Ivo Wallimann-Helmer

Adaptation to changing and new environmental conditions is of fundamental importance to sustainability and requires concerted efforts amongst science, policy, and practice to produce solution-oriented knowledge. Joint knowledge production or co- production of knowledge has become increasingly popular terms to describe the process of scientists, policy makers and actors from the civil society coming together to cooperate in the production, dissemination, and application of knowledge to solve wicked problems such as climate change. Networks are particularly suited to produce knowledge in a joint fashion. However, the process of joint knowledge production (JKP) in networks has rarely been examined. In this paper, we present a sketch of the adaptation network landscape and assess how joint knowledge production supports the development of solution-oriented knowledge in climate change adaptation networks. We conclude that the processes of JKP are diverse, complex, and highly dependent on the interests and roles of actors within the network. To keep such processes alive, signposts in form of analysis and intermediary products along the network lifetime should be positioned as means of stocktaking and monitoring for the future.

Both biofuels and BECCS serve the purpose of reducing the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere, biofuels by reducing the quantity of CO2 newly added and BECCS by removing the CO2 already emitted. Both rely on the large-scale growth of biomass and hence compete with food production for arable land. Consequently, the implementation of both at large scales potentially endangers food security. Given this conflict and the need for climate action, this paper discusses whether there are differences between the ethical implications of mitigation by biofuels and geoengineering with BECCS. We apply a principlist approach, specifying and weighting four key principles of climate ethics: the polluter-pays principle, the ability-to-pay principle, the equal-per-capita principle, and the procedural involvement principle. Because the ethical and practical implications of BECCS and biofuels have many parallels, applying these four principles identifies relevant moral differences to decide between these two technologies.

Ethics reflects the moral aspects of any kind of challenge and especially of complex problems. Ethics asks, ’What should be?’ given the facts, dilemmas and normative claims. It is always worth analyzing complex problems through a normative-ethical lens since many, if not all, complex problems incorporate moral issues. The five-step model allows decision-making in situations in which our moral intuitions do not provide convincing guidance. Ethical analysis is not only a means to clarify your individual moral position but also to analyze the challenge you face from a moral point of view. Using the five-step model allows you to identify the ethical challenges, acquire a more encompassing understanding of them and make a well-reflected ethical decision

One of the major ethical issues in waste policy concerns the just distribution of waste facilities and the associated environmental risks. This essay provides an overview of the most important aspects to consider when assessing whether unequal exposure to waste facilities is unjust. It claims that the ethical principles that might warrant such injustices are problematic due to feasibility constraints. This is why appropriate democratic involvement in policy decisions about waste facilities is crucial. However, equal recognition of all affected is given only if they all can have an effective and equal voice in policy-making about waste facilities.

Significant disagreement remains in ethics about the duties we have towards wild animals. This paper aims to mediate those disagreements by exploring how they are supported by, or diverge from, the common-sense ethical principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy and justice popular in medical ethics. We argue that these principles do not clearly justify traditional conservation or a ‘hands-off ’ approach to wild-animal welfare; instead, they support natural negative duties to reduce the harms that we cause as well as natural positive duties to promote the welfare of wild animals.

In this paper, I argue that the normative framework of liberal democracy is one of the sources of the failure of international climate politics. The liberal framework makes it very likely that at least some democracies will not consent to an international agreement to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. In this situation, the institution of judicial review might be viewed as crucial to overcome the risk of a tragedy of the commons. However, judicial review cannot serve this purpose in the case of climate change and an institutional change of the kind required cannot be derived from within the normative framework of liberal democracy itself

This paper argues that an analysis of the dissatisfactory outcomes of international negotiations concerning climate change must take into account procedures of political decision‐making in democracies. Although the normative ideal of republican democracy has means of dealing with such dissatisfactory results, political processes in republican democracies take too much time and risk becoming stuck in tragic or dilemmatic decision structures when facing challenges such as climate change. Consequently, this paper discusses possibilities for redesigning republican democratic institutions to counter‐act these negative forces. However, all possibilities discussed either call into question the normative ideal of republican democracy itself or would take too much time to be realized.

This chapter lays out what we take to be the main types of justice and ethical challenges concerning those adverse effects of climate change leading to climate-related Loss and Damage (L&D). We argue that it is essential to clearly differentiate between the challenges concerning mitigation and adaptation and those ethical issues exclusively relevant for L&D in order to address the ethical aspects pertaining to L&D in international climate policy. First, we show that depending on how mitigation and adaptation are distinguished from L&D, the primary focus of policy measures and their ethical implications will vary. Second, we distinguish between a distributive justice framework and a compensatory justice scheme for delivering L&D measures. Third, in order to understand the differentiated remedial responsibilities concerning L&D, we categorise the measures and policy approaches available. Fourth, depending on the kind of L&D and which remedies are possible, we explain the difference between remedial and outcome responsibilities of different actors. [Open access]

This paper provides a critical comment on Philip Kitcher’s as yet unpublished book “The Ethical Project”. In the first part it explains why Kitcher’s position is naturalist as well as pragmatist. In the second part it is argued that the role ethics plays in human history is richer than Kitcher conceives it: Building on his view, this paper suggests that ethics not only provides a mechanism to diminish the risk of social conflict and social instability, but it also enables the emergence of self-conceptions. This reveals according to what processes certain particular changes occurred in the evolution of ethics.

