•  36
    Good‐For and Good‐Simpliciter
    Philosophy Compass 21 (4). 2026.
    One fundamental question in value theory concerns the nature of final value: is having final value a matter of being good for someone¸ in the sense of benefiting them (also called prudential value), or is it a matter of being good-simpliciter (also called impersonal or Moorean value)? Or do both kinds of value exist—are some things good-for and others good-simpliciter? In this article, I present the terms of this debate and clarify its stakes and ambiguities before examining two families of argu…Read more
  •  180
    Symbolic value and the limits of good-for theory
    Noûs 59 (2): 542-563. 2024.
    Good-for theorists claim that to be valuable is to be good for someone, in the sense of being beneficial for them. Their opponents deny this, arguing that some things are good-simpliciter: good independently of being good for anyone. In this article I argue in favor of good-simpliciter. I appeal to the category of symbolically valuable acts, acts which seem valuable even when they do not benefit anyone and even when they are costly to the agent. I explore various strategies a good-for theorist m…Read more