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3050What is "naturalized epistemology?"Philosophical Perspectives 2 381-405. 1988.This paper analyzes and evaluates quine's influential thesis that epistemology should become a chapter of empirical psychology. quine's main point, it is argued, is that normativity must be banished from epistemology and, more generally, philosophy. i claim that without a normative concept of justification, we lose the very concept of knowledge, and that belief ascription itself becomes impossible without a normative concept of rationality. further, the supervenience of concepts of epistemic app…Read more
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175Causality, identity and supervenience in the mind-body problemMidwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1): 31-49. 1979.
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130The role of perception in a priori knowledge: Some remarks (review)Philosophical Studies 40 (3). 1981.
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557Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essaysCambridge University Press. 1993.Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the phi…Read more
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109The mind-body problem after fifty yearsIn Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-21. 1998.It was about half a century ago that the mind–body problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind , published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and…Read more
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124Moral kinds and natural kinds: What's the difference: For a naturalist?Philosophical Issues 8 293-301. 1997.
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219Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory ExclusionMidwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1): 225-239. 1988.
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38Reduction, Correspondence and IdentityThe Monist 52 (3): 424-438. 1968.Is social science ‘reducible’ to individual psychology, and ultimately to some physical theory? If a sociological theory, that is, a theory dealing with group phenomena, is ‘reduced’ in a relevant and appropriate sense to individual psychology, could we then say that the social phenomena in the domain of the sociological theory are just psychological phenomena of individuals? Conversely, if social events and processes are just individual psychological events and processes, then does it follow th…Read more
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257The American Origins of Philosophical NaturalismJournal of Philosophical Research 28 (9999): 83-98. 2003.If contemporary analytic philosophy can be said to have a philosophical ideology, it undoubtedly is naturalism. Naturalism is often invoked as a motivating ground for many philosophical projects, and “naturalization” programs abound everywhere, in theory of knowledge, philosophy of mind, theory of meaning, metaphysics, and ethics. But what is naturalism, and where does it come from? This paper examines the naturalism debate in midtwentieth-century America as a proximate source of contemporary na…Read more
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9Mental causation and consciousness: The two mind-body problems for the physicalistIn Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
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34L'émergence, les modèles de réduction et le mentalPhilosophiques 27 (1): 11-26. 2000.Une des doctrines centrales de l’émergentisme est la thèse selon laquelle certaines propriétés d’un tout sont émergentes, en ce sens qu’elles sont irréductibles aux propriétés de base dont elles émergent — c’est-à-dire qu’elles ne peuvent ni être prédites, ni être expliquées à partir de leurs conditions sousjacentes. Pour comprendre et évaluer cette thèse correctement, il est essentiel que nous disposions d’un concept adéquat de réduction. Nous examinons d’abord le modèle classique de la réducti…Read more
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32Philosophy of Mind (Second Edition)Boulder: Westview Press. 2006.The philosophy of mind has always been a staple of the philosophy curriculum. But it has never held a more important place than it does today, with both traditional problems and new topics often sparked by the developments in the psychological, cognitive, and computer sciences. Jaegwon Kim’s Philosophy of Mind is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Now in its second edition, Kim explores, maps, and interprets this complex and exciting terrain. Designed as an introduction to the fie…Read more
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367Causation, nomic subsumption, and the concept of eventJournal of Philosophy 70 (8): 217-236. 1973.
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4Supervenience, emergence, realization, reductionIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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76What Could Pair a Nonphysical Soul to a Physical Body?In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 335-347. 2015.This paper argues that since nonphysical souls lack a position in space, they cannot have the pairing relations that would allow them to interact with physical bodies. For example, if two rifles (A and B) are fired at the same time, and consequently Andy and Buddy are killed, we can only say that rifle A killed Andy while rifle B killed Buddy, rather than the other way around, if there are appropriate spatial relations (such as distance and orientation) that pair Andy’s death to A’s firing, and …Read more
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179This paper offers a critique of the view that causation can be analyzed in terms of explanation. In particular, the following points are argued: a genuine explanatory analysis of causation must make use of a fully epistemological-psychological notion of explanation; it is unlikely that the relatively clear-cut structure of the causal relation can be captured by the relatively unstructured relation of explanation; the explanatory relation does not always parallel the direction of causation; certa…Read more
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147The nonreductivist’s troubles with mental causationIn John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford University Press. 1992.
Jaegwon Kim
(1934 - 2019)
Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |