Michael Ruse

Philosophers of science frequently bemoan (or cheer) the fact that today, with the supposed collapse of logical empiricism, there are now ;;10 grand systems. However, although this mayor may not be true, and if true mayor may not be a cause for delight, no one should conclude that the philosophy of science has ground to a halt, its problems exhausted and its practioners dispirited. In fact, in this post­ Kuhnian age the subject has never been more alive, as we work with enthusiasm on special topics, historical and conceptual. And no topic has grown and thrived quite like the philosophy of biology, which now has many students in the field producing high-quality articles and monographs. The success of this subject is due above all to the work and influence of one man: David Hull. In his own writings and in the support he has given to others, he has shown true leadership, in the best Platonic sense. It is now twenty years since Hull fnt gave his seminal paper 'What the philosophy of biology is not', and to mark that point and to show our respect, gratitude and affection to its author, a number of us who owe much to Hull decided to produce a volume of essays on and around themes to which Hull has spoken.

The debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to use results of individuals’ genetic tests for underwriting purposes has been both lively and increasingly relevant over the past two decades. Yet there appears to be no widely agreed upon resolution regarding appropriate and effective regulation. There exists today a gamut of recommendations and actual practices addressing this phenomenon ranging from laissez-faire to voluntary industry moratoria to strict legal prohibition. One obvious reason for such a variance in views and approaches is that there are competing bases for evaluating the outcomes of restricting insurers’ use of such information. For example, an outright ban on the use of genetic test results may seem the best method for protecting against unfair discrimination, while allowing their use may seem to be the best way to foster efficiency in the market for insurance. However, there is also a lack of understanding about how restricting the use of genetic information would play out in the market through the so-called phenomenon of adverse selection. Using economic analysis, we discuss how the type of adverse selection that occurs in insurance markets affects various arguments both in favour and against an outright ban on insurers’ use of genetic tests for pricing insurance. We review arguments based on moral principles. Practical concerns from the insurance industry based on actuarial principles and economic efficiency are also compared. Each perspective is shown to lead to a range of conflicting recommendations about how genetic information should be regulated and these conclusions depend critically on whether one conducts the analysis from the ex ante temporal perspective, from the interim temporal perspective, or from the ex post temporal perspective.