Aake Elden

This paper argues that moral responsibility can fail under technologically mediated conditions in two structurally connected ways. First, agents may act from motivational states significantly shaped by external formative processes whose influence remains partially opaque to reflective awareness. Second, institutions may assign formal responsibility for decisions whose operative reasons agents cannot meaningfully access, evaluate, or contest within ordinary practices of deliberation. The first failure condition is developed as the Conditional Reflexive Requirement (CRR), according to which blameworthiness depends in part on an agent’s reasonable capacity to identify and critically reassess formative influences shaping action-guiding motivations. The second is described as misfired imputation, referring to cases in which institutions assign responsibility under the assumption that the epistemic and deliberative conditions of genuine agency remain intact when they are structurally absent. The paper argues that these are not two adjacent problems but two moments of one transformation, and defends that claim through a worked case rather than by analogy: in algorithmically mediated decision environments a single architectural property, the placement of the operative determinants of conduct outside the practice of giving and asking for reasons, produces both failures, and the individual-level failure is itself a cause of the institutional one. Three theses are defended: common source, causal coupling, and non-separability of remedy. The last is what makes the two conditions one phenomenon, and it is falsifiable. The argument is developed through a Tracking Principle governing responsibility and motivational ownership, a three-part taxonomy of motivational opacity, a threshold account distinguishing the scalar property of contestability from the threshold predicate of misfired imputation, and a conceptual distinction between misfired imputation and adjacent failure modes including the responsibility gap, distributed responsibility, and the accountability deficit. The paper closes by bringing the result to bear on the human-oversight requirement of Article 14 of the EU AI Act.

Social experiences of unfairness resist standard distributional accounts. This article argues that comparative relations do not merely shape responses to unequal outcomes but participate in constituting the sense of entitlement through which those outcomes are experienced as unfair. Drawing on René Girard’s social theory of mimetic desire, Leon Festinger’s social comparison theory, Axel Honneth’s account of recognition, and empirical research on inequity aversion from behavioural economics and comparative psychology, it develops a single mechanism—comparative entitlement formation—linking proximate comparison, the felt claim it generates, grievance, and, under determinate conditions, displacement onto vulnerable third parties. The argument is positioned between two literatures that approach the phenomenon from opposite directions and leave the same gap: egalitarian political philosophy has moved from the distribution of bundles toward the quality of social relations without supplying an account of how a comparative sense of entitlement is formed, while the recent literature on political grievance documents comparative resentment in detail without theorising the mechanism that generates it. Two consequences follow. First, the characteristic irrationality of unfairness experience—its disproportionate intensity under conditions of social proximity and similarity—reflects the mechanics of comparative entitlement formation rather than a failure of rational judgement. Second, the harms produced when such entitlements are frustrated are second-order costs of institutional arrangements: they are generated by distributive structures, borne by parties outside the initial justification, and cannot be externalised from the basic structure. The article specifies the conditions under which the mechanism operates, the evidential criteria for identifying its products, and the limits beyond which it does not extend.

Automated certainty is a technologically mediated condition in which experienced perplexity is reduced more rapidly than users acquire the competence required to evaluate the apparent resolution thereby pro- duced. The phenomenon is not specific to religion: algorithmically gen- erated summaries, recommendations, and explanations may produce shallow confidence and derivative expertise across educational, political, scientific, and professional domains. This article examines its religious form. Drawing on research in the cognitive science of religion (CSR), processing fluency, predictive processing, and cognitive ecology, I argue that algorithmic systems may increase the accessibility and apparent completeness of theological representations without producing corre- spondingly developed interpretive competence. In domains of doctrinal complexity, such competence often depends on sustained instruction and practice of the kind associated with McCauley’s “cognition possess- ing practiced naturalness.” The central empirical prediction is therefore a divergence between subjective certainty and demonstrated compe- tence. I propose a research program comparing singular-fluent, interpre- tively plural, and scaffolded-complexity presentations in their effects on confidence-accuracy calibration, comprehension, source evaluation, intellectual humility, delayed retention, and transfer. The article also identifies boundary conditions, including algorithmic specificity, user expertise, and cross-cultural and tradition-specific variation. Automated certainty names a conditional risk rather than an inevitable effect: where fluent algorithmic resolution outpaces interpretive formation, theologi- cal confidence may become progressively decoupled from theological competence.

