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Precis of M ind and worldIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 231--9. 1996.
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184Why is Sellars's essay called "empiricism and the philosophy of mind"?In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars, Oxford University Press. 2009.1. I take my question from Robert Brandom, who remarks in his Study Guide (167): “The title of this essay is ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,’ but Sellars never comes right out and tells us what his attitude toward empiricism is.”1 Brandom goes on to discuss a passage that might seem to indicate a sympathy for empiricism on Sellars’s part, but he dismisses any such reading of it. (I shall come back to this.) He concludes: “Indeed, we can see at this point [he has reached §45] that one of …Read more
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Precis of M ind and worldIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception, Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 231--9. 1996.
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The disjunctive conception of perception as material for a transcendental argument against cartesian skepticismIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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77Galen Strawson and the Weather WatchersMind and WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 449. 1998.
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52Motivating inferentialism: Comments onPragmatics and Cognition 13 (1): 121-140. 2005.Brandom's attempt to motivate inferentialism is found wanting on a number of grounds, including a skepticism about how much recommendation for inferentialism can be derived from the evident unsatisfactoriness of the representationalism Brandom contrasts it with, which seems to be a straw man. Brandom's appeal to authorities falls flat; in particular, his reading of Frege's early work as inferentialist in Brandom's sense is a misinterpretation. Given the programmatic character of Brandom's recomm…Read more
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20Meaning, communication, and knowledgeIn Z. van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects, Oxford University Press. pp. 1. 1980.
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5Values and Secondary QualitieIn Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J.L. Mackie, Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 110-129. 1985.
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1269Values and Secondary QualitiesIn Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J.L. Mackie, Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 110-129. 1985.J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse.…Read more
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Wittgenstein on following a ruleIn A. W. Moore (ed.), Meaning and reference, Oxford University Press. 1993.
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318Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin WrightIn Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism, De Gruyter. pp. 148--69. 1991.
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1128Non-cognitivism and rule-followingIn Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, Routledge. pp. 141--62. 1981.
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26Response to Crispin WrightIn Michael McKinsey (ed.), On Knowing Our Own Minds, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 47--62. 2002.
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Lecture III: Non-conceptual contentIn John Henry McDowell (ed.), Mind and World, Harvard University Press. 1994.
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Travis on Frege, Kant, and the given : comments on 'unlocking the outer world'In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Søren Overgaard (eds.), In the light of experience: new essays on perception and reasons, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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4Are meaning, understanding, etc. definite states?In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations: a critical guide, Cambridge University Press. 2010.
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36Singular thought and the extent of 'inner space'In Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context, Clarendon Press. 1986.