• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

E. J. Lowe
(1950 - 2014)

PhD: University of OxfordLast affiliation: Durham University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    354
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    74

 More details
  • Durham University
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1975
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Physical Science
1 more
  • All publications (354)
  •  409
    The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time
    Clarendon Press. 1998.
    Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines. He portrays metaphysics as charting the possibilities of existence, by identifying the categories of being and the relations between them. He sets out his own original metaphysical system, within which he seeks to answer many of the deepest questions in philosophy. 'a very rich book... deserves to be read ca…Read more
    Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines. He portrays metaphysics as charting the possibilities of existence, by identifying the categories of being and the relations between them. He sets out his own original metaphysical system, within which he seeks to answer many of the deepest questions in philosophy. 'a very rich book... deserves to be read carefully by anyone interested in any of the many subjects he discusses.' Katherine Hawley, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science.
    Metaphysical NecessityPhilosophy of Time, MiscPersistenceSubstanceMetaphysics, General Works
  •  123
    Physical causal closure and the invisibility of mental causation
    In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Imprint Academic. pp. 137-154. 2003.
    Causal Closure of the PhysicalMental Causation, Misc
  •  242
    Form without matter
    Ratio 11 (3). 1998.
    Three different concepts of matter are identified: matter as what a thing is immediately made of, matter as stuff of a certain kind, and matter in the (dubious) sense of material ‘substratum’. The doctrine of hylomorphism, which regards every individual concrete thing as being ‘combination’ of matter and form, is challenged. Instead it is urged that we do well to identify an individual concrete thing with its own particular ‘substantial form’. The notions of form and matter, far from being corre…Read more
    Three different concepts of matter are identified: matter as what a thing is immediately made of, matter as stuff of a certain kind, and matter in the (dubious) sense of material ‘substratum’. The doctrine of hylomorphism, which regards every individual concrete thing as being ‘combination’ of matter and form, is challenged. Instead it is urged that we do well to identify an individual concrete thing with its own particular ‘substantial form’. The notions of form and matter, far from being correlative, are relatively independent. There is nothing absurd in the notion of form without matter. Matter provides neither a principle of individuation nor a criterion of identity for individual concrete things: their form alone provides both. Finally, a substance ontology which admits also the existence of particular qualities, or tropes, is to be preferred both to a substance ontology which denies the existence of tropes and to a pure trope ontology.
  •  262
    Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
    Analysis 71 (3): 587-592. 2011.
    Metaphysics, Miscellaneous
  • LYCAN, W.-Real Conditionals
    Philosophical Books 44 (2): 177-178. 2003.
    Conditionals
  •  62
    A Defence Substance
    In Friedrich Beck, Carl Johnson, Franz von Kutschera, E. Jonathan Lowe, Uwe Meixner, David S. Oderberg, Ian J. Thompson & Henry Wellman (eds.), Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Lexington Books. pp. 167. 2008.
    Substance
  •  147
    The mind in nature
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4). 2009.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessMetaphysics of MindTheories of Consciousness
  •  7
    On the individuation of powers
    In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and their Manifestations, Routledge. 2013.
    Ontology
  •  310
    Event causation and agent causation
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1): 1-20. 2001.
    It is a matter of dispute whether we should acknowledge the existence of two distinct species of causation – event causation and agent causation – and, if we should, whether either species of causation is reducible to the other. In this paper, the prospects for such a reduction either way are considered, the conclusion being that a reduction of event causation to agent causation is the more promising option. Agent causation, in the sense understood here, is taken to include but not to be restric…Read more
    It is a matter of dispute whether we should acknowledge the existence of two distinct species of causation – event causation and agent causation – and, if we should, whether either species of causation is reducible to the other. In this paper, the prospects for such a reduction either way are considered, the conclusion being that a reduction of event causation to agent causation is the more promising option. Agent causation, in the sense understood here, is taken to include but not to be restricted to the intentional causation of an event by a rational agent. But, it is argued, there are certain special features of intentional causation, understood as a sub-species of agent causation, which make the agent-causation approach to human agency a particularly promising one with which to tackle the problem of free will.
