Francesca Brencio

Through this contribution I aim to show how the role of language and metaphors is fundamental to our understanding of reality, affecting the way we ordinarily act and live, and particularly important in facing fears and anguish. This is more evident in these times of the COVID-19 pandemic, where our experiences of language and of the world seem to be characterised mainly by war terminology. Politicians declare themselves at war fighting an invisible enemy and health care workers, who are in direct contact with COVID-19 positive patients, are said to be “fighting” on the “frontlines”. Starting from a philosophical account of the relationship between language, fear and anguish, I aim to show how this narrative is unhelpful, both for society at large and especially for patients and health care workers. While war narratives instil fear, it seems to me that new forms of solidarity and new models of coexistence are required. Since language shapes the way in which we think, live and act, it is important to choose words that encourage people to act responsibly, to cooperate and to overcome the hardships of the COVID19 pandemic together.

The problem of names of illnesses is both a problem of words and values that should address not only the classification of disorders, but also a fundamental question both for medical sciences and humanities: can psychiatric nosology and classifications fit with the ontological constitution of human beings? This paper aims to discuss the so-called “psychiatric object” and its language and it intends to provide a hermeneutical-phenomenological account to mental health. In doing so, the paper will firstly examine the “psychiatric object” and its language; secondly, it will show the difference between taxonomy and ontology, both of interest for the psychiatric object; third, it will insist on the critique of the epistemological status of psychiatry conceived from a natural point of view following three main paths: a metaphysical one (Heidegger, Jaspers), a social one (Szasz, Foucault, Basaglia), and an ethical one (Laing). Finally, it will clarify why phenomenology and in particular hermeneutical-phenomenology can illuminate the understanding of the psychiatric object and its implications in a cultural context, in order to achieve a more humanistic psychiatry.

This paper defends the idea that alterations in social perception of people with epilepsy may be crucial in the development of co-morbidities, involving a circular and mutual relationship between the person and her/his social environment, between the self and the world. We aim at exploring the role of these processes in psychopathological phenomena in people with epilepsy. Through a phenomenological and enactive account of intersubjectivity and the model of circular causality, enriched with interviews conducted with people with epilepsy, we develop the hypothesis that the originary domain of a person’s experience with epilepsy expands and modifies the fundamental interrogation of the sense of self. Furthermore, we observe how disturbances in the dynamical coupling and coordination among agents may contribute to psychopathological phenomena, and to changes in intersubjectivity and social perception.

This paper aims to pursue two goals: first, it will explore the encounter and dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s thinking toward medicine, and in particular, psychiatry. Second, it will look toward understanding how this encounter can illuminate clinical practices and provide significant contributions within the fields of medical education and healthcare. The broader horizon of this paper is to underline how embracing a different approach to health can be of interest to both a medical and philosophical audience, inviting the former to progress in their scientific skills and de-personalize texts toward a more genuine and humanistic encounter with patients, while also engendering the latter to leave the dark and dusty halls of metaphysical thinking to move into the greener pastures of the social dimension.