Alberto Romele

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (e.g., machine learning, generative AI) have led to increased interest in its application in educational settings. AI companies hope to revolutionize teaching and learning by tailoring material to the individual needs of students, automating parts of teachers' jobs, or analyzing educational data to optimize the delivery of content. This article outlines the role of imaginaries in shaping concrete practices and understandings of educational AI. By building on an expanded notion of sociotechnical imaginaries, we show, through a review of science-fiction narratives about technology and education, that the imaginaries underlying educational AI are lacking or limited. When imagined, educational tools are most often depicted as systems for the efficient transmission of information. We contend that this poor imaginary affects why, how, and what educational AI systems are developed. As we demonstrate by analyzing the paradigmatic ideas espoused by Salman Khan, educational AI is designed to optimize the acquisition of knowledge and largely ignores other aspects of teaching and learning, such as care, play, or curiosity. We observe that educational AI is not an object of lively philosophical debate—unlike, for example, self-driving cars or autonomous weapons, which are, incidentally, also much more present in the popular imaginary. We conclude by discussing imaginaries of educational AI that would offer an alternative to the dominant paradigm, focusing on Neal Stephenson's The Diamond Age, Kazuo Ishiguro's Klara and The Sun, and Ian McEwan's Machines Like Me. We argue that to develop socially beneficial and desirable educational technologies, we need to look beyond AI as an information system, and we point to three narratives that present alternative imaginaries of educational AI that can allow us to conceptualize new desirable forms of incorporating technology in teaching and learning, as well as point to its limitations.

In this chapter we question the use of the term |ethics of AI|. Our thesis is that |ethics of AI| is a floating signifier, a notion borrowed from Ernesto Laclau. The article is divided into two parts. In the first part, we discuss the need to include in the ethics of AI a reflection on the ethics of communication about AI. We also introduce the concept of the floating signifier. In the second part, we propose an analysis of the discourses mobilizing |ethics of AI| in the daily press. We examine articles mobilizing |ethics of AI| that appeared in eight daily newspapers in four European countries (France, Italy, the UK, and Germany) over a three-month period. We show the existence of three discursive uses of AI ethics: the normativity of institutions, the critique of researchers, and the techno-solutionism of companies.

Automated pain recognition technology (APR) promises to monitor patients with severe communication impairments on a continuous basis, thereby providing better pain diagnosis and treatment. Increasingly, APR is used in non-clinical contexts, in which users are very much capable of verbalizing their own pain experiences. In this paper, we assess the viability of transferring the technology to the terrain of workplace health management, health insurance benefit programs, fitness, or other well-being applications. In such a setting, not only epistemic conflicts between the self-reports of patients and the automated pain recognition tools may arise, which could result in forms of epistemic injustice. At the same time, automated pain recognition tools could form and digitally support intelligent habits that may reduce cognitive load and enhance bodily awareness. We suggest a dialogic design procedure to ensure these ethical considerations during application design.

'Il n'y a pas d'alternative' dit TINA, l'imaginaire institué qui verrouille le futur. Triste nouvelle. Heureusement, elle ne vient pas seule : d'autres imaginaires, instituants ceux-ci, pourraient, pourront rouvrir l'avenir. C'est que des imaginaires technologiques, il y en a tant. Parmi lesquels : une 'manufacture moléculaire', des 'biobriques' comme de LEGO, la réécriture de l'ADN et l'OUGEPO (cf. l'OULIPO), l'Atomium, le reprisselator, le nanoDraster, ou encore un foie amélioré par manipulation génétique dans le but de résister au gin (bonne ou mauvaise chose?). On pourra aussi évoquer dans un même mouvement les Smart (phone, city, etc.) et le dieu Theuth, ou montrer comment les 'imaginaires institués de l'écriture' et les 'imaginaires instituants du graphe' peuvent exprimer le Web. On pourra se demander si les images qui illustrent les discours sur l'IA - par exemple des images de visages androgynes bleus et blancs composés de particules numériques - ne sont pas trop peu 'pensives'. Et encore imaginer un projet de Welfare numérique, de Webfare en somme, au sein duquel apparaissent Dieu et un rasoir à sept lames - pourquoi pas? Cette traversée des imaginaires proposera aussi d'examiner une gravure de Dürer qui représente un dessinateur utilisant un perspectographe : occasion, aussi inattendue que belle, de méditer la tâche de 'travailler pour la forme' à l'heure des appareils numériques. Pour finir, on écoutera une histoire : une histoire où l'on croise Gagarine dans son vaisseau spatial et des addicts aux annonces immobilières sur le Web qui en viennent à habiter les écrans. On ne peut pas partager, distinguer - entre la représentation et l'opération, le rationnel et l'imaginaire (irrationnel, bien sûr), le réel (réel, bien sûr) et l'imaginaire (illusoire, bien sûr) - non, on ne peut pas : les imaginaires technologiques sont à l'œuvre.

