Roberto De Andrade Martins

This paper addresses the context of emergence, development, and current status of the use of history and philosophy of science in science education in Brazil. After a short overview of the three areas (history of science, philosophy of science, and science education) in Brazil, the paper focuses on the application of this approach to teaching physics, chemistry, and biology at the secondary school level. The first Brazilian researches along this line appeared more consistently in the decade of 1970. From 1980 onwards, the importance of this approach became widely accepted, and the subject became a common theme of dissertations and theses, appearing in conferences and educational journals. Since 1998, the use of history and philosophy of science was included among the government recommendations for secondary school science teaching in Brazil. Nowadays, this is an important line of research in graduate programs on science and mathematics education. However, the actual use of this approach in secondary education is still a desideratum.

This paper studies the history of teleological thought in Antiquity, after Aristotle, analyzing three relevant episodes: the contribution of Theophrastus – a companion and successor of Aristotle; Stoicism, as described by Cicero in his work On the nature of gods; and Galen’s anatomical and physiological works, especially his book On the utility of the parts of the human body. This analysis exhibits the broad diversity of views concerning final causes in Antiquity, all of them widely different from Aristotle’s one, and the strong influence of theological concerns in some of those philosophers – such as the Stoics and Galen.

Norwood Hanson's last paper (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) presented an analysis of the very concept of "discovery". Many recent historiographical works discuss episodes of scientific discovery, but there are few epistemological analyses of this concept. The present paper attempts to improve Hanson's work, proposing a hierarchical series of discovery levels. The analysis presented here establishes the conditions that should be satisfied in order to ascribe the scientific discovery of a new phenomenon to somebody. It also points out the partial aims that one should endeavour to attain in the investigation of a new phenomenon. RESUMEN: El último artículo escrito por Norwood Hanson (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) analizaba el concepto mismo de “descubrimiento”. Muchos trabajos historiográficos recientes discuten episodios de descubrimientos científicos, pero hay pocos análisis epistemológicos de este concepto. El presente artículo procura perfeccionar el trabajo de Hanson, proponiendo una serie jerárquica de niveles de descubrimiento. El análisis que se presenta acá establece las condiciones que deben ser satisfechas para que se atribuya a un individuo el descubrimiento científico de un novo fenómeno, e indica también las metas parciales que se deben buscar en la investigación de un fenómeno desconocido.

This paper discusses the role of analogy in pre-theoretical experimental research, studying a particular historical case (the discovery and early investigation of X rays) and using the methodological ideas of William Stanley Jevons. The historical data and Jevons’ analysis suggest that the discovery of a completely new phenomenon is due to chance, but soon afterwards it is necessary that some assumptions provide a guidance to the research – otherwise, observations and experiments would occur at random, and that would sendom lead to significant results. It is impossible to study all the factors that could possibly affect a give phenomenon, and hence the attention of the researcher must focus upon a small number of features. This choice, in a pre-theoretical context, must be guided by analogies. Contrary to tradicional analyses, this paper associates a peculiar epistemological status with analogies used in that kind of investigation: they are interpreted as originating desiderata, instead of probable hypotheses. RESUMO: A partir do estudo de um caso histórico particular (descoberta e investigação preliminar dos raios X), utilizando as concepções metodológicas de William Stanley Jevons, este artigo analisa o papel das analogias no processo de pesquisa experimental pré-teórica. A análise de Jevons e os dados históricos indicam que a descoberta de um fenômeno totalmente novo se dá ao acaso, porém logo em seguida é necessário que algumas suposições guiem a pesquisa, caso contrário as observações e experimentos seriam realizados totalmente ao acaso, o que dificilmente levaria a algum resultado. É impossível estudar todos os fatores que podem influenciar um fenômeno, e assim a atenção do pesquisador deve ser focalizada apenas sobre alguns aspectos, e essa escolha, em um contexto pré-teórico, deve ser guiada por analogias. Ao contrário das análises tradicionais, este artigo atribui um status epistemológico diferente às analogias empregadas nesse tipo de investigação, interpretando-as como geradoras de desiderata e não de hipóteses prováveis.

