A. V. Ravishankar Sarma

Moral conflicts are the situations which emerge as a response to deal with conflicting obligations or duties. An interesting case arises when an agent thinks that two obligations A and B are equally important, but yet fails to choose one obligation over the other. Despite the fact that the systematic study and the resolution of moral conflicts finds prominence in our linguistic discourse, standard deontic logic when used to represent moral conflicts, implies the impossibility of moral conflicts. This presents a conundrum for appropriate logic to address these moral conflicts. We frequently believe that there is a close connection between tolerating inconsistencies and conflicting moral obligations. In paraconsistent logics, we tolerate inconsistencies by treating them to be both true and false. In this paper, we analyze Graham Priest’s paraconsistent logic LP, and extend our examination to the deontic extension of LP known as DLP. We illustrate our work, with a classic example from the famous Indian epic Mahabharata, where the protagonist Arjuna faces a moral conflict in the battlefield of Kurukshetra. The paper aims to avoid deontic explosion and allows to accommodate Arjuna’s moral conflict in paraconsistent deontic logics. Our analysis is expected to provide novel tools towards the logical representation of moral conflicts and to shed some light on the context-sensitive paraconsistent deontic logic.

In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness (IAOA). This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro (2008) against Kriegel’s (2009a and 2009b) self-representationalism. We attempt to show why philosophers like Gennaro get it wrong when they deny the IAOA thesis by critically examining his arguments against it and by giving arguments in its favour.

Enabling constraints are bottom up causes which create the possibility of the existence of a system. Disabling constraints reduce the degrees of freedom and narrow the choices of the system which are structural, functional, meaningful relations that assign executive roles to the component parts. In this paper, we discuss causality as enabling and disabling constraints in order to critique the absurdity of transitivity in causal relations. If downward causation is viewed as causation by constraints, we argue that it will not face the absurdity of self-causation which is incurred because of the transitivity principle. In the process of self-organization, organizationally new structures are created from the lower level subcomponents of the system. Such self-organizing systems can be broadly considered as sui-generis and transcend the transitivity principle by causally influencing its subcomponents. These higher level systemic constraints that causally influence the components in a self-organizing system without violating any physical laws via causal constraints are termed as Downward Causation.