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441Challenges to active externalismIn P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
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344Lloyd's dialectical theory of representationMind and Language 9 (1): 1-24. 1994.This is a critique of Lloyd's theory which appeared in his book, Simple Minds.
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96Distinguishing virtue epistemology and extended cognitionPhilosophical Explorations 15 (2). 2012.This paper pursues two lines of thought that help characterize the differences between some versions of virtue epistemology and the hypothesis that cognitive processes are realized by brain, body, and world
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96Cognitive architecture: The structure of cognitive representationsIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. pp. 172--189. 2003.
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330Understanding The Embodiment of PerceptionJournal of Philosophy 104 (1): 5-25. 2007.Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Noë’s theory of en- active perception provides one proposal. Noë suggests a radical constitutive hypothesis according to which (COH) Perceptual ex…Read more
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109“X” means X: Semantics Fodor-style (review)Minds and Machines 2 (2): 175-83. 1992.InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and giv…Read more
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1083The Enactivist RevolutionAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2): 19-42. 2014.Among the many ideas that go by the name of “enactivism” there is the idea that by “cognition” we should understand what is more commonly taken to be behavior. For clarity, label such forms of enactivism “enactivismb.” This terminology requires some care in evaluating enactivistb claims. There is a genuine risk of enactivist and non-enactivist cognitive scientists talking past one another. So, for example, when enactivistsb write that “cognition does not require representations” they are not…Read more
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92Manfred Spitzer, the mind within the net. Models of learning, thinking, and actingMinds and Machines 11 (3): 445-448. 2001.A review of Manfred Spitzer's The mind within the net: Models of learning, thinking, and acting.
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59Exhibiting verses explaining systematicity: A reply to Hadley and Hayward (review)Minds and Machines 7 (1): 39-55. 1997.
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1155Defending non-derived contentPhilosophical Psychology 18 (6): 661-669. 2005.In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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Cognitive architectureIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2002.
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101The Systematicity ArgumentsKluwer Academic Publishers. 2003.The Systematicity Arguments is the only book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments.
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509The Bounds of CognitionWiley-Blackwell. 2008.A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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461The autonomy of psychology in the age of neuroscienceIn Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences, Oxford University Press. pp. 202--223. 2011.Sometimes neuroscientists discover distinct realizations for a single psychological property. In considering such cases, some philosophers have maintained that scientists will abandon the single multiply realized psychological property in favor of one or more uniquely realized psychological properties. In this paper, we build on the Dimensioned theory of realization and a companion theory of multiple realization to argue that this is not the case. Whether scientists postulate unique realizati…Read more
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296Causal theories of mental contentStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2010.Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs cause the menta…Read more
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398An increasing number of writers (for example, Kim ((1992), (1999)), Bechtel and Mundale (1999), Keeley (2000), Bickle (2003), Polger (2004), and Shapiro ((2000), (2004))) have attacked the existence of multiple realization and wider views of the special sciences built upon it. We examine the two most important arguments against multiple realization and show that neither is successful. Furthermore, we also defend an alternative, positive view of the ontology, and methodology, of the special scien…Read more
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52Editor’s introductionSynthese 167 (3): 433-438. 2009.Introduction to the 2009 Synthese Special Issue on Philosophy and Neuroscience. The papers are: The multiplicity of experimental protocols: a challenge to reductionist and non-reductionist models of the unity of neuroscience Jacqueline A. Sullivan Making sense of mirror neurons Lawrence Shapiro Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization Thomas W. Polger Multiple realization and methodological pluralism Robert C. Richardson Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Munda…Read more
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143Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the BrainRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67 263-284. 2010.In the extended mind literature, one sometimes finds the claim that there is no neural correlate of consciousness. Instead, there is a biological or ecological correlate of consciousness. Consciousness, it is claimed, supervenes on an entire organism in action. Alva Noë is one of the leading proponents of such a view. This paper resists Noë's view. First, it challenges the evidence he offers from neuroplasticity. Second, it presses a problem with paralysis. Third, it draws attention to a challen…Read more
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117What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied?Philosophical Psychology 28 (6): 755-775. 2015.Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to u…Read more
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112'X' means X: Fodor/warfield semantics (review)Minds and Machines 4 (2): 215-31. 1994.In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a…Read more
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54Terence Horgan and John Tienson, connectionism and the philosophy of psychologyMinds and Machines 9 (2): 270-273. 1999.A review of Terry Horgan and John Tienson's book.
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102Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and "Block's problem"Minds and Machines 3 (1): 97-104. 1993.In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathol…Read more
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245Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and MundaleSynthese 167 (3): 493-510. 2009.One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challeng…Read more
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104Introduction to “The Material Bases of Cognition”Minds and Machines 23 (3): 277-286. 2013.Special Issue: The Material Bases of Cognition Guest Editors: Fred Adams · Kenneth Aizawa Compositional Explanatory Relations and Mechanistic Reduction K.L. Theurer 287 Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron to Construct a Starting Framework C. Gillett 309 The Mark of the Cognitive F. Adams · R. Garrison 339 Dynamics and Cognition L.A. Shapiro 353 Causal Parity and Externalisms: Extensions in Life and Mind P. Huneman 377 Did I Do That? Brain–Computer Interfaci…Read more
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60Defending Non-Derived ContentPhilosophical Psychology 18 (6): 661-669. 2005.In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality. 1. Humans lack original intentionality. 2. Humans have derived intentionality only. 3. There is no distinction between original and derived intentionality. 4. There is no such thing as original intentionality. We argue that Dennett’s discussion fails to secure any of these conclusions for the con…Read more
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112Connectionism and artificial intelligence: History and philosophical interpretationJournal for Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 4 1992. 1992.Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus have tried to place connectionism and artificial intelligence in a broader historical and intellectual context. This history associates connectionism with neuroscience, conceptual holism, and nonrationalism, and artificial intelligence with conceptual atomism, rationalism, and formal logic. The present paper argues that the Dreyfus account of connectionism and artificial intelligence is both historically and philosophically misleading.
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212The value of cognitivism in thinking about extended cognitionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4): 579-603. 2010.This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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722Why the mind is still in the headIn P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 78-95. 2009.Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, th…Read more
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242The biochemistry of memory consolidation: A model system for the philosophy of mindSynthese 155 (1): 65-98. 2007.This paper argues that the biochemistry of memory consolidation provides valuable model systems for exploring the multiple realization of psychological states
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