Leo Catana

In this essay I examine and discuss the concept “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy; I do so in two moves. First I analyze the historical origin of the concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thereafter I undertake a discussion of its methodological weaknesses—a discussion that is not only relevant to the writing of history of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also to the writing of history of philosophy in our times, where the concept remains an important methodological tool. My first move is to analyze Jacob Brucker’s employment of the concept in his influential history of philosophy, Historia critica philosophiae, dating from 1742–1744. To Brucker, a “system of philosophy” is characterized by the following four features: it is autonomous in regard to other, non-philosophical disciplines; all doctrines stated within the various branches of philosophy can be deduced from one principle; as an autonomous system it comprises all branches of philosophy; the doctrines stated within these various branches of philosophy are internally coherent. Brucker employed the concept on the entire history of philosophy, and he gave it a defining role in regard to two other methodological concepts, namely “eclecticism” and “syncretism,” which he regarded as more or less successful forms of systematic philosophy. My second move is to point out the weakness of the concept of “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy. I argue that the interdisciplinary nature of much premodern philosophy makes Brucker’s methodological concept “system of philosophy” inadequate, and that we may be better off leaving it behind in our future exploration of premodern philosophy.

SummaryIn a series of articles from the 1980s and 1990s, Michael Frede analysed the history of histories of philosophy written over the last three hundred years. According to Frede, modern scholars have degenerated into what he calls a ‘doxographical’ mode of writing the history of philosophy. Instead, he argued, these scholars should write what he called ‘philosophical’ history of philosophy, first established in the last decades of the seventeenth century but since abandoned. In the present article it is argued that Frede's reconstruction of the history of histories of philosophy is historically problematic.

The division of Ancient Platonism into Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism is a fairly new one. The conceptual foundation of this division was cemented in Jacob Brucker’s pioneering Historia critica philosophiae (1742-67). In the 1770s and 1780s, the term ‘Neoplatonism’ was coined on the basis of Brucker’s analysis. Three historiographical concepts were decisive to Brucker: ‘system of philosophy’, ‘eclecticism’ and ‘syncretism’. By means of these concepts, he characterized Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism as opposing philosophical movements, the former being a genuine form of Platonism, the latter a false form. However, the division is untenable and we ought to abandon it.

It is commonly known that ancient schools of ethics were revived during the Renaissance: The texts pertaining to Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean ethics were edited, translated and discussed in this period. It is less known that the Renaissance also witnessed a revival of Plotinian ethics, by then perceived as a legitimate form of Platonic ethics. Plotinus' ethics had been transmitted through the Middle Ages through Macrobius' Latin treatise In somnium Scipionis I.8, which relied heavily on Plotinus' student, Porphyry, and his report of Plotinus' ethics. In this article it is argued that the Florentine humanist and philosopher Marsilio Ficino carried on this tradition of Platonic, or rather Plotinian, ethics. He was familiar with Plotinus' Enneads, since he had had access to it through Greek manuscripts from around 1462; his Latin translation of the Enneads was published in 1492. The article argues that in his commentary on Plato's Symposium, completed in 1469, Ficino made use of Plotinian ethi..

Arthur O. Lovejoy made rather grand methodological statements about the nature of history of ideas in his Great Chain of Being (1936). These statements were, it is argued, rhetorical declarations, intended to produce the conviction in the minds of his readers that history of ideas was distinct from history of philosophy and thus deserved institutional independence; they were not adequate descriptions of the method actually practiced. Instead, Lovejoy's historiographical practice can be contextualized within nineteenth-century general histories of philosophy. His studies on Giordano Bruno, dating from 1904 and 1936 respectively, illustrate this historiographical continuity.

The volumes under review are of immense value, because they convey to the modern reader how and why one of the most important Renaissance Platonists, Marsilio Ficino, came to regard the writings of one late ancient Platonist, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, as central to the history of ancient Platonism. The philosopher nowadays known as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is the author of four treatises composed in Greek in the late fifth or the sixth century CE: On the Divine Names, On the Celestial Hierarchy, On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, On Mystical Theology. In addition, ten of his letters have survived. The acquired prefix ‘pseudo’ derives from the circumstance that, from the sixth to the fifteenth century..