Aaron James

Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is standardly assumed, by apologists and critics alike, to have offered a theory of what money is: a “means of exchange” whose raison d’etre is to ease the inconveniences of barter. The present discussion rejects this consensus. Read charitably, neither Smith’s origin story in Book I nor his account of “the great wheel of circulation” in Book II traffics in a theory of what money is. Rather, the Wealth of Nations offers no theory of the nature of money at all. What Smith presents, instead, is a functionalist story of a piece with David Hume’s empiricism, which does not make any claims about natures or essences. Smith’s reply to the mercantilist theory of money—that money is specie—is not a rival theory of money’s true nature, but rather a broad depiction of the various ways money brings “conveniency.”

Surfers both cooperate and compete around a scarce natural resource – ocean waves suited for surfing – often with a fraught mix of motives and feelings, pro-social and anti-social. Much as surfers constantly adapt to a dynamic wave environment, their pro- and anti-social motives readily mix and shift, based on their interpretation of quickly changing context. What we learn from surfers is something materialistic focus on self-interest and realities of scarcity or abundance might de-emphasize or miss: a culture of interpretation and reasoning (e.g. ‘localism’) is as important in the formation of shifting pro- and anti-social attitudes as the material reality of wave scarcity or abundance itself.

Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first‐order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assume constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assume that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation‐specific” and yet retain truth‐independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons.

This dissertation examines what is required for judgments about practical reasons to have the objectivity we ordinarily accord to them and which accounts of practical reasons can explain objectivity in this sense. ;In the first section of this dissertation, I assume that objectivity involves "independence from attitudes" but suggest that this can be explained in terms of the notion of invariance. In particular, the judgment that some consideration is a good reason is objectively true if, and only if, its truth is invariant with respect to any possible difference in attitudes. I explain how our ordinary aspiration to objectivity, so understood, extends beyond moral claims to prudential judgments, instrumental judgments, and even judgments in "matters of taste." Though our claim to objectivity is in this sense more radical than is commonly believed, it does not, contrary to received opinion, presuppose any idea of "metaphysical independence." It matters for objectivity that the truth of a practical judgment is invariant with respect to attitudes; but our claim to objectivity presupposes no particular explanation as to why this relation of invariance holds. ;In the second main section of this dissertation, I set out a constructivist account of practical reasons, namely: a judgment about reasons is true if and only if it is the judgment one would make provided excellent practical reasoning, in conditions ideal for practical reflection. Constructivism, so characterized, captures objectivity in the sense of invariance with respect to attitudes. But it does so, I claim, without collapsing into either conventionalism or Platonism. I distinguish constructivism from these other positions by articulating its core notion, the notion of a norm of practical reasoning. ;The third section of this dissertation argues that two forms of "naturalism" fail to capture objectivity in the sense that ordinarily matters to us. Dispositional theories of reasons, on the one hand, either tacitly assume the idea of a norm of practical reasoning or straightforwardly fail to capture objectivity. Expressivist accounts of practical judgment, on the other hand, trivialize our claim to objectivity

One of the more troubling developments in recent human history is the emergence of a single, nearly global system of intellectual property (IP). As I will explain, the usual moral arguments for IP—arguments from social utility, piracy, and natural or human rights—are clearly inadequate as justifications for the emerging global IP system. Indeed, the arguments are so weak that it is natural to conclude that the system should simply be abolished. I sympathize with this conclusion, but here defend a somewhat more modest policy prescription. If the system is not abolished, it should at least be eviscerated: developing countries should be exempted from international IP rules, by an unlimited grace period.

This paper seeks to deflate G. A. Cohen ’s recent meta-ethical argument that fundamental principles must be “fact-insensitive.” That argument does not advance Cohen ’s dispute with Rawls and other social contract theorists. There is attenuated sense of “factinsensitivity” which they can happily grant, which Cohen never rules out on specifically metaethical grounds. While his barrage of substantive arguments may retain independent force, the argument from fact-insensitivity is largely inconsequential

The practice-based method of justification requires sensitivity to social practices. This raises difficult questions: Must the practices in question be established or at least realistic? How “constructive” can we be in our interpretation of their form or aims? This paper suggests that our answers to these questions can vary with our explanatory purposes. Requirements of realism and sociological accuracy are relatively thin given purely intellectual aims of moral understanding, thicker given the aim of addressing humanity, and thicker still given the aim of justifying principles as normative for us , in our current world historical situation. I suggest that we have no reason to insist on one set of animating justice concerns to the exclusion of all the others, even as normative requirements rightly take center stage.