The images used to depict artificial intelligence (AI) in science communication and marketing are often criticized for their stereotypical nature, yet their actual effectiveness remains an open question. Rather than reiterating existing critiques, this paper examines whether these images truly influence public perception and, if so, how different types of AI representations—particularly stock images—compare in their effectiveness. Drawing on Aristotelian rhetoric, we conceptualize effectiveness through three persuasive dimensions: logos (explanatory clarity), ethos (credibility and engagement), and pathos (emotional impact). To investigate these aspects, we conducted an experiment with 79 communication students, who were presented with three versions of the same fabricated scientific article: one without images, one with an institutional research image, and one with a stock image. The findings indicate that while stock images may reduce comprehension of technical content, they slightly enhance reader engagement. Our analysis calls for a more nuanced understanding of AI imagery, moving beyond ethical concerns to consider how these visuals shape public discourse. While stock images contribute to a standardized and sometimes misleading portrayal of AI, their rhetorical power in communication contexts should not be overlooked. The paper concludes by arguing for a more critical yet balanced approach to evaluating the role of images in AI representation.

Today, there is an emerging interest for the potential role of hermeneutics in reflecting on the practices related to digital technologies and their consequences. Nonetheless, such an interest has neither given rise to a unitary approach nor to a shared debate. The primary goal of this paper is to map and synthetize the different existing perspectives to pave the way for an open discussion on the topic. The article is developed in two steps. In the first section, the authors analyze digital hermeneutics “in theory” by confronting and systematizing the existing literature. In particular, they stress three main distinctions among the approaches: between “methodological” and “ontological” digital hermeneutics; between data- and text-oriented digital hermeneutics; and between “quantitative” and “qualitative” credos in digital hermeneutics. In the second section, they consider digital hermeneutics “in action”, by critically analyzing the uses of digital data for studying a classical object such as the political opinion. In the conclusion, we will pave the way to an ontological turn in digital hermeneutics. Most of this article is devoted to the methodological issue of interpreting with digital machines. The main task of an ontological digital hermeneutics would consist instead in wondering if it is legitimate, and eventually to which extent, to speak of digital technologies, or at least of some of them, as interpretational machines.

Most of the existing studies on Bourdieu and the digital regards the social and class distinctions in the use of digital technologies, thus presupposing a certain transparency of technologies themselves. Our proposal is to refer to this attitude as “Bourdieu outside the digital.” Yet in this paper, another perspective called “Bourdieu inside the digital” is developed, which moves the focus on the effects of some emerging technologies on social distinctions and discrimination. The main hypothesis is that algorithms of machine learning are producers and reproducers of habitus. Although their results present a greater granularity with respect to the standard techniques of the past, these algorithms still reduce individuals to categories, general trends, classes, and behaviors. Such a reduction has flattening effects on the individuals’ self-understanding, especially in terms of identity and interaction with the social world. This is the phenomenon described in the article as the “personalization without personality,” whose consequences are both existential and social-political. This idea will be illustrated through qualitative and comparative analysis between the correspondence analysis and the multiple correspondence analysis used by Bourdieu in his works and some of those techniques that are performed today in big data analytics.

What is the difference between a researcher in philosophy and a philosopher? There are two kinds of answer that we can give to this question. We can say that the difference lies in a sort of internal quality; or, as the authors of this paper do, we can argue that a philosopher would not be a philosopher without the intervention of an ensemble of social actors such as universities, departments, funding, colleagues, editors, journals, media, and so on. In the first section, referring to actor-network theory (ANT), the authors define the philosopher as a Leviathan, i.e. a macro-actor that became macro- not thanks to his/her essence, but because he/she succeeded in translating the interests of other actors. In the second section, it is introduced the notion of digital traces, and the homology between ANT and the image of the social reality we can obtain from a process of extraction, treatment, and (visual) restitution of digital traces. In particular, the authors stress the potential of a digital traces-based scientometric for studying actor-networks related to the academic world, but also its limit. In the third section, the specific case of the actor-networks related to philosopher Paul Ricoeur is considered. First, on the basis of a scientometric analysis of the digital traces contained in the bibliographic database Scopus, and secondly by extending the exploration to digital traces available on the Web via web mapping. In the conclusion, the authors affirm that the merit of their digital hermeneutics consists in bringing forward a «world of the text» which is probably less romantic, but certainly more authentic that the «world of the text» to which Ricoeur has often referred to.