This paper suggests a way to elaborate the ethical implications of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) as decided at COP 19 from the perspective of justice. It advocates three pro-posals. First, in order to fully understand the responsibilities and liabilities implied in the WIM, adaptation needs to be distinguished from loss and damage (L&D) on the basis of the different goals which should be attributed to adaptation and to L&D approaches. Second, the primary concern of the WIM should be compensatory justice. In case of climate L&D, three aspects of compensatory justice should be kept separate: corrective liability, remedial responsibility, and with regard to the resources available, fair remedy. Third, it is crucial to distinguish between recov-erable damage and irrecoverable or at least not fully recoverable loss. This distinction is crucial because it informs the principles of fair remedy and because damage and loss may differ in their relevance for the stability and functioning of a human system.

In this comment a challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes.

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 21 Heft: 1 Seiten: 197-220. There seem to be good reasons that democratic institutions must be reformed in order to minimize the danger of unsustainable policy decisions infringing upon duties of intergenerational justice. This is why there exist a number of different proposals of how to reform democratic states in order to foster their duties towards the future. However, the debate lacks a systematic assessment of these suggested reforms within a coherent theoretical and norma-tive framework. This paper aims at developing such a framework. We suggest two conceptual dimensions defining the spectrum of different justi-fiable institutional reforms: the relation between democracy and justice as one dimension and the conditions considered relevant for viewing democracies as responsible collective agents as the other. Depending on how we understand this relation and these conditions, it is possible to substantiate a set of types of institutional reforms that will promote democracies? capacities to comply with their responsibilities towards the future.

This paper provides a critical comment on Philip Kitcher’s as yet unpublished book “The Ethical Project”. In the first part it explains why Kitcher’s position is naturalist as well as pragmatist. In the second part it is argued that the role ethics plays in human history is richer than Kitcher conceives it: Building on his view, this paper suggests that ethics not only provides a mechanism to diminish the risk of social conflict and social instability, but it also enables the emergence of self-conceptions. This reveals according to what processes certain particular changes occurred in the evolution of ethics.

In the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the parties to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed “that adaptation is a challenge faced by all Parties, and that enhanced action and international cooperation is urgently required to enable and support the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing country Parties […].” Furthermore, the conference of the parties requests the developed countries to provide developing countries with additional finance, technology, and capacity-building. This paper argues that this decision tends to oversimplify matters because it seems to differentiate responsibilities for climate change adaptation according to differences in the contribution to anthropogenic climate change only. However, the differentiation of responsibilities for climate change adaptation is more complex than it first appears to be. To show why the differentiation of responsibilities for climate change adaptation is more complex, this paper analyzes the aspects of responsibility as a fourfold concept. Someone is always responsible for something, answerable to some institution, and held accountable to a norm. The paper argues, first, that the appropriate object of responsibility in climate change adaptation is the burdens to be shared for effective and efficient adaptation. Second, for such adaptation to occur, however, subjects of responsibility should not only be developed countries. If appropriate competence and decision-structures are given in developing countries, these countries should also be deemed responsible for their own adaptation. Third, the paper shows that those vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change should decide on their own what adaptation measures they wish to take. Fourth, the argument of this paper suggests that ability-to-pay principles are the most appropriate norms by which to blame countries for failing their responsibilities in climate change adaptation.

Der anthropogene Klimawandel trifft die armen und ärmsten Weltregionen und Bevölkerungsgruppen besonders hart. Weder haben diese in der Vergangenheit viel zum Klimawandel beigetragen, noch ist ihr heutiger Treibhausgasausstoß annähernd so hoch wie derjenige in den entwickelten Industrienationen und einigen Schwellenländern. Benachteiligte Bevölkerungsgruppen sind den negativen Folgen des Klimawandels zudem häufig besonders stark ausgesetzt. Diese Auswirkungen sind bereits jetzt zu spüren und werden sich in Zukunft noch verstärken.

In this paper I argue for the following conclusions. First, quotas are not normative goals in themselves but only a means to reach non-discriminatory selection procedures. Second, in a democracy quotas are most plausibly used as a means to fill offices in those bodies which have a major impact on how well interests or discourses are translated into policy. Third, quotas for the young can be justified since, due to demographic development, their discourses tend to be marginalized. Fourth, youth quotas cannot be a means to ensure long-term policy-making, but they can enhance legitimacy of long-term impacts from policy decisions taken today.

