Roberto De Andrade Martins

This paper describes the early history of magnetochemistry: the search for chemical effects of magnetism in the nineteenth century. Some early researchers, such as Johann Wilhelm Ritter, attempted to reproduce with magnets the effects that had been produced by electricity and Volta’s battery. For several decades, researchers successively reported positive results and denied claims concerning the effect of magnetism in oxidation, electrolysis, reduction of metals from saline solutions, crystallisation, change of colour of vegetable tinctures and other chemical reactions. In the two last decades of the nineteenth century some effects were accepted as real, and a thermodynamic theory of the influence of magnetic fields upon chemical reactions was developed. Finally, Dragomir Hurmuzescu was able to create reproducible experiments and measured the electromotive force between two electrodes, with or without the presence of magnetic fields, confirming the existence of the phenomenon and obtaining results compatible with the theoretical predictions. Afterwards, this magnetochemical effect was accepted as real, but the effect was weak and its practical importance was negligible. The subject was gradually forgotten. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-26 DOI 10.1007/s10698-011-9127-8 Authors Roberto de Andrade Martins, Department of Physics, State University of Paraiba, Campina Grande, PB, Brazil Journal Foundations of Chemistry Online ISSN 1572-8463 Print ISSN 1386-4238.

A considerable part of the 20th century epistemology was devoted to attempts at differentiating science from metaphysics or from non-science. Such demarcations try to establish necessary and sufficient conditions to ascribe the scientific status to a theory. However, all demarcations that were proposed conflict with scientific practice, and no proposal received general acceptance. This article suggests a new kind of approach, in which nothing is prohibited in science, but criteria for evaluating and guiding the scientific research are established through desiderata, that establish sufficient (but not necessary) conditions to ascribe a positive scientific value to any contribution. RESUMO Grande parte da epistemologia do século XX discutiu a questão de diferenciar a ciência da metafísica ou da não-ciência. Tais demarcações procuram estabelecer condições necessárias e suficientes para que se atribua o status de ciência a uma teoria. No entanto, todas as demarcações propostas conflitam com a prática científica e nenhuma recebeu aceitação geral. Este artigo sugere um novo tipo de abordagem, em que não se proibe nada na ciência, estabelecendo-se no entanto critérios que permitam avaliar e guiar o trabalho científico, através de desiderata, que determinam condições suficientes (mas não necessárias) para que algo tenha um valor científico positivo.

In the early 20th century, science was supposed to be “value free”. In 1953 Richard Rudner claimed that “the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments”, and later philosophers discussed the relations between science and values. From the 60’s onward Michael Scriven and other authors came to the conclusion that non-moral values (intrinsic or epistemic values) are required to evaluate scientific works. This paper supports this general view. However, it stresses that there are several independent scientific values, corresponding to a multi-dimensional value space, and for this reason it is commonly impossible to compare the scientific worth of two different scientific contributions. Scientific values can be used to guide and to evaluate scientific research. However, the result is not a linear succession of better and better theories, but a proliferation of different theories and hypotheses, each of them fulfilling only a few desiderata. RESUMEN: A principios del siglo XX se suponía que la ciencia era “libre de valores”. En 1953 Richard Rudner concedió que “el científico cómo científico hace juicios de valor”, y filósofos posteriores discutieron las relaciones entre la ciencia y los valores. De los años 60 hacia delante, Michael Scriven y otros autores llegaron a la conclusión que valores no-morales (valores científicos intrínsecos o epistémicos) son requeridos para evaluar trabajos científicos. El presente trabajo utiliza esta perspectiva general. Sin embargo, enfatiza que hay muchos valores científicos independientes, correspondiendo a un espacio multidimensional de valores, y por esta razón es comúnmente imposible comparar los valores científicos de dos contribuciones científicas diversas. Los valores científicos se pueden utilizar para dirigir y para evaluar la investigación científica. Sin embargo, el resultado no es una sucesión linear de teorías mejores y mejores, sino una proliferación de teorías y hipótesis diversas, y cada una de ellas satisfaz solamente algunos desiderata.