This introduction accounts for three main elements characterizing digital media and the recent history of their interpretation and understanding. The authors label these three elements: “interaction”; “recording”; and “autonomy.” First, digital media somehow subvert the traditional notion of mass media. In digital media, the masses do not passively receive information; rather, they contribute to its creation and diffusion. Second, digital media involve a complete overlapping between communication, on the one hand, and recording, registration and keeping track, on the other. For sure, information production and communication remain important aspects of digital media. And yet, for a few years now, recording, registration and keeping track have taken the upper hand. The third element characterizing digital media is that a crucial role is assigned to software, which is not only able to transmit and store information, but also to manipulate it. Digital media do not limit themselves to help our minds or to interconnect us with other human subjects. In digital media, recording often involves the autonomous manipulation, combination, and recombination of what is recorded.

ABSTRACT: In this article, the author deals with the status of the self and personal identity in the digital milieu. In the first section, he presents his general approach to digital media and technologies, which he has called “digital hermeneutics.” He distinguishes between three perspectives in digital hermeneutics, namely the deconstructive, epistemological, and ontological approaches. In the second part, he focuses on digital hermeneutics as hermeneutics of the self. He compares Paul Ricoeur’s narrative identity to Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus. His first thesis is that the habitus can be seen as a concept of subjectivation that neglects an important part of the subject. Narrative identity offers, in this sense, a remedy to such negligence. His second thesis is that today’s digital media and technologies are closer to the Bourdieusian habitus than to the Ricoeurian narrative identity. In other words, digital machines and technologies are “habitus machines” both in their structure and in their effects.

This is the first monograph to develop a hermeneutic approach to the digital--as both a technological milieu and a cultural phenomenon. While philosophical in its orientation, the book covers a wide body of literature across science and technology studies, media studies, digital humanities, digital sociology, cognitive science, and the study of artificial intelligence. In the first part of the book, the author formulates an epistemological thesis according to which the "virtual never ended." Although the frontiers between the real and the virtual are certainly more porous today, they still exist and endure. In the book's second part, the author offers an ontological reflection on emerging digital technologies as "imaginative machines." He introduces the concept of emagination, arguing that human schematizations are always externalized into technologies, and that human imagination has its analog in the digital dynamics of articulation between databases and algorithms. The author takes an ethical and political stance in the concluding chapter. He resorts to the notion of "digital habitus" for claiming that within the digital we are repeatedly being reconducted to an oversimplified image and understanding of ourselves. Digital Hermeneutics will be of interest to scholars across a wide range of disciplines, including those working on philosophy of technology, hermeneutics, science and technology studies, media studies, and the digital humanities.

This paper argues that the AI ethics has generally neglected the issues related to the science communication of AI. In particular, the article focuses on visual communication about AI and, more specifically, on the use of certain stock images in science communication about AI — in particular, those characterized by an excessive use of blue color and recurrent subjects, such as androgyne faces, half-flesh and half-circuit brains, and variations on Michelangelo’s The Creation of Adam. In the first section, the author refers to a “referentialist” ethics of science communication for an ethical assessment of these images. From this perspective, these images are unethical. While the ethics of science communication generally promotes virtues like modesty and humility, similar images are arrogant and overconfident. In the second section, the author uses French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s concepts of “distribution of the sensible,” “disagreement,” and “pensive image.” Rancière’s thought paves the way to a deeper critique of these images of AI. The problem with similar images is not their lack of reference to the “things themselves.” It rather lies in the way they stifle any possible forms of disagreement about AI. However, the author argues that stock images and other popular images of AI are not a problem per se, and they can also be a resource. This depends on the real possibility for these images to support forms of pensiveness. In the conclusion, the question is asked whether the kind of ethics or politics of AI images proposed in this article can be applied to AI ethics tout court.

Paul Ricœur has been one of the most influential and intellectually challenging philosophers of the last century, and his work has contributed to a vast array of fields: studies of language, of history, of ethics and politics. However, he has up until recently only had a minor impact on the philosophy of technology. Interpreting Technology aims to put Ricœur’s work at the centre of contemporary philosophical thinking concerning technology. It investigates his project of critical hermeneutics for rethinking established theories of technology, the growing ethical and political impacts of technologies on the modern lifeworld, and ways of analysing global sociotechnical systems such as the Internet. Ricœur’s philosophy allows us to approach questions such as: how could narrative theory enhance our understanding of technological mediation? How can our technical practices be informed by the ethical aim of living the good life, with and for others, in just institutions? And how does the emerging global media landscape shape our sense of self, and our understanding of history? These questions are more timely than ever, considering the enormous impact technologies have on daily life in the 21st century: on how we shape ourselves with health apps, how we engage with one-another through social media, and how we act politically through digital platforms.