Financial crises are now commonplace in the global economy. It was not always so. For over two decades after World War II, under the Bretton Woods system of capital controls, financial crises were relatively rare.[1] Since the early 1970’s the number and frequency of financial crises (currency crises, banking crises, sovereign debt crises, or combinations thereof) increased dramatically, culminating in the enormously destructive global crisis of 2008-2009. (By one count, there were at least 124 banking crises between 1970 and 2008. During the postwar decades before 1970 the number is: two.[2]) What explains the post-1970 rise? The date suggests a natural explanation: capital liberalization. With the early 1970’s breakdown of Bretton Woods, governments increasingly removed controls on private capital movements across their borders. As capital flows dramatically increased, economically integrated countries became markedly more susceptible to financial crises as compared to the postwar years of careful controls. While each crisis has its own varying local causes, and leaves plenty of blame to go around, the general tendency for crises to become more numerous and more frequent is substantially (even if not wholly) explained by a major trend in government policy: the choice of governments to remove capital controls has created a global economic environment in which financial crises readily break out. It is difficult to overstate the profoundly consequential nature of this choice. More than most any adverse economic event—and import surge, downturn in the business cycle, a commodity price spike—financial crises cause severe and potentially irreparable harm on a large and even global scale. Developing countries from Argentina to Mexico to Japan to Malaysia have become familiar with crisis-induced ravages of high unemployment, reduced tax revenue, exploding public debt, and cuts in social services. The losses often fall to very poor people, though they would be significant for most anyone..

The paper suggests that the state is subject to assessment according to principles of social justice because state institutions or practices exercise forms of power over which no particular person has control. This rationale for assessment of social justice equally applies to legally optional or informal social practices. But it does not apply to individual conduct. Indeed, it follows that principles of social justice cannot provide a basis for the assessment and guidance of individual choice. The paper develops this practice-based conception of the subject of justice by rejoining G. A. Cohen's influential critique of Rawls’ focus on the “basic structure” of society.

Now more than ever it is clear that the global economy needs to be assessed and governed from a moral point of view. Such moral assessment can, however, come in at least two quite different forms. Political philosophers have tended to focus on a range of issues (e.g. poverty, human rights, or general distributive justice) whose basic moral importance is “external” to and wholly independent of how the global economy is socially organized. The result has been relative neglect of a quite different class of “internal” moral issues, which do in various ways depend on the complex legal and social relations that now organize the global economic scene. These include a dizzying array of politically important but poorly understood fairness concerns—concerns such as “non-discrimination,” “special and differential treatment,” “fair trade,” “fair play,” “fair competition,” “level playing fields,” “equitable growth,” “fair wages,” and “exploitation.” My aim in this discussion is to suggest a framework for understanding how several such fairness notions might be systematically connected and have an internal rather than external character. Specifically, I suggest that the content and internal nature of several such fairness notions can be explicated in terms of a more fundamental idea of “structural equity.” From the point of view of political philosophy, the issue turns on the sorts of principles that might ground moral assessment of the global economy. External principles are justified and apply quite independently of what the global economy and its social organization happens to be like. Humanitarian principles are a natural example: in asking whether or not the current global economy is set up so as to bring as many people as possible out of poverty, the assumed goal of poverty reduction can be seen as important and morally necessary quite independently of how the global economy is institutionally organized, and indeed independently of its very existence. Internal principles, by contrast, are not justified, and do not apply, independently of the global economy and its organizing institutions..

In matters of distributive justice, we assume that it is important how benefits and burdens are distributed among different people. But what, precisely, is important about this? In particular, what, from the point of view of justice, is ultimately at stake in what distributions come about? T. M. Scanlon has been coy about what his contractualist moral theory might imply for justice.[ii] Yet his conception of morality bears directly on this question of stakes. The significance of distribution then depends on independently valuable relations of recognition. Distribution has no fundamental importance per se. This in turn has significant implications for how philosophical reasoning about justice in distribution must proceed. In recent years, many egalitarians have proceeded as though a distribution can be just by its very nature, in and of itself. The basic aim of the theory of distributive justice is to say what this intrinsically just distribution is.[iii] What is ultimately at stake in matters of distributive justice, it is suggested, is whether or not a certain intrinsically valuable distributional pattern comes about. Scanlon ’s theory implies that this cannot be right: a distribution, taken as such, cannot be owed, and so cannot be justice. Or at least this follows given the platitude about justice, due to Aristotle, that justice is, by nature, giving each his or her due.[iv] The platitude tells us that to distribute justly is simply to give to each individual what he or she is due or owed, as determined by an independent conception of what this is. According to Scanlon ’s independent conception of “what we owe to each other,” no individual can be owed a distribution across persons, as such. We are at most each owed our respective shares—only what we can reasonably ask for on our own behalf.

