Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
  • States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 7 (1): 145-162. 1979.
  • Values and Morals (edited book)
    . 1978.
  •  6
    Mind-Body Problems
    The Philosophers' Magazine 5 42-44. 1999.
  • What is Naturalized Epistemology?
    In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2000.
  •  4
    El problema mente-cuerpo tras cincuenta años
    Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 4 (1). 2002.
    Hace aproximadamente 50 años que se reintrodujo el problema mente-cuerpo en la filosofía como problema metafísico serio. Este artículo revisa el debate que ha seguido a las obras seminales de los años 50 y 60 de escritores tales como J. J. C. Smart, Herbert Feigl, Hilary Putnam y otros, y ofrece una evaluación del estado actual de la discusión.
  •  26
    Supervenience, emergence, and realization in the philosophy of mind
    In P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh University Press and Universtaetsverlag Konstanz. pp. 271. 1997.
  •  70
  •  1
    XIV—Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (3): 281-297. 1997.
  •  30
    The Mind–Body Problem after Fifty Years: Jaegwon Kim
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 3-21. 1998.
    It was about half a century ago that the mind–body problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and …Read more
  •  38
    Précis of Mind in a Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 640-643. 2002.
    For the physicalist, the mind-body problem is the problem of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. What does “fundamentally physical” mean? I think any physicalist will accept at least the following two claims. First, the world contains nothing but bits of matter and aggregates of bits of matter. There are no Cartesian souls, or Hegelian spirits, or neo-vitalist entelechies—as the emergentist C. Lloyd Morgan put it, no “alien influx” into the natural order. This…Read more
  •  2
    Mind in a Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 655-662. 2002.
  •  17
    Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 1-26. 1992.
  •  1
    Mind in a Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 663-670. 2002.
  • Mind in a Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 671-680. 2002.
  •  4
    Causality, Identity, and Supervenience in the Mind‐Body Problem
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1): 31-49. 1979.
  • Values and Morals
    Mind 90 (357): 144-147. 1981.
  •  7
    Supervenient Properties and Micro-Based Properties
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (n/a): 115-118. 1999.
  •  254
    The layered model: Metaphysical considerations
    Philosophical Explorations 5 (1). 2002.
    This paper examines the idea, commonly presupposed but seldom explicitly stated in discussions of certain philosophical problems, that the objects and phenomena of the world are structured in a hierarchy of "levels", from the bottom level of microparticles to the levels of cells and biological organisms and then to the levels of creatures with mentality and social groups of such creatures. Parallel to this "layered model" of the natural world is an ordering of the sciences, with physics as our "…Read more
  •  6
    Mental Causation in Searle’s “Biological Naturalism”
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 189-194. 1995.
  • Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction
    with John Heil
    Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201): 548-551. 2000.
  •  6
    Responses
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 671-680. 2002.
    Jackson says that the form of physicalism that I recommend, with certain emendations he believes are necessary, turns out to be none other than the “Australian” type-type identity theory of J.J.C. Smart and others. About this, too, I have no serious disagreement, although Jackson’s claim appears to depend, at least in part, on a certain chosen reading of the texts involved. In fact, one point of similarity may be worth noting. As I take it, one special feature of the “Australian” type identity t…Read more
  •  124
    Does the problem of mental causation generalize?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (3): 281-97. 1997.
  •  99
    States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 7 147-162. 1979.
    States of affairs constitute a basic ontological category in Chisholm's metaphysical system, and yield events and propositions as subclasses. Qua events, they enter into causal relations, and qua propositions, they are objects of our intentional attitudes. This paper expounds and critically examines Chisholm's conception of a state of affairs and his constructions of events and propositions. Various difficulties with some of Chisholm's definitions and procedures are pointed out and discussed. Th…Read more
  •  165
    Metaphysics: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.
    This anthology, intended to accompany _A Companion to Metaphysics_, brings together over 60 selections which represent the best and most important works in metaphysics during this century. The selections are grouped under ten major metaphysical problems and each section is preceded by an introduction by the editors