In the first chapter of the Origin of species and in two chapters of the Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discusses the origin of domestic pigeons, claiming that all the known breeds were produced from a single species: Columba livia, the rock pigeon. The detailed defense of this point is of high relevance in Darwin’s argumentation strategy, since the differences between the several domestic breeds is so large that, if they were found in the wild, they could be classified as different species or genera. If man was able to produce such large differences, it becomes plausible that nature can produce even larger differences, and therefore the process of natural selection becomes acceptable. Darwin emphasizes the enormous differences between the several domestic breeds (that may have dissimilar cranial structures and a varying number of vertebrae), and at the same time he attempts to show that there are connections and transitions between the extreme types, arguing for their common origin. One of the several interesting parts of his argument is an experiment of crossing between widely different breeds, which led him to obtain pigeons similar to the wild species. The detailed analysis of Darwin’s study of pigeons shows the extreme care he took in his attempt to provide strong arguments for his theory. RESUMO: No primeiro capítulo do Origin of species, e em dois capítulos do Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discute a origem dos pombos domésticos, defendendo que todas as raças conhecidas provêm de uma única espécie: Columba livia, o pombo de rocha. A defesa detalhada desse ponto é de grande importância na estratégia argumentativa de Darwin, pois as diferenças entre as várias raças de pombos são tão grandes que, se fossem encontradas em estado selvagem, poderiam ser classificadas como espécies ou gêneros diferentes. Se o homem foi capaz de produzir mudanças tão grandes como essas, torna-se plausível que a natureza possa produzir diferenças ainda maiores, e assim o processo de seleção natural se torna aceitável. Darwin enfatiza as grandes diferenças entre as raças de pombos (que chegam a possuir, por exemplo, diferentes estruturas cranianas e diferentes números de vértebras), e ao mesmo tempo procura mostrar a existência de nuances e transições entre os tipos extremos, para defender a origem comum. Um dos aspectos interessantes de sua argumentação é um experimento de cruzamento entre raças bem diferentes, através da qual obtém pombos semelhantes à espécie selvagem. A análise detalhada desse estudo de Darwin mostra o extremo cuidado que ele tomava para tentar proporcionar fortes argumentos a favor de sua teoria.

The issue concerning the nature of science can be dealt in different ways. The question “What is science?” can receive empirical answers (what has been science, historically?), normative answers (what should be science?) and analytical ones (what could be science?). The two later approaches concern Philosophy. This paper criticises some philosophical attitudes towards science (relativism, dogmatism, scepticism, ecletism). It claims the existence of a well grounded acquired epistemological wisdom, encompassed by “impotence principles” that exhibit some limits of the human thought and point out what science cannot be. On the other side, there are no acceptable science/non-science demarcation criteria. This does not lead necessarily to a relativist or anarchist view, because it is possible to argue for a non-prohibitive axiological concept of science that could evaluate and guide research. RESUMO: A questão da natureza da ciência pode ser respondida sob diferentes pontos de vista. A pergunta “O que é a ciência?” pode receber respostas de tipo empírico (o que tem sido, historicamente, a ciência?), de tipo normativo (o que deveria ser a ciência?) e de tipo analítico (o que poderia ser a ciência?). Apenas esses dois últimos enfoques são pertinentes à Filosofia. Este artigo critica algumas atitudes filosóficas frente à natureza da ciência (relativismo, dogmatismo, ceticismo, ecletismo), defendendo no entanto a existência de pontos bem estabelecidos na Epistemologia, dados por “princípios de impotência” que mostram limites do pensamento humano e que indicam o que a ciência não pode ser. Por outro lado, não há critérios aceitáveis de demarcação entre ciência e não-ciência. Isso não leva necessariamente a uma posição relativista ou anarquista, pois é possível defender uma concepção axiológica não-proibitiva da ciência que permite avaliar e orientar a pesquisa.