Este trabajo analiza las diferencias entre las teorías de Lorentz y Poincaré (quienes aceptaban el éter) y de Einstein, cuestionando las explicaciones comunes de los motivos por los cuales la teoría de la relatividad es preferible a la anterior. La principal diferencia entre los puntos de vista de Einstein y de Lorentz y Poincaré era de naturaleza epistemológica y no teórica. Cada uno de los enfoques tenía aspectos epistémicos positivos, pero de la misma manera les hacía falta a los dos puntos de vista determinados aspectos que estaban presentes en la otra propuesta. Por lo tanto, una de ellas no era superior a la otra. De ese modo, no había argumentos conclusivos que permitieron elegir una de ellas y rechazar a la otra.

Isometry hypotheses are propositions that assert the constancy of a specific physical magnitude of a system under prescribed conditions. This paper addresses the controversy concerning the conventionality of this type of hypotheses. It discusses several instances of isometry hypotheses and it is shown that experimental facts can be invoked to criticise (or "refute") isometry hypotheses, just as other types of hypotheses. This proves that isometry hypotheses, and the choices of measurement standards that are grounded in such hypotheses, are not merely conventional.

This paper studies Lamarck's scientific method both from the point of view of his methodological discourse and according to his scientific praxis. Lamarck's methodology is compared to Condillac's as well as to that of the idéologues - a group in which Lamarck is usually included. The analysis of this paper shows that Lamarck's methodological discourse is very similar to Condillac's, but his scientific praxis does not follow this view. Instead of following an empiricist approach, Lamarck's work is grounded upon general metaphysical principles concerning nature. Thus, from the ideologues's point of view, Lamarck's work should have been rejected -and that is what really happened - as being a mere metaphysical system grupo no qual se costuma incluir o próprio Lamarck. Mostra-se que o discurso metodológico de Lamarck assemelha-se ao dos ideólogos; no entanto, sua prática científica não se coaduna com esse enfoque. Em vez de seguir uma abordagem empirista, a obra de Lamarck se fundamenta em princípios metafísicos gerais sobre a natureza. Sob o ponto de vista dos ideólogos, seu trabalho deveria ser rejeitado - o que de fato ocorreu - como um mero sistema metafísico - no sentido pejorativo utilizado pelos seguidores de Condillac. No entanto, o presente artigo argumenta que esse é justamente um importante e inovador aspecto da obra de Lamarck, que permitiu a eclosão do evolucionismo moderno

Einstein knew and accepted some philosophical ideas similar to Bridgman's operationalism, at the time when he developed the theory of relativity. It is possible to detect the influence of those ideas both in the special and the general theories. Some of the basic steps taken by Einstein were essentially operationalistic: they could not be justified without epistemological principles of that kind. The common opinion is held that the special theory of relativity embodied a complete and coherent operational elucidation of physical magnitudes. This paper, however, points out some instances of physical magnitudes used in special relativity – such as the force that acts upon a moving body, its mass and its temperature – that could not be measured. It is claimed that this shows an early empistemological inconsistency in Einstein's work. RESUMO: Einstein conhecia e aceitava idéias filosóficas aparentadas ao operacionalismo de Bridgman na época em que desenvolvia a teoria da relatividade. Pode-se detectar essa influência nas teorias especial e geral da relatividade. Alguns dos passos básicos de Einstein foram essencialmente operacionalistas. Assim, é comum a opinião que supõe ter sido completamente efetuada, na teoria especial, de modo coerente, a elucidação operacional das grandezas físicas. Neste artigo, porém, apresentam-se exemplos de grandezas físicas utilizadas na relatividade especial – como a força que age sobre um corpo em movimento, sua massa e sua temperatura – que não eram mensuráveis. Isso revela uma inconsistência epistemológica no trabalho inicial de Einstein.

