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70Substance and SelfhoodPhilosophy 66 (255): 81-99. 1991.How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of s…Read more
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100Indicative and Counterfactual ConditionalsAnalysis 39 (3). 1979.E. J. Lowe; Indicative and counterfactual conditionals, Analysis, Volume 39, Issue 3, 1 June 1979, Pages 139–141, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/39.3.139.
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175Review: How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties (review)Mind 116 (463): 762-766. 2007.
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Perception: A causal representative theoryIn Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception, Brookfield: Avebury. 1993.
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10How Are Identity Conditions Grounded?In Kanzian Christian (ed.), Persistence, Ontos. pp. 73-90. 2007.
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84All the power in the world – Peter UngerPhilosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 745-747. 2008.No Abstract
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114There are no easy problems of consciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3): 266-71. 1995.This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia' resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued, rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience and their intimate interrelationship, thereby …Read more
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113Locke: Compatibilist event-causalist or libertarian substance-causalist? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3). 2004.Towards the end of Chapter XXI of Book II of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke remarks, with all the appearance of sincerity and genuine modesty, that.
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34Review of Maria Elisabeth Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10). 2009.
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R. I. G. HUGHES "A philosophical companion to first-order logic" (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2): 255. 1994.
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63Self, Reference and Self-ReferencePhilosophy 68 (263): 15-33. 1993.I favour an analysis of selfhood which ties it to the possession of certain kinds of first-person knowledge, in particular de re knowledge of the identity of one's own conscious thoughts and experiences. My defence of this analysis will lead me to explore the nature of demonstrative reference to one's own conscious thoughts and experiences. Such reference is typically ‘direct’, in contrast to demonstrative reference to all physical objects, apart from those that are parts of one's own body in wh…Read more
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266An Introduction to the Philosophy of MindCambridge University Press. 2000.In this book Jonathan Lowe offers a lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind. Using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, he begins with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moves on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge. His discussion is notably broad in scope, and di…Read more
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236Categorial predicationRatio 25 (4): 369-386. 2012.When, for example, we say of something that it ‘is an object’, or ‘is an event’, or ‘is a property’, we are engaging in categorial predication: we are assigning something to a certain ontological category. Ontological categorization is clearly a type of classification, but it differs radically from the types of classification that are involved in the taxonomic practices of empirical sciences, as when a physicist says of a certain particle that it ‘is an electron’, or when a zoologist says of a c…Read more
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284The definition of enduranceAnalysis 69 (2): 277-280. 2009.David Lewis, following in the tradition of Broad, Quine and Goodman, says that change in an object X consists in X's being temporally extended and having qualitatively different temporal parts. Analogously, change in a spatially extended object such as a road consists in its having different spatial parts . The alternative to this view is that ordinary objects undergo temporal change in virtue of having different intrinsic non-relational properties at different times. They endure, remaining the …Read more
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Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Physical Science |