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1MACKIE, J. L. "Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic" (review)Mind 85 (n/a): 303. 1976.
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4The Pragmatics of the Logical ConstantsIn Ernest LePore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768--793. 2006.The logical constants are technical terms, invented and precisely defined by logicians for the purpose of producing rigorous formal proofs. Mathematics virtually exhausts the domain of deductive reasoning of any complexity, and it is there that the benefits of this refined form of language are felt. Pragmatic issues may arise — issues concerning the point of making a certain statement — for there will be more or less perspicuous and illuminating ways of presenting proofs in this language, and we…Read more
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18Counterfactuals and the benefit of hindsightIn Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, Routledge. 2003.Book synopsis: Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey w…Read more
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4The Concept of Probability by J. R. Lucas. (Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 220. £2.10.)Philosophy 47 (182): 375-. 1972.
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15Possible knowledge of unknown truthSynthese 173 (1). 2010.Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unkno…Read more
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Un argumento de Orayen en favor del condicional materialRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 13 (1): 54. 1987.
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3Conditionals, truth and assertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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1Sorensen on Vagueness and ContradictionIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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21Verificationism and the Manifestations of MeaningAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1). 1985.
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12Mellor on chance and causation (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3): 411-433. 1997.Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to…Read more
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Probability |