This work compares the views of René Descartes and Isaac Newton on the nature of gravitation and the possibility of direct action at a distance. In his early writings, Newton tried to find mechanical explanations of gravitation, but could not find any acceptable model. For that reason he preferred to avoid any mechanical explanation. He admitted that the existence of gravitation could be justified by induction, and used it to explain and to predict several phenomena, although gravitation itself was not explained. Descartes, on the other side, tried to explain gravity and the motion of planets using a mechanical model that accepted the existence of vortices of invisible matter. He criticized authors of his time, such as Roberval, who tried to introduce action at a distance. Descartes argued that this would require that brute matter should be endowed with soul and intelligence. This article analyses the arguments of several authors (before and after Descartes) and concludes that Descartes' criticism of action at a distance is valid. RESUMO: Este trabalho discute as posições de René Descartes e Isaac Newton frente à natureza da gravitação e à possibilidade de ações diretas à distância. Newton procurou inicialmente explicações mecânicas da gravitação, porém, não encontrando nenhum modelo aceitável, preferiu não propor nenhuma explicação. Admitindo que a existência da gravitação era justificada pela indução, ele a utilizou para explicar e prever muitos fenômenos, sem que ela própria fosse, no entanto, explicada. Descartes, por sua vez, tentou explicar a gravidade e os movimentos dos planetas a partir de um modelo mecânico de um vórtice de matéria invisível, criticando duramente autores de sua época que, como Roberval, tentaram introduzir a idéia de ação à distância, pois isso exigiria atribuir-se alma e inteligência à matéria bruta. Estudando os argumentos de vários outros autores anteriores e posteriores a Descartes, o artigo defende a posição de Descartes.

The mathematical or theoretical approach to the theory of measurement (opposed to the operational approach) is usually accepted by philosophers, at least in its general lines. Some recent criticimsms against this theory can be answered by qualifying the requirements of the theoretical approach as "desiderata", not as strict impositions or prohibitions. Besides, it is shown that the use of this approach is instrumental in creating mathematically simple quantitative laws and in allowing the development of a "scientific intuition" concerning the relevant phenomena. RESUMO: Os filósofos geralmente aceitam pelo menos as idéias gerais da abordagem matemática ou teórica da teoria da mensuração. Essa abordagem opõe-se ao operacionalismo. Algumas críticas recentes contra a abordagem teórica podem ser respondidas qualificando-se as normas que ela propõe como "desiderata", e não como imposições ou proibições estritas. Além disso, mostra-se que o uso dessa abordagem ajuda a criar leis quantitativas matematicamente simples, e permite o desenvolvimento de um tipo de "intuição científica" sobre os fenômenos relevantes.

This paper addresses the context of emergence, development, and current status of the use of history and philosophy of science in science education in Brazil. After a short overview of the three areas (history of science, philosophy of science, and science education) in Brazil, the paper focuses on the application of this approach to teaching physics, chemistry, and biology at the secondary school level. The first Brazilian researches along this line appeared more consistently in the decade of 1970. From 1980 onwards, the importance of this approach became widely accepted, and the subject became a common theme of dissertations and theses, appearing in conferences and educational journals. Since 1998, the use of history and philosophy of science was included among the government recommendations for secondary school science teaching in Brazil. Nowadays, this is an important line of research in graduate programs on science and mathematics education. However, the actual use of this approach in secondary education is still a desideratum.

This paper studies the history of teleological thought in Antiquity, after Aristotle, analyzing three relevant episodes: the contribution of Theophrastus – a companion and successor of Aristotle; Stoicism, as described by Cicero in his work On the nature of gods; and Galen’s anatomical and physiological works, especially his book On the utility of the parts of the human body. This analysis exhibits the broad diversity of views concerning final causes in Antiquity, all of them widely different from Aristotle’s one, and the strong influence of theological concerns in some of those philosophers – such as the Stoics and Galen.

Norwood Hanson's last paper (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) presented an analysis of the very concept of "discovery". Many recent historiographical works discuss episodes of scientific discovery, but there are few epistemological analyses of this concept. The present paper attempts to improve Hanson's work, proposing a hierarchical series of discovery levels. The analysis presented here establishes the conditions that should be satisfied in order to ascribe the scientific discovery of a new phenomenon to somebody. It also points out the partial aims that one should endeavour to attain in the investigation of a new phenomenon. RESUMEN: El último artículo escrito por Norwood Hanson (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) analizaba el concepto mismo de “descubrimiento”. Muchos trabajos historiográficos recientes discuten episodios de descubrimientos científicos, pero hay pocos análisis epistemológicos de este concepto. El presente artículo procura perfeccionar el trabajo de Hanson, proponiendo una serie jerárquica de niveles de descubrimiento. El análisis que se presenta acá establece las condiciones que deben ser satisfechas para que se atribuya a un individuo el descubrimiento científico de un novo fenómeno, e indica también las metas parciales que se deben buscar en la investigación de un fenómeno desconocido.

