H Kim

For the legions of Paper Magazine fans, and anyone who's interested in Where Style Starts. This stunning portrayal of the last 20 years is a wonderful commemorative look at the life and times of the era. Following introductions and commentary by a virtual who's who of popular culture, 20 Years of Style charts just how style has evolved over the past twenty years, illustrating the huge influence that underground cultures from the worlds of art, music, film, sports and urban street life ultimately have played on mainstream fashion. Laid out by year starting in 1984 and continuing through the present, this star-studded journey cannot be described by words alone. Adding to this visual feast are essays and commentary from Paper Magazine founders and co-editors Kim Hasreiter and David Hershkovits, as well as celebratory tributes to Paper Magazine from dejay and musicologist Moby; rap icon Fab 5 Freddy; artist/designer Todd Oldham; and style historian Harold Koda.

Spinoza’s stance against “bad” universals is well known but his own view on “good” universals is not obvious. In this paper we examine the ontological status of general terms in Spinoza against the background of his metaphysical ontology. We then move onto his view of universals in his discussions of the three kind of knowledge. I argue that Spinoza’s view may be best characterized as trope-conceptualism. Universals are, considered in things themselves, nothing but tropes, i.e., fully particularized properties of individual objects. In particular, I claim that what Spinoza calls “attributes” in his grand scheme of ontology are tropes, of which we can have “adequate” ideas. Spinoza’s theory is a lot more delicate and sophisticated than is usually construed.

Subjective materialism is a new worldview of the subject of self-awareness based on man-in-the world, and a methodology of man interconnecting the world. Subjective materialism is a logical result of development in western philosophy. This logic comes from the metaphysics of Graeco, while its thinking originates from Kantian philosophy. Kant’s philosophy has been occupying the most important position in the history of western philosophy. Of important significance in the history of philosophy is a fact implied by the Copernican Revolution in Kant’s philosophy, namely the indication of the possibility for subjective materialism. A particular transcendental epistemology and its point of view about man’s free nature led to today’s subjective materialism. Subjective materialism is a finalization of Kantian philosophy in a materialistic form.

We give definitions that distinguish between two notions of indiscernibility for a set {aη∣η∈ω>ω}\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\{a_{\eta} \mid \eta \in ^{\omega>}\omega\}}$$\end{document} that saw original use in Shelah [Classification theory and the number of non-isomorphic models. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1990], which we name s- and str−indiscernibility. Using these definitions and detailed proofs, we prove s- and str-modeling theorems and give applications of these theorems. In particular, we verify a step in the argument that TP is equivalent to TP1 or TP2 that has not seen explication in the literature. In the Appendix, we exposit the proofs of Shelah [Classification theory and the number of non-isomorphic models. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1990, App. 2.6, 2.7], expanding on the details.

In this essay, I examine the concept of individual freedom that varies depending on cultures through different attitudes toward the administrative policy of wearing masks. Many Westerners criticized the enforcement of the policy in East Asia as the oppression of individual freedom. I argue that the criticism is based on a narrow understanding of the problem and that individual freedom becomes obscure even in the West as we are entering the society of surveillance capitalism due to technological revolution. Confucian cultures give us a context in reference to which we reflect on individual freedom in the post-pandemic situation.

The third section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals presents a particularly acute interpretative problem that has perplexed generations of Kant commentators. Having devoted the two preceding sections of the work to identifying the supreme principle of morality, Kant, in this section, turns to the task of justifying the principle for rational yet sensually affected beings like humans. However, in the middle of this famous “deduction,” he suddenly confesses that “there is a hidden circle” from which “there is no escape.” Kant’s abrupt confession of the circle leaves the reader deeply puzzled, partly because Kant has so confidently presented his arguments for our subjection to the constraints of the supreme principle of morality up to that point, and partly because no clues are readily apparent as to what the mistake in the arguments might be. Where is the circle located? In this paper I tackle Kant’s problem of the hidden circle in the Foundations. In particular, I will identify and critically discuss three influential interpretations of the fallacy of circularity and offer an alternative reading of Kant’s way out of the problem.

Despite the dominant practice in contemporary Korean academia since 1936 to define Dasan’s philosophy and Practical Learning as intellectual defiance against neo-Confucianism and neo-Confucian society, some scholarly efforts that have sought to disprove this understanding attract the unremitting attention of many modern skeptics. These efforts revolve around one point: they are not separated from neo-Confucianism philosophically, politically, and historically. In this view, these “new” intellectual trends are perceived as redemption of the ideal Confucian statecraft commonly cherished by all types of Confucians, and a natural development consequent on the expansion of neo-Confucian interest in Confucian classical texts. In stark contrast to the prevailing perspective on Dasan’s philosophy and Practical Learning, which sees them as estranged from their neo-Confucian predecessors probably with hope of positioning them closer to modernity, the opposition insists continuity exists between the two Confucian traditions, somewhat provoking disconnection of all Joseon intelligentsia from modernity.

Are mechanisms for social attention influenced by culture? Evidence that social attention is triggered automatically by bottom-up gaze cues and is uninfluenced by top-down verbal instructions may suggest it operates in the same way everywhere. Yet considerations from evolutionary and cultural psychology suggest that specific aspects of one's cultural background may have consequence for the way mechanisms for social attention develop and operate. In more interdependent cultures, the scope of social attention may be broader, focusing on more individuals and relations between those individuals. We administered a multi-gaze cueing task requiring participants to fixate a foreground face flanked by background faces and measured shifts in attention using eye tracking. For European Americans, gaze cueing did not depend on the direction of background gaze cues, suggesting foreground gaze alone drives automatic attention shifting; for East Asians, cueing patterns differed depending on whether the foreground cue matched or mismatched background cues, suggesting foreground and background gaze information were integrated. These results demonstrate that cultural background influences the social attention system by shifting it into a narrow or broad mode of operation and, importantly, provides evidence challenging the assumption that mechanisms underlying automatic social attention are necessarily rigid and impenetrable to culture.