In this contribution, the author contends that the way in which Pieter Lemmens interprets the transcendental of technology, particularly through the work of Bernard Stiegler, is only one of the possible ways of understanding the transcendental of technology. His thesis is that there are many other transcendentals of technology besides technology itself. The task of a philosophy of technology beyond the empirical turn could precisely consist in exploring these multiple transcendentals of technology, along with their multiple relations. In the first section, the author considers and criticizes the “empirical transcendentality” that characterizes most of the current philosophical approaches to technology, in particular when it comes to ethical issues. In the second section, he proposes to include Lemmens’ perspective in a more general theory about the transcendentals of technology. The transcendentals of technology include social symbolic forms, culture, language, media, and many other dimensions that philosophy of technology has not systematically explored yet.

Digital media and technologies have significantly transformed the ways we relate to the world, in the triple sense of Selbstwelt, Mitwelt, and Umwelt. Think of the quantification of the self, the number of followers and likes on social media, or using Google maps and similar tools to orient ourselves in a city, to find and choose a good restaurant, and so on. One might say that digital media and technologies have actually transformed our interpretation, understanding, and access to the world. Now, if hermeneutics is the philosophy of interpretation, then we might suppose that hermeneutics should pay attention to these transformations. For us, digital hermeneutics is the study of the ways digital media and technologies mediate between humans and the world. It is also the study of the ways digital media and technologies are embedded in non-technological relations between humans and the world – psychological, social, cultural, and so on.

In this article, the author deals with the status of the self and personal identity in the digital milieu. In the first section, he presents his general approach to digital media and technologies, which he has called “digital hermeneutics”. He distinguishes between three perspectives in digital hermeneutics, namely the deconstructive, epistemological, and ontological approaches. In the second part, he focuses on digital hermeneutics as hermeneutics of the self. He compares Paul Ricoeur’s narrative identity to Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus. His first thesis is that the habitus can be seen as a concept of subjectivation that neglects an important part of the subject. Narrative identity offers, in this sense, a remedy to such negligence. His second thesis is that today’s digital media and technologies are closer to the Bourdieusian habitus than to the Ricoeurian narrative identity. In other words, digital machines and technologies are “habitus machines” both in their structure and in their effects. In the conclusion, the author accounts for three potential responses to the habituation of our selves online. He also introduces the concepts of “digital agency” and “digital citizenship”.

In this article, we show how postphenomenology can be used to analyze the Affinity Map: a data visualization that reveals the hidden dynamics that exist between individuals within large organizations. We make use of the Affinity Map to expand the classic postphenomenology that privileges a ‘linear’ understanding of technological mediations and introduce the notions of ‘iterativity’ and ‘collectivity.’ In the first section of the paper, we discuss both classic and more recent descriptions of human-technology-world relations in order to transcendentally approach the discipline of data visualization. In the second section, we use the Affinity Map case study to consider three elements: 1) the collection of data and the design process; 2) the visual grammar of the data visualization, and 3) the process of self-recognition for the map ‘reader.’ In the third section, we introduce the hermeneutic circle of data visualization. Finally, we suggest that the Affinity Map, because of its ethical and political multistability, might be seen as a material encounter between postphenomenology, actor-network theory (ANT), and hermeneutics.

The purpose of this chapter is to offer the grounds for a double rehabilitation: that of hermeneutics on the one hand, and of the virtual, a concept that became popular especially between the 1980s and 1990, on the other hand. More precisely, hermeneutics will be used to lay foundations for the hypothesis according to which the virtual never ended. The argument will follow three steps. In the first section, the author accounts for theories on the end of the virtual, distinguishing between those who think that the real has invaded the virtual and those who say that it is rather the opposite. The second section, entitled “The Virtual Never Ended”, is a tribute to Philip K. Dick and his crazy idea that the Roman Empire never came to an end. The digital works through representational distanciation and performative appropriation, and it is precisely this process that makes the virtual a valid concept that still gives rise to thought, and which allows hermeneutics to be used in the context of digitality. Finally, in the concluding section, the author will briefly present the epistemological and ontological advantages of such a perspective.