Towards the middle of the 18th century, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis proposed the “principle of least action” as a fundamental law of physics and as a proof of the existence of God. Samuel König and other contemporary authors criticized Maupertuis’ work. There ensued a fierce discussion concerning this subject, in which Leonhard Euler, the king Frédéric II of Prussia and Voltaire took part. This paper discusses that debate, emphasizing its extrascientific features and analyzing the interests that motivated the actions of the people involved in that episode. RESUMO: Em meados do século XVIII, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis propôs o “princípio de ação mínima”, que seria uma lei fundamental da física, além de constituir uma prova da existência de Deus. O trabalho de Maupertuis foi criticado por Samuel König e outros autores da época. Ocorreu uma violenta discussão a respeito desse assunto, da qual participaram Leonhard Euler, o rei Frédéric II da Prússia e Voltaire. Este artigo estuda o debate ocorrido, enfatizando especialmente os aspectos extracientíficos e analisando os interesses que motivaram as ações das pessoas envolvidas nesse episódio.

The Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone is a non-profit academic association, founded on May 5th, 2000, in Quilmes, Argentina, at the closing ceremony of the 2nd Meeting of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone. The creation of this Association was the result of the interest to deepen and strengthen the exchange between the researchers in Philosophy and History of Science from the countries of the South Cone, from the two first meetings that took place in Porto Alegre and Quilmes onwards. Since then, there have been biennial meetings organized as its responsibility. The main aim of AFHIC is to contribute to a better understanding of science from a philosophical as well as a historical point of view in the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries, especially in those which belong to the American South Cone, promoting a space for reflection, exchange, discussion, communication, and dissemination of such an understanding. This volume is - with minor changes - the English version of Fisica: Estudos Filosofi cos e Historicos. It is composed of refereed and, in some cases, opportunely modifi ed contributions made by members of the Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone, some of them who are unfortunately no longer among us. Pablo Lorenzano Director of AFHIC's Book Series.

From Antiquity to the 19th century it was very common to explain natural phenomena (especially biological ones) through final causes. This paper analyses one of the periods of development of this concept, in Antiquity, with special emphasis upon the contributions of Socrates and Plato. They introduced the idea of an intelligent and beneficial god, who plans the structure of the universe and of all beings in the best possible way. This concept was strongly influential in later periods. RESUMO: Da Antiguidade até o século XIX foi muito comum procurar-se entender os fenômenos naturais (especialmente os biológicos) através de causas finais. Este artigo analisa um dos períodos de formação dessas concepções, na Antiguidade, dando especial atenção às contribuições de Sócrates e Platão. Estes introduzem a ideia de uma divindade inteligente e bondosa, que planeja a estrutura do universo e de todos os seres da melhor forma possível. Essa concepção teve grande influência, no período posterior.

Este trabajo discute si hoy todavía es posible admitir que hay principios a priori que no pueden ser abandonados por la física. La historia indica que ciertas “imposibilidades” filosóficas (como el movimiento, el vacuo y la acción directa a distancia) fueron sucesivamente abandonadas por la física. En el siglo XX, la mecánica cuántica rechazó al determinismo y al principio de simetría. La opinión más común entre los científicos es la de que cuando hay un conflicto entre física y filosofía hay que despreciar a los principios a priori. Sin embargo, hay todavía casos en los cuales es posible negar la posibilidad de determinados objetos físicos que entran en conflicto con nuestros conceptos espaciales. El autor defiende que existen principios a priori válidos en la física, y que su abandono es una deficiencia de determinadas teorías físicas modernas. Tal postura no tiene por consecuencia la negación de tales teorías, pero impone la tarea de complementarlas o interpretarlas de un novo modo para que sean compatibles con los principios filosóficos.

Although historians and philosophers of science usually try to explain the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories by scientists, there are no well definite criteria to evaluate when a scientist accepts or rejects a theory/hypothesis. This work proposes a new method of analysis. The attitudes of scientists towards a theory or hypothesis are classified according to three dimensions (cognitive, instrumental and strategic). This method is exemplified by the study of the attitude of the British naturalist William Bateson (1861-1924) towards chromosome theory. The analysis shows that Bateson never rejected the chromosome theory – a conclusion opposite to most historical accounts. RESUMEN: Los historiadores y los filósofos de la ciencia intentan explicar la aceptación o lo rechazo de determinadas hipótesis ó teorías por los científicos, pero no hay criterios claros que nos permitan decir lo qué es aceptación o rechazo. Este trabajo propone un nuevo método de análisis. Las actitudes de los investigadores son analizadas en relación a tres dimensiones (cognitiva, instrumental y estratégica). El método es ejemplificado por el estudio de la postura del naturalista inglés William Bateson (1861-1924) frente a la teoria cromosómica. El análisis que se realizó permitió verificar que Bateson jamás rechazó la teoría cromosómica, en contrario de lo que la mayoría de los historiadores afirman.

