E. J. Lowe

(1950 - 2014)

This chapter considers Locke’s account of our general ideas of natural kinds, and in particular of the natural kind “water.” This account came under explicit criticism in the work on the semantics of natural kinds by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam in the 1970s, which also highlighted this particular natural kind. However, the argument here is that Locke’s detractors had much less right on their side than they suppose. Though there are some deficiencies in Locke’s account, these are due for the most part to his commitment to a theory of the “Great Chain of Being” that has not been borne out by modern science.

Raftopoulos suggests that realism can be defended only if it can be argued that perception includes _nonconceptual content_, to individuate objects in the perceiver’s environment. The perceptual mechanisms appealed to by Raftopoulos cannot serve to single out environmental objects uniquely; our perceptual systems must be able to exploit sortal distinctions of a very broad kind in order to achieve this task. It is further contended that Raftopoulos’ response to antirealism is question-begging, failing to tackle antirealism at its real philosophical roots. If one is to argue non-question-beggingly _from_ nonconceptual perceptual content _to_ realism, one needs to identify a species of nonconceptual content in perception which is introspectively accessible by the perceiver and suited by its intrinsic character to constitute good evidence for the existence of an external world conforming to the realist’s conception. This chapter sketches and defends this account of the nonconceptual content of perception.

In this chapter it is argued that genuine relations, if any such there be, are external, in that they do not supervene on the intrinsic properties of the relata. Internal relations are cases of formal, as opposed to material, predication, where no genuine property or relation is predicated of the subject(s) of the predication. Genuine properties, by contrast, are denoted by material predications on the subjects of predication. The question of whether there are any relations comes down to the question of whether any true relational predications involve material predication. It is suggested that the best candidates, causal and spatiotemporal relational predications, involve formal predication, and on this basis it is argued that there are (probably) no relations. The very idea of polyadic properties is highly mysterious and gives rise to a range of philosophical problems. If the arguments in this chapter are correct, then positing such properties serves no useful ontological purpose, so we should not spend too much time trying to demystify them.

The notion of truthmaking is examined. A distinction is drawn between formal ontological predicates — which should not be taken to denote elements of being — and other predicates, with ‘is true’, ‘exists’, and ‘is identical with’ belonging to the former class. Metaphysical realism is defended in the face of W. V. Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. Various species of metaphysical dependence are identified, and an account of truthmaking as a species of essential dependence is proposed and defended. It is explained how contingent truths are possible, given this account and the framework of the four-category ontology.

A connection between metaphysical realism and the idea that truth is single and indivisible (alethic monism) is proposed. It is argued that propositions are the primary bearers of truth and truth itself is ineliminable. It is urged that truthmakers are many and do not all belong to the same ontological category. The need to posit facts or states of affairs as truthmakers, as proposed by D. M. Armstrong, is questioned. The unity of truth is related to the principle of non-contradiction, and the unpalatable ontological implications of relativism are examined.

The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of _a posteriori_ knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.

The sense in which laws are necessary is reviewed. The relationship between natural laws and natural kinds is emphasized. The relationship between natural laws and causal powers is further explored, focusing on the advantages of an approach based on the four-category ontology over alternative theories of these matters. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is reviewed in the light of the problem known as ‘Bradley’s regress’, and is accepted in the case of fundamental laws but not in other cases. The idea that so-called natural or nomic necessity constitutes a genuine kind of necessity is challenged.

F. P. Ramsey’s objections to the universal/particular distinction, especially as advocated by Bertrand Russell, are examined in depth and rebutted. At the same time, certain important lessons are drawn from his arguments concerning how best to articulate the distinction. In response to related arguments recently directed against the four-category ontology by Fraser MacBride, it is shown how each of the four categories can be uniquely identified in terms of the characteristic pattern of ontological dependence relations that its members bear to members of other ontological categories.

The customary distinction between _dispositional_ and _categorical_ properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of _laws of nature_, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.

The distinction between properties and predicates, and how best to draw the distinction between universals and particulars are discussed. The notion that properties are most aptly characterized as ‘ways of being’ is defended. The need to distinguish between the formal ontological relations of _instantiation_ and _characterization_ is emphasized, as well as the need to distinguish both from that of _exemplification_. The advantages of immanent realism concerning universals over both transcendent realism and pure trope theory are explained, and two different notions of immanence are compared.

The formal ontological concept of an _object_ is explicated and contrasted with that of a _property_. F. P. Ramsey’s objections to this distinction are challenged. The sense in which objects possess an _individuality_ not exhibited by entities of certain other types is discussed. The object/property distinction is distinguished from that between universals and particulars. The ontological status of events and processes, and that of abstract entities such as numbers, are examined. Gottlob Frege’s treatment of number and his object/concept distinction are criticized, and an alternative account of the ontological status of concepts is advanced.

Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to be implicitly committed to a two-category ontology of particulars and universals. A system of _sortal logic_ is described, which exhibits some features of traditional formal logic and some of modern quantified predicate logic, such as its deployment of a symbol for identity. It is argued that this system represents more perspicuously than other systems the ontological distinctions of the four-category ontology, and that this counts as a distinct advantage in its favour.

The central principles of the four-category ontology are explained, especially its distinction between properties conceived as particulars (modes) and properties conceived as universals (attributes), and its distinction between substantial universals (kinds) and substantial particulars (objects). Its appeal to universals is defended and its account of the dispositional/occurrent distinction is explained. Some advantages of the four-category ontology over various of its more parsimonious rivals are sketched: its account of the individuation of tropes or modes, its analysis of laws, its analysis of dispositionality, and its account of property-perception.

The notion of a _formal ontological relation_ is introduced and illustrated. Distinctions are drawn between various types of ontological dependence relations. The hierarchical character of systems of ontological categories is examined, together with the ontological status of such categories themselves. It is argued that neither ontological categories nor formal ontological relations, such as instantiation and characterization, should be regarded as elements of being, that is, as entities in their own right. A distinction is drawn between form and content in ontology, paralleling but distinct from a similar distinction commonly made in logic.

A realist approach to metaphysics and ontology is defended in the face of some antirealist tendencies in contemporary philosophical thought. The general notion of an _ontological category_ is explained and justified. Different systems of ontological categories are compared and contrasted with the four-category ontology: a one-category ontology of modes or tropes, a two-category ontology of particulars and universals, and a two-category ontology of substantial particulars and modes. The ontological status of states of affairs and natural laws, and the ontological implications of the truthmaker principle as advocated by D. M. Armstrong are discussed.

Ontological dependence is a relation—or, more accurately, a family of relations—between entities or beings. For there are various ways in which one being may be said to depend upon one or more other beings, in a sense of “depend” that is distinctly metaphysical in character and that may be contrasted, thus, with various causal senses of this word. More specifically, a being may be said to depend, in such a sense, upon one or more other beings for its existence or for its identity. Some varieties of ontological dependence may be analyzed in modal terms—that is, in terms of distinctly metaphysical notions of possibility and necessity—while others seem to demand an analysis in terms of the notion of essence. The latter varieties of ontological dependence may accordingly be called species of essential dependence. Notions of ontological dependence are frequently called upon by metaphysicians in their proposed analyses of other metaphysically important notions, such as the notion of substance