    Causal RelataAgent Causation
  •  324
    The 3d/4d controversy: A storm in a teacup
    with Storrs McCall
    Noûs 40 (3). 2006.
    Three- and Four-Dimensionalism
  •  145
    Reply to Hornsby on Actions
    Analysis 43 (3). 1983.
    The Nature of Action
  •  42
    Logical Argument
    In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today, Ontos Verlag. pp. 50--179. 2012.
    Philosophy of Linguistics
  •  352
    The causal autonomy of the mental
    Mind 102 (408): 629-44. 1993.
    InteractionismPsychophysical EmergenceAutonomy and AgencyDualism about ConsciousnessMental Causation…Read more
    InteractionismPsychophysical EmergenceAutonomy and AgencyDualism about ConsciousnessMental Causation, Misc
  •  85
    Objects and criteria of identity
    In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 1997.
    'Object' and 'criterion of identity' are philosophical terms of art whose application lies at a considerable theoretical remove from the surface phenomena of everyday linguistic usage. This partly explains their highly controversial status, for their point of application lies precisely where the concerns of linguists and philosophers of language merge with those of metaphysicians. This chapter explains the possession of determinate identity‐conditions. It argues that the distinction between 'abs…Read more
    'Object' and 'criterion of identity' are philosophical terms of art whose application lies at a considerable theoretical remove from the surface phenomena of everyday linguistic usage. This partly explains their highly controversial status, for their point of application lies precisely where the concerns of linguists and philosophers of language merge with those of metaphysicians. This chapter explains the possession of determinate identity‐conditions. It argues that the distinction between 'abstract' and 'concrete' objects is itself a highly controversial one, and although it has indeed been argued that this distinction turns ultimately upon differences between the criteria of identity governing objects of these two broad categories. It examines the role which criteria of identity play in our talk about objects of the least controversial varieties. The chapter concerns the problem of identity over time and the paradoxes to which identity criteria often appear to give rise when time is brought into the picture.
    Vague ObjectsVague Identity
  •  764
    Categorial predication
    Ratio 25 (4): 369-386. 2012.
    When, for example, we say of something that it ‘is an object’, or ‘is an event’, or ‘is a property’, we are engaging in categorial predication: we are assigning something to a certain ontological category. Ontological categorization is clearly a type of classification, but it differs radically from the types of classification that are involved in the taxonomic practices of empirical sciences, as when a physicist says of a certain particle that it ‘is an electron’, or when a zoologist says of a c…Read more
    When, for example, we say of something that it ‘is an object’, or ‘is an event’, or ‘is a property’, we are engaging in categorial predication: we are assigning something to a certain ontological category. Ontological categorization is clearly a type of classification, but it differs radically from the types of classification that are involved in the taxonomic practices of empirical sciences, as when a physicist says of a certain particle that it ‘is an electron’, or when a zoologist says of a certain animal that it ‘is a mammal’, or when a meteorologist says of a certain weather‐phenomenon that it ‘is a hurricane’. Classifications of the latter types presuppose that the items being classified have already been assigned to appropriate ontological categories, such as the categories of object, species, or event. What do categorial predications mean? How are their truth‐conditions to be determined, and how can those truth‐conditions be known to be satisfied? Do they have truthmakers? Questions like these are amongst those addressed in the present paper
    Ontological Categories
  •  554
    What is a criterion of identity?
    Philosophical Quarterly 39 (154): 1-21. 1989.
    Identity, Misc
  •  201
    Routledge philosophy guidebook to Locke on human understanding
    Routledge. 1995.
