic sorts of philosophical anxiety by recalling th…Read more
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199Meaning, knowledge, and realityHarvard University Press. 1998.This is the second volume of John McDowell's selected papers.