This paper suggests that “systemic risk” has a distinctive kind of moral significance. Two intuitive data points need to be explained. The first is that the systematic imposition of risk can be wrongful or unjust in and of itself, even if harm never ensues. The second is that, even so, there may be no one in particular to blame. We can explain both ideas in terms of what I call responsibilities of “Collective Due Care.” Collective Due Care arguably precludes purely aggregative cost-benefit decision-making and requires one kind of “precautionary” attitude in public choice.

There is much in Thomas Hobbes’s political theory that contemporary political philosophy cannot readily accept—including Hobbes’s egoism, his unconditional right of self-defense, and his insistence that peace is only possible under absolute sovereign rule.[1] Nevertheless, we can and should embrace one of Hobbes’s central insights: that problems of assurance are of fundamental importance for questions of social justice, even, or especially, justice questions of global scale. In general, agents face normatively significant problems of assurance because they have imperfect knowledge about the conduct of others and must therefore weigh consequent risks of action. Practically speaking, the basic human device for their resolution is for agents to form “agreements”—promises, conventions, social practices, or institutions—that reduce uncertainty and thus “assure” the parties involved. None of this necessarily bears on basic principles of morality or justice, at least not without further argument.[2] Hobbes’s dramatic assurance problem—the state of nature—makes this further step. It shows vividly how agreement-making may be not simply a useful device but a condition for the applicability of basic principles. In the absence of an agreed upon common power to assure compliance, Hobbes explains, basic principles of conduct—including considerations of justice and injustice—are simply out of place. The resulting uncertainty about what others will do in the name of self-preservation gives us sweeping liberty to defend ourselves. Contemporary political philosophy is concerned with substantive political morality and “ideal theory,” so it may seem that Hobbes’s problem of assurance—a matter of amoral selfpreservation—can simply be set aside. This is to underestimate the depth of Hobbes’s insight. As I will explain, assurance problems can take specifically moral forms, arising even among morally motivated agents, in a way which bears on the very applicability of fundamental moral principles. In central cases of normative political philosophy, justification of basic principles, even in “ideal theory,” must be tailored to the circumstances that give rise to assurance problems and the available human means for their resolution..

Familiar questions about whether or how far to impose risks of harm for social benefit present a fundamental dilemma for contractualist moral theories. If contractualism allows objections by considering actual outcomes, it becomes difficult to justify the risks created by most public policy, leaving contractualism at odds with moral commonsense in much the way utilitarianism is. But if contractualism instead takes a fully form by considering only expected outcomes, it becomes unclear how it recommends something other than aggregative cost-benefit decision-making. Focusing on T.M. Scanlon's version, this paper develops this basic choice of interpretation and recommends the ex ante version. The paper explains how contractualism is inconsistent with John Harsanyibad aggregationgood aggregation” that is both unavoidable and fully appropriate in public life

Michael Ruse‘s Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails moral nihilism. However, I argue here that people generally have justified true beliefs about which acts promote their most coherent set of moral values, and hence, by definition, about which acts are right. What the evolutionary story explains is the existence of these values, but it is not an error theory for moral beliefs. Ordinary beliefs correspond to real moral properties, though these are not objective or absolute properties independent of anyone‘s subjective states. On its best footing, therefore, a Darwinian metaethics of the type Ruse offers is not an error theory and does not entail moral nihilism.

This paper develops John Rawls’s famous objection to the system of natural liberty as against the contemporary system of international trade. Even as “dynamic” policies have proven successful in several recent development success stories, the current system enforces a “static,” laissez-faire system of comparative advantage that threatens to consign poorly-endowed countries to a low-productivity, low-income destiny in agriculture and raw materials. I discuss two very different fairness arguments in favor of allowing and encouraging “dynamic,” pro-development polices: an argument from “structural equity” and an argument from “equity of fortune.” I suggest that the former is of more central importance, and that the difference between the two kinds of fairness argument shows why Rawls’s original objection to the system of natural liberty does not imply “luck egalitarianism.”

To what extent should those of us concerned with justice in the global economy worry about exploitation? As I understand it, this question is in part a question about fairness and where, if at all, it applies. On one plausible view, exploitation, in the most basic, morally problematic sense, arises in bargaining situations: one party exploits another party when and only when it uses its superior bargaining position to win terms favorable to it in the agreement being made between them. (The resulting unfair agreement can also be said to be exploitative, in a secondary sense, if it resulted, or could only have resulted, from a wrongfully exploitative bargaining process.) What distinguishes morally problematic exploitation from morally innocent ways of “taking advantage of an opportunity” (e.g., sitting outside on a fine day) is certain fairness expectations: the exploiting party uses its superior bargaining position to get the other to accept an unfair agreement, in breach of an obligation to instead offer and negotiate toward fair terms. Regardless of what is fair, the party with the upper hand doesn’t budge.