This article advances a modest doctrinal proposal: Christian theological responsibility is not merely act-based but institutionally conditioned, and the doctrines of sin, judgment, and moral agency may therefore benefit from explicit articulation considering institutional forms that may decline to produce action. The social and institutional hierarchies that reduce some human beings to objects of management rather than addressees of action and speech are not new; what may be comparatively new is the degree to which contemporary infrastructural systems can accomplish this without any individual ever intending or even perceiving it. The argument proceeds by suggesting that the tradition’s resources for indirect agency cooperation, omission, vicarious responsibility, structural sin are, on inspection, without exception act-derivative, and that certain contemporary infrastructural configurations decline, at the operating level, to produce the act on which these resources depend. The diagnosis offered is therefore not that the tradition is silent before such configurations but that its categories presuppose an institutional production of action that can no longer simply be assumed. Three institutional examples, robotic debt-recovery in Australia, the Dutch childcare-benefits scandal, and platform content moderation, introduce the problem at the outset and are returned to throughout. The argument is then developed, more gradually than a brief summary can suggest, through engagement with classical accounts of the act-grammar (Augustine, Aquinas, Barth, O’Donovan), social ontology of action (Anscombe, Searle), the political phenomenology of action and judgment (Arendt), and the reconstruction of responsibility under structural conditions (Bonhoeffer); through a defined distinction between operating and upstream levels of infrastructural systems; and through four convergent mechanisms of withdrawal. It closes by proposing how the doctrines of sin, judgment, and moral agency might be reformulated under the condition that institutional forms can fail to produce action.

Contemporary theological engagement with artificial intelligence (AI) has been dominated by applied ethics, focusing on bias, surveillance, and governance. This approach often treats algorithms as external instruments subject to moral regulation. This article argues that predictive systems must be understood as formative environments that shape attention, imagination, and desire through patterned repetition and the strategic management of salience. Drawing on Thomas Aquinas’s account of habitus and the doctrine of the invisibilis missio of the Holy Spirit, I propose that certain algorithmic architectures function as rival ecologies of habituation. These systems pre-structure deliberation by compressing the temporal interval between stimulus and assent and reinforcing probabilistic continuity with the past. Against this extractive economy of attention, sanctification is interpreted not as self-optimisation but as the Spirit’s infusion of charity, which reorders love and restores the temporal spaciousness required for mature freedom. By situating AI theology within pneumatology rather than metaphysical speculation about machine agency, the article reframes the central question: not whether AI can think, but how predictive systems participate in the formation of human desire. It offers a Thomistic grammar for discerning the limits of prediction and articulating a theological account of freedom in an age of algorithmic mediation.

Contemporary AI systems are increasingly designed to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, and cognitive burden. This article argues that such systems do not merely expand human capacities but progressively externalize forms of judgment and existential burden that Christian traditions have historically understood as necessary conditions for the cultivation of moral agency. Drawing on the theological anthropologies of Augustine, Søren Kierkegaard, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the article develops a theological-anthropological critique of what it terms optimization culture: the normative logic through which the reduction of friction and existential difficulty becomes a dominant telos of technological design. Contemporary articulations of this logic are examined through the work of Jacques Ellul, Byung-Chul Han, Peter Thiel, Balaji Srinivasan, and William Davies. The article argues that AI systems shaped by this logic risk progressively externalizing the practices of disciplined attention, existential responsibility, and costly judgment through which mature moral agency has historically been cultivated. In response, it proposes a formative anthropology of technology as a framework for evaluating AI not only according to functional criteria such as safety or efficiency, but according to the kinds of human beings such systems actively help to form.

Contemporary AI systems are increasingly designed to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, and cognitive burden. This article argues that such systems do not merely expand human capacities but progressively externalize forms of judgment and existential burden that Christian traditions have historically understood as necessary conditions for the cultivation of moral agency. Drawing on the theological anthropologies of Augustine, Søren Kierkegaard, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the article develops a theological-anthropological critique of what it terms optimization culture: the normative logic through which the reduction of friction and existential difficulty becomes a dominant telos of technological design. Contemporary articulations of this logic are examined through the work of Jacques Ellul, Byung-Chul Han, Peter Thiel, Balaji Srinivasan, and William Davies. The article argues that AI systems shaped by this logic risk progressively externalizing the practices of disciplined attention, existential responsibility, and costly judgment through which mature moral agency has historically been cultivated. In response, it proposes a formative anthropology of technology as a framework for evaluating AI not only according to functional criteria such as safety or efficiency, but according to the kinds of human beings such systems actively help to form.