The goal of this article is twofold. First, it aims at sketching the outlines of material hermeneutics as a three-level analysis of technological artefacts. In the first section, we introduce Erwin Panofsky’s three levels of interpretation of an artwork, and we propose to import this approach in the field of philosophy of technology. Second, the rest of the article focuses on the third level, with a specific attention towards big data and algorithms of artificial intelligence. The thesis is that these new technologies are not only radically transforming our interactions with the world, or our modes of production and consumption, but also our worldview. In the second section, we rely on Panofsky’s Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism to describe the Scholastic “mental habit” or worldview and its principles. In the third section, we confront this worldview with the mechanistic and informationistic worldviews. Our contribution consists in arguing that (1) despite the differences, the Scholastic, mechanistic, and informationistic worldviews are part of the same logical and causal order that dominated Western epistemology, and (2) today we are facing the appearance of a new worldview that we call “data worldview”. Examples from design, architecture, and visualization of knowledge will be set all along the article.

This article builds on the hypothesis that theoretical approaches to philosophy of technology are currently stuck in a false alternative: either embrace the “empirical turn” or jump back into the determinism, pessimism, and general ignorance towards specific technologies that characterized the “humanities philosophy of technology.” A third path is however possible, which consists of articulating an empirical point of view with an interest in the symbolic dimension in which technologies and technological mediations are always already embedded. Bourdieu’s sociology of the symbolic forms represents an important and mostly unexplored resource in this respect. In this article, we introduce the notion of technological capital and its tree states—objectified, institutionalized, and embodied. In the first section, we briefly account of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology. Specific attention is then devoted to postphenomenology. We depict three perspectives in postphenomenology: standard postphenomenology, in which one single human-technology-world relation at a time is considered; the attempt of some technological mediation theorists to articulate postphenomenology and actor-network theory ; the original effort in Ihde, which is currently practiced by a minority of postphenomenologists, to combine an interest for the empirical dimension of technological mediations with an attention to the social and cultural conditions of possibility in which these mediations are embedded. In the second section, we consider some recent critiques of the limits of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology, especially related to postphenomenology. Furthermore, we argue that Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology may benefit the philosophy of technology. One might say that according to a Bourdieusian perspective, technologies are, in their invention, implementation, and use, embedded in symbolically organized interactions among social actors or groups. The notion of technological capital is introduced. A specific attention is given to its embodied state, which is related to the habitus. Such concept suggests that, to rephrase the famous sentence by Heidegger, “the essence of technology is not totally technological.” In the conclusion, we consider three risks related to a Bourdieusian approach to technology: transparency, determinism, and absolutism.

This article builds on the hypothesis that theoretical approaches to philosophy of technology are currently stuck in a false alternative: either embrace the “empirical turn” or jump back into the determinism, pessimism, and general ignorance towards specific technologies that characterized the “humanities philosophy of technology.” A third path is however possible, which consists of articulating an empirical point of view with an interest in the symbolic dimension in which technologies and technological mediations are always already embedded. Bourdieu’s sociology of the symbolic forms represents an important and mostly unexplored resource in this respect. In this article, we introduce the notion of technological capital and its tree states—objectified, institutionalized, and embodied. In the first section, we briefly account of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology. Specific attention is then devoted to postphenomenology. We depict three perspectives in postphenomenology: standard postphenomenology, in which one single human-technology-world relation at a time is considered; the attempt of some technological mediation theorists to articulate postphenomenology and actor-network theory ; the original effort in Ihde, which is currently practiced by a minority of postphenomenologists, to combine an interest for the empirical dimension of technological mediations with an attention to the social and cultural conditions of possibility in which these mediations are embedded. In the second section, we consider some recent critiques of the limits of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology, especially related to postphenomenology. Furthermore, we argue that Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology may benefit the philosophy of technology. One might say that according to a Bourdieusian perspective, technologies are, in their invention, implementation, and use, embedded in symbolically organized interactions among social actors or groups. The notion of technological capital is introduced. A specific attention is given to its embodied state, which is related to the habitus. Such concept suggests that, to rephrase the famous sentence by Heidegger, “the essence of technology is not totally technological.” In the conclusion, we consider three risks related to a Bourdieusian approach to technology: transparency, determinism, and absolutism.

This book uses the conceptual tools of philosophy to shed light on digital media and on the way in which they bear upon our existence. At the turn of the century, the rise of digital media significantly changed our world. The digitizing of traditional media has extraordinarily increased the circulation of texts, sound, and images. Digital media have also widened our horizons and altered our relationship with others and with ourselves. Information production and communication are still undoubtedly significant aspects of digital media and life. Recently, however, recording, registration and keeping track have taken the upper hand in both online practices and the imaginaries related to them. The essays in this book therefore focus primarily on the idea that digital media involve a significant overlapping between communication and recording.