Leo Catana

The Introduction explains the motivations for the present work, namely, to give modern readers access to an eighteenth-century text that was decisive to the methodology of history of philosophy as a philosophical discipline from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, in some cases even longer; Brucker’s _Historia critica philosophiae_ (1742–1744). The Introduction thus explains his central methodological concepts, notably the concept ‘system of philosophy’, and the use of this methodological concept in his periodization of the world’s past philosophies. Moreover, the Introduction also explains how these methodological precepts were put into practice in the case of the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates. According to Brucker, Socrates developed a sound philosophical method, that is, a sceptical and non-sectarian method of philosophizing that should also serve as an ideal for the modern philosopher. The Introduction explains how Brucker arrived at this interpretation of Socrates by rejecting late ancient and Renaissance Platonist interpretations of Socrates and his method, and how he used Socrates as a proxy to engage in a contemporary theological debate that included Ralph Cudworth. Brucker’s interpretation of Socrates as a rational, sceptical philosopher became influential in subsequent histories of philosophies, and it has typically been treated as an objective an unbiased interpretation. The Introduction explains, however, that his interpretation was partly an outcome of a theological polemics and premised on Brucker’s theological position, imposing a filter through which Socrates has often been understood. Finally, the Introduction accounts for Brucker’s European outlook, his intended audience, and the guidelines governing the present translation.

This chapter contains a translation of the introductory text to the _Historia_, namely the ‘Dissertatio praeliminaris’ (‘Preliminary Discourse’), which formulates the aim, nature, methodology, mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and periodization of his history of philosophy. In the ‘Preliminary Discourse’ Brucker explains his methodological precepts in the form of fifteen precautions, his scholarly and religious motivations for writing the _Historia_, his stance towards earlier models for narrating past philosophy, his criterion of inclusion and exclusion, and the scheme of the entire work and its underlying periodization. The ‘Preliminary Discourse’ is of value to any reader interested in his methodology, partly because it is relevant to his exposition of singular philosophers or periods exposed in his _Historia_, and partly because his methodology has been very influential up till at least the first half of the twentieth century, in some cases even longer. In addition, the chapter provides a translation of ‘De schola socratica’ (‘On the Socratic School’), illustrating how his methodological precepts were put into practice in the case of Socrates and his school. This text illustrates to an exceptional degree several of the precautions listed in the ‘Preliminary Discourse’, in particular the ones concerned with textual criticism. Moreover, in the ‘Preliminary Discourse’, Brucker himself pointed out Socrates’ philosophical method as an ideal way of philosophizing. Lastly, the understanding and evaluation of Socrates in eighteenth-century Germany is under-examined among modern Socrates scholars, and the text ‘On the Socratic School’ provides insight into this eighteenth-century debate about Socrates.

Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner argued in _Philosophy in History_ (1984) that what is outside the sphere of philosophical problems, that is, historical truth and the contingency of historical contexts, should be examined by intellectual historians, not by historians of philosophy; the method of the latter, and their followers in analytic philosophy, is not suited to uncover such historical contexts. In this essay it is argued that if history of philosophy is conceived as a problem-oriented discipline, as the three authors hold, then historians of philosophy would still have to undertake the historically and philologically exacting task of contextualisation usually assigned to intellectual historians, since philosophical problems are shaped by their contexts, especially their disciplinary and argumentative contexts.

This chapter outlines the historical context of the eighteenth-century German reinterpretation of ancient Platonism. It does so by pointing out the intersection of four disciplines in that century, namely history, philology, theology and history of philosophy. One key figure in that context was Christoph August Heumann (1681–1764), a German Lutheran theologian, philologist and philosopher. Heumann rejected the biographical tradition as a legitimate medium for writing the history of philosophy, since he thought that this tradition had failed to root out fables and to assess in a philosophical manner the philosophical systems elaborated by the past philosopher(s) it portrayed. He used Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus to exemplify these characteristics, which he claimed were inherent in the biographical tradition. Moreover, this chapter comprises an edition of Heumann’s 1715 review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus; Heumann’s review, written in German, is accompanied by an English translation.

Thomas Taylor’s (1758–1835) interpretation of Plato’s works in 1804 was condemned as guilty by association immediately after its publication. Taylor’s 1804 and 1809 reviewer thus made a hasty generalisation in which the qualities of Neoplatonism, assumed to be negative, were transferred to Taylor’s own interpretation, which made use of Neoplatonist thinkers. For this reason, Taylor has typically been marginalised as an interpreter of Plato. The anonymous reviewer is now believed to be the Utilitarian James Mill (1773–1836). This chapter does not deny the association between Taylor and Neoplatonism. Instead, it examines the historical and historiographical reasons for the reviewer’s assumption that Neoplatonic readings of Plato are erroneous by definition. In particular, it argues that the reviewer relied on, and tacitly accepted, ethical and theological premises going back to the historiography of philosophy developed by Jacob Brucker in his Historia critica philosophiae (1742–1744). These premises were an integral part of Brucker’s Lutheran religiosity and thus theologically and ethically biased. If these premises are identified, articulated and discussed critically, it becomes less obvious that the reviewer was justified in his assumption that the Neoplatonic reading was erroneous by definition.

This chapter presents and discusses interpretations of German Enlightenment thought advanced over the last hundred years, notably those current in contemporary scholarship. It discusses whether it is possible to determine the period in an essentialist manner, valid to the European Enlightenment, or only according to national and more local categories. Jonathan Israel’s interpretation of the European, so-called ‘radical Enlightenment’ is discussed critically, and it is argued that religion and philosophy were not separated in the German Enlightenment, but intimately connected.

This chapter asks if and how the eighteenth-century German reception of late ancient Platonism had any impact upon German nineteenth-century Plato scholarship, in particular that of the classical philologist and theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), who is often seen as the first modern Plato interpreter. It is argued that he was less original than normally assumed, since he was decisively influenced by the denigration of the biographical tradition, which had been so conspicuous in German eighteenth-century scholarship. It is also argued that contemporary Plato scholarship, dedicated to the nineteenth-century reception of Plato, has failed to pay sufficient attention to the eighteenth-century background.

This chapter critically explores the history and nature of a hermeneutic assumption which frequently guided interpretations of Plotinus from the eighteenth century onwards, namely that Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) advanced a system of philosophy. It is argued that this assumption was introduced relatively late, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and that it was primarily made possible by Brucker’s methodology for the history of philosophy, dating from the 1740s, to which the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ was essential.

The division of Ancient Platonism into Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism is a fairly new one. The conceptual foundation of this division was cemented in Jacob Brucker’s pioneering Historia critica philosophiae (1742–1767). In the 1770s and 1780s, the term ‘Neoplatonism’ was coined on the basis of Brucker’s analysis. Three historiographical concepts were decisive to Brucker: ‘system of philosophy’, ‘eclecticism’ and ‘syncretism’. By means of these concepts, he characterized Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism as opposing philosophical movements, the former being a genuine form of Platonism, the latter a false form. It is argued in this chapter that the division is untenable and that we ought to abandon it.

This article offers a conceptual clarification of the Aristotelian component in environmental virtue ethics (EVE). It demonstrates that throughout the last four decades, contributors to EVE have favored an Aristotelian foundation (though a Humean base also has been proposed), and it presents six theoretical challenges and two underexplored possibilities premised on such an Aristotelian foundation of EVE. These two possibilities concern: 1) Aristotle’s notion of the city-state (polis), denoting not only a densely populated area, but also agricultural land outside the city-walls, implying agrarian virtues were implicit in the Aristotelian framework; this is valuable to modern agriculture, and the ways in which environmentally friendly virtues are integrated into food production and consumption. 2) Aristotle’s understanding of well-being (eudaimonia) as existing not only at an individual level, but also at a collective level; the latter is relevant to the prospect of upscaling eudaimonia to a structural level, within the limits of an ecologically sustainable citizenship.

In this article I argue that Socrates appropriated a traditional discourse characteristic of Athenian law courts and politics keyed to the concept of protection (boētheia). More specifically, I argue that Socrates aimed at protecting the Athenians, though not directly, but indirectly, namely via his life-long endeavour to serve (boēthein) Apollo. I thus read Plato’s Apology as a political text, though not “political” in the sense of Socrates being suspect of overthrowing democracy, as sometimes claimed, but “political” in the sense that Plato’s Socrates latched on to this concept of boēthein in the Apology.

In Plato’s Gorgias 482c4–484c3, Callicles advances a concept of natural justice: the laws of the polis must agree with nature, that is, human nature. Since human nature is characterised by its desire to get a greater share (pleon echein), nature itself makes it legitimate that stronger human beings get a greater share than weaker ones. Socrates objects: Callicles’ theoretical approach to civic life poses a threat to the polis’ community, its citizens, and to the friendship amongst its citizens. However, Socrates accepts Callicles’ premise, that the laws of the polis must agree with nature (again, human nature). Still, he disagrees with Callicles about the nature of human nature and proposes an alternative theory of human nature, eventually leading to his alternative concept of natural justice. The article explains the arguments underpinning these two concepts of natural justice, including the conflicting understandings of human nature.

On croit souvent que le mythe du Gorgias de Platon a pour objet d’expliquer comment la vertu dans cette vie est récompensée dans l’au-delà. L’auteur soutient qu’il s’agit d’une fausse piste. En réalité, le mythe renforce la conception qu’a Socrate de la « protection » [ boētheia ]. Elle structure le mythe et est un concept éthique dans le débat entre Socrate et Calliclès qui a eu lieu plus tôt dans le dialogue. Selon l’auteur, Socrate entend la « protection » comme la disposition volontaire à s’exposer à la correction ou à la punition [ kolasis ] ; et la position de Socrate dans le mythe est cohérente avec sa position antérieure dans le dialogue.