This article argues that algorithmically mediated communication environments displace phronesis, or practical wisdom, by making anticipatory, reception-oriented deliberation increasingly normative. The central issue is not merely how agents act within such environments, but whether the conditions for wise deliberation have themselves been structurally transformed. The article names this mode of reasoning pronoia: not ordinary foresight, but a form of deliberation in which anticipated reception becomes constitutive of intelligible action under conditions of quantified visibility. Drawing on Aristotelian and Thomistic accounts of practical judgment alongside media theory and digital theology, the article argues that algorithmic feeds reorganize moral deliberation through ranking, commensuration, and recursive feedback. These mechanisms do not simply influence behavior externally but reshape agency internally by normalizing predictive calibration to visibility conditions. Theologically, the article distinguishes this form of pronoia from divine providence, arguing that algorithmic pronoia contracts deliberation into the management of reception. The result is a deformation of moral formation that weakens habituation and redirects agency toward signal management. The article concludes by identifying liturgical counter-formation and ascetic withdrawal as practices capable of sustaining phronesis under algorithmic conditions.

Contemporary discussions of kenosis remain caught between two insufficient anthropologies. A tradition of passive self-surrender collapses the human subject into divine action, while a tradition of strategic self-limitation preserves autonomy by reducing kenosis to a moral model for imitation. Both assume that agency and receptivity are mutually exclusive. This article argues for a third option: the subject of kenosis is neither passive nor autonomous but responsively constituted through divine address. Building on Sarah Coakley and engaging contemporary kenosis debates, the argument develops a phenomenological account of responsive agency through Levinas’s ethical anteriority, Marion’s saturated givenness, and Merleau-Ponty’s embodied mediation. Historically, the proposal is anchored in the Giessen-Tübingen kenosis-krypsis controversy, where the Giessen insistence on real renunciation already implies an anthropology in which divine self-giving constitutes rather than negates creaturely agency. Philippians 2:6–11 is read as disclosing a somatic grammar in which kenosis, embodiment, servanthood, and obedience form a single Christological movement, liturgically enacted in the Eucharist. The result is a theological anthropology in which reception becomes the deepest form of agency.

This article introduces explanatory entitlement as an epistemic category: the inferential right to deploy a construct as a basis for causal inference in a given domain. Drawing on Woodward’s interventionist account and Cartwright’s analysis of causal portability the article argues that this entitlement is conferred by demonstrated invariance and does not transfer automatically across levels or domains. When constructs are projected beyond their invariance conditions without bridging support, they undergo conceptual inflation: retention of explanatory authority without the evidential conditions that license it. The article formalizes this failure, distinguishes it from seven neighboring frameworks, and proposes a diagnostic structure.

Research on personality and behaviour has established that individuals exhibit relatively stable patterns of conduct across time, commonly described in terms of trait dimensions such as conscientiousness. At the same time, self-regulation and habit research have identified mechanisms involved in behavioural initiation, persistence, and automatization. Despite these advances, existing frameworks do not adequately specify the intermediate processes through which behavioural continuity is maintained across everyday contexts. This article introduces the concept of micro-discipline to address this gap. Micro-discipline refers to recurrent low-level acts of behavioural regulation that preserve continuity between intention and action under ordinary conditions of friction, including returning attention to a task, sustaining effort despite resistance, modulating minor impulses, and completing small obligations that might otherwise be deferred. The central claim is that these repeated regulatory acts constitute a distinct and temporally cumulative process through which behavioural patterns are stabilised and, over time, modified. Drawing on personality theory, self-regulation research, and related process-based approaches, the article develops a conceptual model explaining how such micro-regulatory processes bias the recurrence, persistence, and interruption of behavioural states, thereby contributing to trait stabilisation and trait change. By clarifying this intermediate process layer, the framework provides a more precise account of how local regulatory acts scale into durable patterns of behaviour. It further offers implications for understanding personality development, the maintenance of goal-directed behaviour, and the conditions under which intentional behavioural change succeeds or fails.