Attitudes toward repository projects cannot be explained merely on the basis of perceived risks, trust, or technical information. Issues of justice and fairness frequently arise when burdens and benefits are to be allocated. A fair distribution across the various parts of a given territory of the waste to be stored is unlikely to be accomplished as it is contingent on appropriate geological formations and other factors. The process by which the specific distribution is determined and accomplished needs to be taken into account as well. Thus, justice evaluations of both the distributive outcome and the process itself, by which the outcome is accomplished, are likely to affect people’s attitudes toward and acceptance of siting decisions. Data from a number of methodically different studies conducted over the last eight years on site selection in Switzerland suggest that a fair procedure is more essential than a fair distribution to a consensus about the decisions made. As a consequence, even normative assessments of the fairness of a distribution of nuclear waste must consider procedural justice as a valuable indicator, independently of the particular shape of the distribution. However, contextual factors, such as the wider nuclear energy strategy of a country, may compete with procedural fairness in terms of importance. Even though fairness is a requirement it does not guarantee acceptance. It may, however, enhance acceptability from a moral standpoint.

This comment questions Lister's reading of the reciprocity condition in three respects. First, it challenges the view that this condition necessarily leads to egalitarian claims about just distribution. Secondly, it questions Lister's argument that the reciprocity condition is linked to substantial schemes of egalitarian distribution irrespective of context. Thirdly, it claims that entitlements to justice for people with mental or psychological impairments cannot be based on a distinction between willingness and unwillingness to contribute to the cooperative venture of a society.

The aim of this paper is to link empirical findings concerning environmental inequalities with different normative yard-sticks for assessing whether these inequalities should be deemed unjust, or not. We argue that such an inquiry must necessarily take into account some caveats regarding both empirical research and normative theory. We suggest that empirical results must be contextualised by establishing geographies of risk. As a normative yard-stick we propose a moderately demanding social-egalitarian account of justice and democratic citizenship, which we take to be best suited to identify unjust as well as legitimate instances of socio-environmental inequality

Although I believe that Gardiner and Fragnière are right to claim that geoengineering governance demands participatory structures, I think more caution is needed. First, the public to be considered because it is affected must be differentiated depending on the geoengineering technique at issue and on the severity of its impact. Second, to avoid undermining democratic legitimacy, ethical conditions of legitimacy must be carefully assessed. Even though future generations and nature are very likely to be affected by geoengineering, their representation is not as unproblematic as it might seem at first sight.

The UN's Sustainable Development Goals saw the global community agree to end hunger and malnutrition in all its forms by 2030. However, the number of chronically undernourished people is increasing continuously. Ongoing climate change and the action needed to adapt to it are very likely to aggravate this situation by limiting agricultural land and water resources and changing environmental conditions for food production. Climate change and the actions it requires raise questions of justice, especially regarding food security. 0These key concerns of ethics and justice for food security due to climate change challenges are the focus of this book, which brings together work by scholars from a wide range of disciplines and a multitude of perspectives. These experts discuss the challenges to food security posed by mitigation, geoengineering, and adaptation measures that tackle the impacts of climate change. Others address the consequences of a changing climate for agriculture and food production and how the Covid-19 pandemic has affected food security and animal welfare.0.

In this comment I challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes.

As our experience with this special issue shows, climate change is such a multi-faceted problem that interdisciplinary research is a necessity. This is much more easily said than done. In the course of the publication of this special issue there were many lessons to be learned. First of all we saw how the exchange between our authors allowed them to expand the focus of their respective disciplines. Philosophers considered literature from various fields they would not have touched upon in their usual course of inquiry. Scientists and legal scholars became more sensitive to the normative dimensions and justice-related intricacies involved in their research. This enabled all contributors to open up to different vocabularies and standards of research. At the same time, however, several obstacles to the success of this issue emerged as well. For such an endeavor it is necessary to find researchers who are ready to engage with other disciplines and to take up ideas and comments which at first sight might not seem relevant and out of place from their disciplinary perspective. Due to the special format another challenge was to communicate the interdisciplinary character of this special issue to the reviewers and to put the reviews in context accordingly without risking to diminish the disciplinary quality of contributions. For the guest editors this came with a further challenge. We not only had to become familiar with different disciplinary vocabularies and standards of research but also had to judge the quality and relevance of contributions in the light of our overall aim as well as disciplinary standards of quality.

Spätestens seit der Veröffentlichung von Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit ist Chancengleichheit ein prominentes Ideal der neueren liberalen Theoriebildung. War es im klassischen Liberalismus eher das Ideal der Freiheit, das im Vordergrund stand, kann man in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie von John Rawls und der Entwicklung des Egalitarismus eine Verschiebung hin zum Ideal der Chancengleichheit beobachten, zumindest was die philosophische Theoriebildung zur Verteilungsgerechtigkeit betrifft. Ob Chancengleichheit damit allerdings eine angemessene Auslegung erfährt oder das liberale Ideal der Freiheit eher aufweicht, hängt wesentlich davon ab, welches Gewicht das Ideal in der jeweiligen liberalen Theoriebildung erhält.

This chapter serves as an introduction to the collected volume. In the first section, we aim to provide background on important themes in social egalitarianism and to set the context for understanding which significant questions the chapters in this book pose and attempt to answer. In this section we focus especially on what could be said to characterize socially egalitarian relationships, on which relationships are of concern, and on what might make social egalitarianism distinct. In the second section, we provide a brief explanation of the structure of the book and each of its chapters