    Locke on Human Understanding, is a comprehensive introduction to John Locke's major work, Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Locke's Essay remains a key work in many philosophical fields, notably in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophies of mind and language. In addition, Locke is often referred to as the first English empiricist. Knowledge of this influential work and figure is essential to Enlightenment thought. E. J. Lowe's approach enables students to effectively study the Essay …Read more
    Locke on Human Understanding, is a comprehensive introduction to John Locke's major work, Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Locke's Essay remains a key work in many philosophical fields, notably in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophies of mind and language. In addition, Locke is often referred to as the first English empiricist. Knowledge of this influential work and figure is essential to Enlightenment thought. E. J. Lowe's approach enables students to effectively study the Essay by placing Locke's life and works in their intellectual and historical context. The book provides a critical examination of the leading themes in the Essay , illuminating the main lines in Locke's thinking. Such topics include innate ideas, perception, primary and secondary qualities, personal identity, free will, action and language. Finally, E. J. Lowe examines the comtemporary work being done on this highly influential English philosopher.
    Locke: IntroductionsLocke: Metaphysics, MiscLocke: IdentityLocke: EssenceLocke: PowersLocke: Primary…Read more
    Locke: IntroductionsLocke: Metaphysics, MiscLocke: IdentityLocke: EssenceLocke: PowersLocke: Primary and Secondary QualitiesLocke: SubstanceLocke: Free Will
  •  48
    Introductory Modal Logic
    Philosophical Books 28 (3): 165-166. 1987.
  •  99
    The Human Person: Animal and Spirit By David Braine London:Duckworth, 1993, viii+182pp., £35.00 (review)
    Philosophy 69 (268): 244-. 1994.
  •  2
    Non-Cartesian Dualism
    In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Dualism
  •  52
    Consciousness and the World (review)
    Philosophy 77 (2): 283-296. 2002.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  122
    Uwe Meixner, the two sides of being: A reassessment of psycho-physical dualism, paderborn, mentis, 2004, 486 pp. ISBN: 3-89785-376- (review)
    Erkenntnis 62 (2): 290-294. 2005.
    Dualism about Consciousness
  •  115
    Real metaphysics, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-pereyra
    European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1). 2008.
    Metaphysics, General WorksAbstract ObjectsTruthmakers
  •  148
    Intentionality and intuition: A reply to Davies
    Analysis 42 (March): 85. 1982.
    Intentionality, Misc
  •  113
    A simplification of the logic of conditionals
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (3): 357-366. 1983.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic of Conditionals
  •  110
    Sortal terms and natural laws
    American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3): 253-60. 1978.
    Law StatementsDispositional Theories of Laws
  •  305
    Mereological Extensionality, Supplementation, and Material Constitution
    The Monist 96 (1): 131-148. 2013.
    Material ConstitutionMereology
  •  13
    Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 102 (405): 210-212. 1993.
  •  71
    The rational and the real: Some doubts about the programme of 'rational analysis'
    In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, Clarendon Press. pp. 175. 2002.
    Rationality and Cognitive Science
  •  272
    Powerful Particulars: Review Essay on John Heil’s From an Ontological Point of View (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2): 466--479. 2006.
    John Heil’s new book is remarkable in many ways. In a concise, lucid and accessible manner, it develops a complete system of ontology with many strikingly original features and then applies that ontology to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, with illuminating results. Although Heil acknowledges his intellectual debts to C. B. Martin, he is unduly modest about his own contribution to the development and application of this novel metaphysical system. A full examination of the position t…Read more
    John Heil’s new book is remarkable in many ways. In a concise, lucid and accessible manner, it develops a complete system of ontology with many strikingly original features and then applies that ontology to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, with illuminating results. Although Heil acknowledges his intellectual debts to C. B. Martin, he is unduly modest about his own contribution to the development and application of this novel metaphysical system. A full examination of the position that Heil defends would require a book in itself, so I shall limit myself to discussing some of its central themes and to explaining a few doubts that I have concerning some aspects of it.
    Ontology
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • 8
  • 9
  • 10
  • 11
  • 12
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback