David Lefebvre

Does Aristotle attribute to the nutritive soul a function specifically dedicated to the embryonic formation? The claim has sometimes been defended in the Aristotelian tradition or by modern scholars. This article intends to show that Aristotle never uses such formative power. The whole embryogenesis is the work of the nutritive soul inasmuch as it makes the living thing grow. Through a close reading of texts from de Anima II,4, de Generatione Animalium II,1, 4 and 6, we establish that (i) Aristotle distinguishes two stages in the generative process of the embryo: the generation (understood in a restrictive meaning) of the heart by an external principle (the male’s seed) and the growth of the heart and of the whole embryo by the action of the internal principle located in the heart; (ii) Aristotle sometimes makes a more accurate distinction between the initial “constitution” of the organs and their growth. Even in this case, these two processes depend on the soul’s “productive power”, which is the same as the one by which the nutritive soul makes the living thing grow. There is no conflict on this point between the de An. and the GA. The growth of the adult animal and the whole formation of the embryo depend on a single function of the nutritive soul, the “use of the food”. This result confirms the unity of the functions of the nutritive soul in Aristotle’s psychology and embryology.

Résumé — On se propose de lire le commentaire par Alexandre de la première critique aristotélicienne aux Idées de Platon en Métaphysique, A, 9, 990 a 34 - b 8. Cette critique comprend deux parties : dans la première, Aristote voit dans les Idées une multiplication inutile d’êtres ; dans la seconde, il envisage la question du nombre des Idées et précise de quoi il y a des Idées. Le commentaire d’Alexandre, qui ne peut s’appuyer ici sur le traité perdu Sur les Idées, est dense et complexe. À partir de son étude, on propose d’abord une hypothèse pour reconstituer le sens des lignes corrompues p. 76, 16-18. Dans une troisième section, on montre comment Alexandre hésite entre deux interprétations des Idées : sont-elles les causes des communs ou sont-elles l’unité d’une multiplicité ? et on dégage ce que signifie cette difficulté à articuler les Idées et les communs.Le commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise à métaphysique,— In his criticism of the theory of Ideas, Aristotle starts with an argument against this type of platonic causes which has two parts : he first points out that Ideas are a useless multiplication of beings and then explains in a somehow obscure way why Ideas are so numerous and what are the objects of the Ideas . In his commentary on this text, Alexander of Aphrodisias is very cautious and propounds three different interpretations of the first part of Aristotle’s argument. We submit an hypothesis in order to establish the meaning of two lines of the text that are corrupted . In a third section , we show how Alexander does hesitate between two interpretations about the Ideas : are they the causes of the commons or are they a « one over many » ? Even in this last case, Alexander says, they still are Ideas of the commons, because the commons are in the particulars

Generation of Animals is one of Aristotle's most mature, sophisticated, and carefully crafted scientific writings. His overall goal is to provide a comprehensive and systematic account of how animals reproduce, including a study of their reproductive organs, what we would call fertilization, embryogenesis, and organogenesis. In this book, international experts present thirteen original essays providing a philosophically and historically informed introduction to this important work. They shed light on the unity and structure of the Generation of Animals, the main theses that Aristotle defends in the work, and the method of inquiry he adopts. They also open up new avenues of exploration of this difficult and still largely unexplored work. The volume will be essential for scholars and students of ancient philosophy as well as of the history and philosophy of science.