Apresentação / Pablo Lorenzano Introdução / Os editores Princípios em cosmologia / Antonio Augusto Passos Videira Aleatoriedad vs. arbitrariedad en la mecánica estadística clásica / Eduardo H. Flichman La teoría galileana de la materia: resolutio e infinitos indivisibles / Fernando Tula Molina Ciencia y música en la obra de Vincenzo Galilei (ca. 1520-1591) / Guillermo Boido & Eduardo Kastika T-invariancia, irreversibilidad, flecha del tiempo: similares pero diferentes / Olimpia Lombardi Mapa das interpretações da teoria quântica / Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. Aspectos epistemológicos y geométricos de la teoría del campo unificado de Schrödinger / Victor Rodríguez & Pedro W. Lamberti

O conceito de pseudo-ciência procura identificar propostas que têm uma aparência científica mas que não satisfazem critérios rigorosos de cientificidade. Alguns exemplos muito citados de pseudo-fenômenos estão os fatos alegados pela parapsicologia e pela astrologia. Para caracterizar a pseudo-ciência alguns autores propuseram critérios psicológicos, sociológicos ou metodológicos. O objetivo básico de uma caracterização metodológica dos pseudo-fenômenos é permitir identificar aquilo que parece existir, mas não existe. Trata-se, portanto, de uma distinção essencialmente ontológica. Este trabalho irá descrever várias tentativas de estabelecer critérios desse tipo e mostrará que nenhuma delas é satisfatória. Será apresentada uma abordagem alternativa, compatível com o caráter provisório do conhecimento científico, que permite avaliar a proposta de existência de um novo fenômeno e guiar a pesquisa, sem no entanto permitir concluir se o fenômeno existe ou não.

This paper discusses George John Romanes’ (1848-1894) contributions to evolution theory. In his early evolutionary work, Romanes could be regarded as a mere disciple and collaborator of Darwin. Strictly speaking, a follower of Darwin would only attempt to develop and to diffuse Darwin’s ideas, to apply them to new cases, to obtain new evidence for this theory and to answer to problems and objections against Darwin’s theory. However, after working for some time under Darwin’s guidance (for instance, trying to provide an experimental foundation for the hypothesis of pangenesis), Romanes adopted another strategy. As several other so-called Darwinians of the late 19th century, he endeavored to correct and to complement Darwin’s theory, with the introduction of new concepts and hypotheses (especially his “physiological selection”). Romanes’ new attitude might be regarded as an effort to step out of Darwin’s shadow and to exhibit his own brightness. Besides that, Romanes strove to undermine the work of other Darwinians that aimed at similar goals.

According to Aristotelian physics, there was a fundamental distinction between natural and violent motion. When the cause of the motion was internal to the moving body, that motion was regarded as natural. Violent motion was supposed to have an external efficient cause. It should stop as soon as this external cause ceased its action. The fall of a body was believed to have an internal cause – the very nature of the heavy body – but the motion of a projectile was supposed to be accidental and a violent one, produced by an external agent and maintained by the continuous action of the air around it. Those distinctions disappeared from physics during the 17th century. Descartes and Newton do not address those problems. However, in Galileo’s thought those distinctions were still present, and they did play a relevant role in his physics. Some central arguments presented by Galileo Galilei in the Dialogues concerning the two chief world systems depended on the characterisation of circular motion as “natural”. Considerations concerning natural or violent motion, circular and straight motions, provided a trap that led Galileo astray to ideas that seem extremely odd, from the point of view of classical mechanics. This article shows how Galileo struggled with those Aristotelian concepts when he tried to understand the nature of the motion of falling bodies.