This paper discusses the role of analogy in pre-theoretical experimental research, studying a particular historical case (the discovery and early investigation of X rays) and using the methodological ideas of William Stanley Jevons. The historical data and Jevons’ analysis suggest that the discovery of a completely new phenomenon is due to chance, but soon afterwards it is necessary that some assumptions provide a guidance to the research – otherwise, observations and experiments would occur at random, and that would sendom lead to significant results. It is impossible to study all the factors that could possibly affect a give phenomenon, and hence the attention of the researcher must focus upon a small number of features. This choice, in a pre-theoretical context, must be guided by analogies. Contrary to tradicional analyses, this paper associates a peculiar epistemological status with analogies used in that kind of investigation: they are interpreted as originating desiderata, instead of probable hypotheses. RESUMO: A partir do estudo de um caso histórico particular (descoberta e investigação preliminar dos raios X), utilizando as concepções metodológicas de William Stanley Jevons, este artigo analisa o papel das analogias no processo de pesquisa experimental pré-teórica. A análise de Jevons e os dados históricos indicam que a descoberta de um fenômeno totalmente novo se dá ao acaso, porém logo em seguida é necessário que algumas suposições guiem a pesquisa, caso contrário as observações e experimentos seriam realizados totalmente ao acaso, o que dificilmente levaria a algum resultado. É impossível estudar todos os fatores que podem influenciar um fenômeno, e assim a atenção do pesquisador deve ser focalizada apenas sobre alguns aspectos, e essa escolha, em um contexto pré-teórico, deve ser guiada por analogias. Ao contrário das análises tradicionais, este artigo atribui um status epistemológico diferente às analogias empregadas nesse tipo de investigação, interpretando-as como geradoras de desiderata e não de hipóteses prováveis.

Apresentação / Pablo Lorenzano Introdução / Os editores Princípios em cosmologia / Antonio Augusto Passos Videira Aleatoriedad vs. arbitrariedad en la mecánica estadística clásica / Eduardo H. Flichman La teoría galileana de la materia: resolutio e infinitos indivisibles / Fernando Tula Molina Ciencia y música en la obra de Vincenzo Galilei (ca. 1520-1591) / Guillermo Boido & Eduardo Kastika T-invariancia, irreversibilidad, flecha del tiempo: similares pero diferentes / Olimpia Lombardi Mapa das interpretações da teoria quântica / Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. Aspectos epistemológicos y geométricos de la teoría del campo unificado de Schrödinger / Victor Rodríguez & Pedro W. Lamberti

In the first chapter of the Origin of species and in two chapters of the Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discusses the origin of domestic pigeons, claiming that all the known breeds were produced from a single species: Columba livia, the rock pigeon. The detailed defense of this point is of high relevance in Darwin’s argumentation strategy, since the differences between the several domestic breeds is so large that, if they were found in the wild, they could be classified as different species or genera. If man was able to produce such large differences, it becomes plausible that nature can produce even larger differences, and therefore the process of natural selection becomes acceptable. Darwin emphasizes the enormous differences between the several domestic breeds (that may have dissimilar cranial structures and a varying number of vertebrae), and at the same time he attempts to show that there are connections and transitions between the extreme types, arguing for their common origin. One of the several interesting parts of his argument is an experiment of crossing between widely different breeds, which led him to obtain pigeons similar to the wild species. The detailed analysis of Darwin’s study of pigeons shows the extreme care he took in his attempt to provide strong arguments for his theory. RESUMO: No primeiro capítulo do Origin of species, e em dois capítulos do Variation of animals and plants under domestication, Darwin discute a origem dos pombos domésticos, defendendo que todas as raças conhecidas provêm de uma única espécie: Columba livia, o pombo de rocha. A defesa detalhada desse ponto é de grande importância na estratégia argumentativa de Darwin, pois as diferenças entre as várias raças de pombos são tão grandes que, se fossem encontradas em estado selvagem, poderiam ser classificadas como espécies ou gêneros diferentes. Se o homem foi capaz de produzir mudanças tão grandes como essas, torna-se plausível que a natureza possa produzir diferenças ainda maiores, e assim o processo de seleção natural se torna aceitável. Darwin enfatiza as grandes diferenças entre as raças de pombos (que chegam a possuir, por exemplo, diferentes estruturas cranianas e diferentes números de vértebras), e ao mesmo tempo procura mostrar a existência de nuances e transições entre os tipos extremos, para defender a origem comum. Um dos aspectos interessantes de sua argumentação é um experimento de cruzamento entre raças bem diferentes, através da qual obtém pombos semelhantes à espécie selvagem. A análise detalhada desse estudo de Darwin mostra o extremo cuidado que ele tomava para tentar proporcionar fortes argumentos a favor de sua teoria.

