•  157
    Mental Causation and Ontology (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    Mental causation has been a hotly disputed topic in recent years, with reductive and non-reductive physicalists vying with each other and with dualists over how to accommodate, or else to challenge, two widely accepted metaphysical principles—the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal non-overdetermination—which together appear to support reductive physicalism, despite the latter’s lack of intuitive appeal. Current debate about these matters appears to…Read more
  • Book Reviews (review)
    with Robert Kirk, Paul Rusnock, Mirella Capozzi, K. Misiuna, T. Boswell, Maria J. Frapolli, Alan R. Perreiah, Victor Sánchez Valencia, James Gasser, D. P. Henry, Besprechung von Guillermo Guillermo Bottcher, and Wolfe Mays
    History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2): 237-263. 1994.
  •  1
    Metaphysics as the Science of Essence
    In Alexander Carruth, Sophie Gibb & John Heil (eds.), Ontology, Modality, and Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe, Oxford University Press. pp. 14-34. 2018.
    If metaphysics is centrally concerned with charting the domain of the possible, the only coherent account of the ground of metaphysical possibility and of our capacity for modal knowledge is to be found in a version of essentialism: a version that I call serious essentialism, to distinguish it from certain other views which may superficially appear very similar to it but which, in fact, differ from it fundamentally in certain crucial respects. This version of essentialism eschews any appeal wha…Read more
  •  8
    From an Ontological Point of View
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2): 466-479. 2006.
  •  114
    Sameness and Substance Renewed
    Mind 112 (448): 816-820. 2003.
  •  37
    The Physical Basis of Predication
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 490-492. 1995.
  •  3
    The Nature of Rationality
    Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180): 397-399. 1995.
  •  7
    Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 300-301. 1997.
  •  9
    Grasp of Essences versus Intuitions
    In Booth Anthony Robert & P. Rowbottom Darrell (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    One currently popular methodology of metaphysics has it that ‘intuitions’ play an evidential role with respect to metaphysical claims. This chapter defends a realist methodology of metaphysics that implies that any rational being, simply in virtue of being rational, is necessarily capable of grasping the essences of at least some mind-independent entities. The notion of essence in play here is Aristotelian, whereby an entity’s essence is captured by an account of what that entity is, or what it …Read more
  •  6
    In Thomas Pradeu & Alexandre Guay (eds.), Individuals Across the Sciences, Oxford University Press. 2016.
    An individual, as this term will be understood here, is an entity to which the concepts of unity and identity fully and determinately apply. That is to say, an entity x is an individual just in case x determinately counts as one entity and x has a determinate identity. Many philosophers tacitly assume that all entities are individuals in the foregoing sense, and indeed that it is a necessary truth that they are. But this can certainly be disputed. It is, very arguably, both logically and metaphy…Read more
  •  1
    How Real Are Artefacts and Artefact Kinds?
    In M. Franssen, P. Kroes, Th Reydon & P. E. Vermaas (eds.), Artefact Kinds: Ontology and the Human-made World, Springer. pp. 17-26. 2014.
  • Book Review (review)
    with A. G. B. Ter Meulen, David Stump, Robert Kirk, I. Grattan-Guinness, Jacob Hoeksema, and D. Harrah
    History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3): 175-185. 1998.
    Book Review of Michael Resnik, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns.
  •  577
    Ontological Dependence
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    Ontological dependence is a relation—or, more accurately, a family of relations—between entities or beings. For there are various ways in which one being may be said to depend upon one or more other beings, in a sense of “depend” that is distinctly metaphysical in character and that may be contrasted, thus, with various causal senses of this word. More specifically, a being may be said to depend, in such a sense, upon one or more other beings for its existence or for its identity. Some varieties…Read more
  •  11
  •  24
    Naturalism, Theism, and Objects of Reason
    Philosophia Christi 15 (1): 35-45. 2013.
    It is argued that the dispute between philosophical naturalism and theism can, ultimately, only be rationally resolved in favor of theism, owing to certain internal inadequacies of philosophical naturalism that are commonly overlooked by both its friends and its foes. The criticisms of philosophical naturalism focus on certain questions concerning the ontological status of the objects of human reason and probe into the nature of human rationality and the conditions of its possibility. There is a…Read more
  •  11
    The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 43 (1): 6-20. 2008.
  •  34
    Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind: E. J. Lowe
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29 87-107. 1991.
    Are persons substances or modes? Two currently dominant views may be characterized as giving the following rival answers to this question. According to the first view, persons are just biological substances. According to the second, persons are psychological modes of substances which, as far as human beings are concerned, happen to be biological substances, but which could in principle be non-biological. There is, however, also a third possible answer, and this is that persons are psychological …Read more
  •  19
    In Defence of the Autonomous Mind
    SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3). 2006.
  • An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (3): 636-637. 2000.
  • A Survey of Metaphysics
    with Jörg Disse
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 67 (2): 347-348. 2005.
  •  1
    Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism
    Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1): 9-33. 2008.
    Metaphysical realism is the view that most of the objects that populate the world exist independently of our thought and have their natures independently of how, if at all, we conceive of them. It is committed, in my opinion, to a robust form of essentialism. Many modern forms of anti-realism have their roots in a form of conceptualism, according to which all truths about essence knowable by us are ultimately grounded in our concepts, rather than in things 'in themselves'. My aim is to show that…Read more
  •  8
    Sortals and the Individuation of Objects
    Mind and Language 22 (5): 514-533. 2007.
  • Review (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 300-301. 1997.