This paper argues that the most significant challenge artificial intelligence poses to theological anthropology is not ontological but epistemic. Rather than asking whether machines can think, feel, or bear the image of God, this paper redirects attention to the prior question of what happens to the human when core epistemic capacities, judgment, discernment, interpretive authority, and moral reasoning are progressively delegated to computational systems. Drawing on the concept of epistemic automation, understood as the systematic transfer of knowledge-producing functions from human agents to algorithmic processes, this paper develops a threefold analytical framework. First, it distinguishes epistemic authority from ontological status as the more productive locus for theological anthropological inquiry. Second, it introduces the distinction between fluency and understanding as an anthropological boundary condition that AI renders newly visible. Third, it analyses delegated cognition as a form of agency deformation with theological significance. The paper concludes that theological anthropology must move beyond reactive commentary on AI and instead generate a theory of the human under conditions of epistemic transformation. The argument engages constructively with philosophy of technology, social epistemology, and Christian theological traditions to offer a framework applicable across confessional boundaries.

Theological engagement with artificial intelligence has largely focused on applied ethics, addressing bias, governance, and labor displacement. While indispensable, this framing often presumes that algorithmic systems operate as external instruments acting upon already constituted subjects. This article argues that contemporary predictive architectures intervene at a deeper anthropological level by structuring attention, expectation, and habituation prior to deliberative judgment. It introduces the concept of ordo extractionis to designate a technologically mediated regime of formation characterized by behavioral trace extraction, probabilistic modeling, and recursive projection of statistically inferred continuity. Drawing on Augustine’s account of ordered love and temporality and Aquinas’s doctrine of habitus and the invisible mission of the Spirit, the article distinguishes algorithmic projection from sanctification as divergent pedagogies of temporal formation. Predictive systems stabilize continuity by extrapolating from measurable past behavior; sanctification reorders desire teleologically toward a final end not deducible from prior pattern and grounded in non-competitive divine causality. Algorithmic mediation is therefore interpreted pedagogically rather than metaphysically: it does not rival divine agency but participates creaturely in shaping the ecology within which habituation unfolds. Engagement with contemporary AI research on recommender systems, reinforcement learning, and generative models situates the argument within technological realism and resists determinism. The digital twin is analyzed as a probabilistic representation that acquires institutional authority when operationalized in ranking, profiling, and evaluative systems, without constituting a metaphysical competitor to the imago Dei. In response to anticipatory closure, Eucharistic anamnesis and epiclesis are developed as practices that re-situate memory and expectation within eschatological promise. The article concludes that the central theological question posed by AI is not whether machines can think, but how formative sovereignty over desire is exercised within technologically mediated modernity.

Contemporary debates about artificial intelligence governance often assume that the presence of human oversight preserves responsibility within algorithmic systems. This paper challenges that assumption by arguing that contemporary AI safety architectures increasingly reorganize decision-making in ways that dissolve the conditions under which responsibility can meaningfully arise. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s distinction between judgment, action, and bureaucratic administration, the paper develops the concept of post-agential governance to describe institutional regimes in which power operates through distributed optimization processes without identifiable agents publicly appearing as the authors of decisions. I argue that reinforcement learning systems, audit infrastructures, and contemporary safety protocols increasingly replace discrete acts of judgment with continuous probabilistic adjustment, producing what I call the diffuse void, a condition in which governance remains operative while responsibility becomes structurally unlocatable. The paper examines the philosophical implications of this transformation for responsibility, institutional accountability, and the future of human judgment under algorithmic governance.

Contemporary frameworks of algorithmic accountability typically assume that responsibility persists under conditions of sociotechnical complexity, even when it becomes opaque or distributed. This article builds on a recent argument that under optimization‑driven governance responsibility does not merely become hidden but fails to arise [14], and develops the institutional structure that argument requires. Drawing on an externalist reading of Arendt, I argue that minimal publicly attributable responsibility depends on three jointly necessary conditions: discreteness, authorship, and publicness. I then identify four mechanisms by which optimization‑driven systems erode them: iterative output generation, metric substitution, procedural diffusion, and temporal continuity. The four are derived from the three rather than enumerated as a parallel list. The framework is demonstrated through the Australian Robodebt scheme, a deterministic system in which automated welfare debt notices were issued without identifiable decisions, attributable authors, or contestable forums. A brief extension shows that the framework holds, and strengthens, when applied to probabilistic and generative architectures. The article closes with three concrete design principles, event‑marking, authorship preservation, and deliberative apertures, aimed at preserving the institutional form decisions must take if anyone is to answer for them.