Towards the middle of the 18th century, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis proposed the “principle of least action” as a fundamental law of physics and as a proof of the existence of God. Samuel König and other contemporary authors criticized Maupertuis’ work. There ensued a fierce discussion concerning this subject, in which Leonhard Euler, the king Frédéric II of Prussia and Voltaire took part. This paper discusses that debate, emphasizing its extrascientific features and analyzing the interests that motivated the actions of the people involved in that episode. RESUMO: Em meados do século XVIII, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis propôs o “princípio de ação mínima”, que seria uma lei fundamental da física, além de constituir uma prova da existência de Deus. O trabalho de Maupertuis foi criticado por Samuel König e outros autores da época. Ocorreu uma violenta discussão a respeito desse assunto, da qual participaram Leonhard Euler, o rei Frédéric II da Prússia e Voltaire. Este artigo estuda o debate ocorrido, enfatizando especialmente os aspectos extracientíficos e analisando os interesses que motivaram as ações das pessoas envolvidas nesse episódio.

The issue concerning the nature of science can be dealt in different ways. The question “What is science?” can receive empirical answers (what has been science, historically?), normative answers (what should be science?) and analytical ones (what could be science?). The two later approaches concern Philosophy. This paper criticises some philosophical attitudes towards science (relativism, dogmatism, scepticism, ecletism). It claims the existence of a well grounded acquired epistemological wisdom, encompassed by “impotence principles” that exhibit some limits of the human thought and point out what science cannot be. On the other side, there are no acceptable science/non-science demarcation criteria. This does not lead necessarily to a relativist or anarchist view, because it is possible to argue for a non-prohibitive axiological concept of science that could evaluate and guide research. RESUMO: A questão da natureza da ciência pode ser respondida sob diferentes pontos de vista. A pergunta “O que é a ciência?” pode receber respostas de tipo empírico (o que tem sido, historicamente, a ciência?), de tipo normativo (o que deveria ser a ciência?) e de tipo analítico (o que poderia ser a ciência?). Apenas esses dois últimos enfoques são pertinentes à Filosofia. Este artigo critica algumas atitudes filosóficas frente à natureza da ciência (relativismo, dogmatismo, ceticismo, ecletismo), defendendo no entanto a existência de pontos bem estabelecidos na Epistemologia, dados por “princípios de impotência” que mostram limites do pensamento humano e que indicam o que a ciência não pode ser. Por outro lado, não há critérios aceitáveis de demarcação entre ciência e não-ciência. Isso não leva necessariamente a uma posição relativista ou anarquista, pois é possível defender uma concepção axiológica não-proibitiva da ciência que permite avaliar e orientar a pesquisa.

The Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone is a non-profit academic association, founded on May 5th, 2000, in Quilmes, Argentina, at the closing ceremony of the 2nd Meeting of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone. The creation of this Association was the result of the interest to deepen and strengthen the exchange between the researchers in Philosophy and History of Science from the countries of the South Cone, from the two first meetings that took place in Porto Alegre and Quilmes onwards. Since then, there have been biennial meetings organized as its responsibility. The main aim of AFHIC is to contribute to a better understanding of science from a philosophical as well as a historical point of view in the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries, especially in those which belong to the American South Cone, promoting a space for reflection, exchange, discussion, communication, and dissemination of such an understanding. This volume is - with minor changes - the English version of Fisica: Estudos Filosofi cos e Historicos. It is composed of refereed and, in some cases, opportunely modifi ed contributions made by members of the Association of Philosophy and History of Science in the South Cone, some of them who are unfortunately no longer among us. Pablo Lorenzano Director of AFHIC's Book Series.