This article argues for two inter-related theses keyed to Plato’s Gorgias. Callicles does not represent a constitutional form, but political participation itself, characterised by ambition, competition among political candidates, and the psychological and ethical mechanisms entailed in the process of gaining political recognition. According to Socrates’s understanding, the political leader’s mirroring and internalisation of dominant character traits, held amongst those individuals transferring power, is decisive to the approval bestowed upon the political leader in question. This reading supplements that of Ober, who has claimed that the would-be political leader’s conformity with the demos’ ideology is decisive. This article argues that Socrates’ point is that a would-be political leader needs to mirror the character traits of those exercising power in specific civic institutions, implying a more pluralistic and context-determined approach. Moreover, this reading connects Socrates’ notion of recognition with that of moral psychology.

Plato’s Gorgias sets out to discuss the nature and aim of rhetoric. The dialogue was held in high esteem among late ancient Platonists and it resurfaced in Renaissance discussions about ethics. Olympiodorus produced an extensive commentary on the dialogue, emphasising its ethical content. In 1409, Leonardo Bruni provided the first complete Latin translation of the Gorgias with preface and annotations. Later in the Renaissance we find direct and indirect commentaries by George of Trebizond and Marsilio Ficino. I argue that Ficino’s translation of, and commentary to, Plato’s Gorgias was a significant, but perhaps also unintended, contribution to the dissemination of ancient sophists in the Italian Renaissance. Ficino’s commentary to the Gorgias defends a legitimate and philosophical use of rhetoric, including the one we find in Plato’s own writings. Furthermore, Ficino treats the character Callicles – together with several other sophists in Plato’s dialogues – as an enemy of the Platonic-Pythagorean ethical ideal, maintaining that the sophists were wrong. Moreover, he treats ancient sophists as a fairly homogeneous group, unlike some of the ancient sources.

This work synthesizes work previously published in leading journals in the field into a coherent narrative that has a distinctive focus on Germany while also being aware of a broader European dimension. It argues that the German Lutheran Christoph August Heumann marginalized the biographical approach to past philosophy and paved the way for the German Lutheran Johann Jacob Brucker’s influential method for the writing of past philosophy, centred on depersonalised and abstract systems of philosophy. The work offers an authoritative and engaging account of how late ancient Platonism, Plotinus in particular, was interpreted in eighteenth-century Germany according to these new precepts. Moreover, it reveals the Lutheran religious assumptions of this new approach to past philosophy, which underpinned the works of Heumann and Brucker, but also influential reviews that rejected the English Plato translator Thomas Taylor and his understanding and evaluation of late ancient Platonism.

In this essay I examine and discuss the concept “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy; I do so in two moves. First I analyze the historical origin of the concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thereafter I undertake a discussion of its methodological weaknesses—a discussion that is not only relevant to the writing of history of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also to the writing of history of philosophy in our times, where the concept remains an important methodological tool. My first move is to analyze Jacob Brucker’s employment of the concept in his influential history of philosophy, Historia critica philosophiae, dating from 1742–1744. To Brucker, a “system of philosophy” is characterized by the following four features: it is autonomous in regard to other, non-philosophical disciplines; all doctrines stated within the various branches of philosophy can be deduced from one principle; as an autonomous system it comprises all branches of philosophy; the doctrines stated within these various branches of philosophy are internally coherent. Brucker employed the concept on the entire history of philosophy, and he gave it a defining role in regard to two other methodological concepts, namely “eclecticism” and “syncretism,” which he regarded as more or less successful forms of systematic philosophy. My second move is to point out the weakness of the concept of “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy. I argue that the interdisciplinary nature of much premodern philosophy makes Brucker’s methodological concept “system of philosophy” inadequate, and that we may be better off leaving it behind in our future exploration of premodern philosophy.

SummaryIn a series of articles from the 1980s and 1990s, Michael Frede analysed the history of histories of philosophy written over the last three hundred years. According to Frede, modern scholars have degenerated into what he calls a ‘doxographical’ mode of writing the history of philosophy. Instead, he argued, these scholars should write what he called ‘philosophical’ history of philosophy, first established in the last decades of the seventeenth century but since abandoned. In the present article it is argued that Frede's reconstruction of the history of histories of philosophy is historically problematic.

The division of Ancient Platonism into Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism is a fairly new one. The conceptual foundation of this division was cemented in Jacob Brucker’s pioneering Historia critica philosophiae (1742-67). In the 1770s and 1780s, the term ‘Neoplatonism’ was coined on the basis of Brucker’s analysis. Three historiographical concepts were decisive to Brucker: ‘system of philosophy’, ‘eclecticism’ and ‘syncretism’. By means of these concepts, he characterized Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism as opposing philosophical movements, the former being a genuine form of Platonism, the latter a false form. However, the division is untenable and we ought to abandon it.